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I believe very strongly…that no one could ever deserve to suffer. Of the people in whose 
moral judgment I have the most confidence, some disagree. When some wrong-doers 
suffer, these people believe, this suffering is in itself good, or at least not in itself bad. 
Though this belief seems to me mistaken, I would be greatly relieved if I could explain 
why these people are making this mistake. This may be one of the cases in which an 
evolutionary explanation helps to undermine what it explains. This retributive belief may 
seem to justify certain natural reactive attitudes, such as an angry desire to hurt or the 
withdrawal of good will. These attitudes are like some simpler emotions that are had by 
the animals that are most like us. If evolution can explain why many people have these 
reactive attitudes, that might give some support to the view that these attitudes, and the 
widely held belief that such attitudes are justified, are not responses to reasons. 
 -Derek Parfit (2011) 
 2 
Introduction: Circumscribing the Phenomena 
Punishment, whether institutional (e.g. by governments) or interpersonal (e.g. by 
parents) usually involves the imposition of hard treatment on the punishee. These hard 
treatments can include the curtailment of certain liberties, such as freedom of movement 
and association, as well as privacy. Prima facie, people have rights to these liberties. 
Moreover, hard treatments expend resources and cause suffering. Given its costs and its 
curtailment of liberties, it is no wonder that philosophers and legal theorists have spilled 
a great deal of ink developing justifications for punishment.  
Two positive considerations are usually given as justification for punishment (as 
opposed to negative considerations that constrain or limit punishment). 
Consequentialist considerations are forward-looking or prospective in nature, appealing 
to the good outcomes that will result from punishing a transgressor, outcomes like 
general deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation. The other kind of consideration is 
retributive, appealing to what a transgressor deserves given their transgression.1 These 
retributive considerations have weight only if the punishment of transgressors has some 
positive value aside from its consequences.2 
Retributive considerations for punishment have considerable intuitive appeal (as 
I demonstrate below), and they factor strongly into justifications (popular or otherwise) 
                                               
1 There are other considerations relevant to punishment that do not fall under either of these headings. For 
instance, one might have a right to make threats against those who might violate one’s rights, and the right 
to punish might follow from this right to threaten (Quinn 1985). This kind of justification is not of interest 
to me here. Note however, that to the punishee, even this justification will seem retributive in this sense, it 
“…is a deprivation inflicted on someone found guilty [of violating a right], and not on anyone else, and it is 
imposed solely because of that finding.” (Bedau and Kelly 2003) In this sense, the procedural justification 
of punishment warranted by this theoretical justification comports with the retributive motive that I 
characterize below. 
2 This positive retributive consideration is often contrasted with the negative retributive consideration (also 
contrary to straightforward consequentialist evaluations of action) that the innocent should not be punished. 
I mention this possibility only to point out that negative considerations are not my focus here. Rather, my 
focus is on the motivation to punish the deserving (e.g. anger), which I suspect to be distinct from the 
motivation to avoid punishing the guilty (e.g. anticipated guilt or regret). Henceforth, I will use “retributive 
considerations” and “retributive reasons” to refer to only to positive retributive considerations in favor of 
punishment. 
 3 
for harsh treatments such as incarceration and capital punishment (see e.g. Moore 2010; 
Pojman 2005). Thus, there is good reason to evaluate this kind of justification for 
punishment, to see what role, if any it ought to play in reasoning about punishment. One 
way of supporting retributive considerations is to appeal to widespread retributive 
intuitions. One purpose of this dissertation is to undermine these intuitions as evidence 
in support of retributive considerations. 
 Doing this requires more clarity about retributive considerations. Insofar as 
retributive considerations can lead agents to choose punishment over a range of 
alternatives, it makes sense to think of retribution as a motive for action. In this 
introductory chapter, I characterize the structure of this motive. Thus, in the first section 
I review some of the philosophical issues surrounding retribution, both clarifying the 
relevant concept of retribution and pointing out the philosophical import of the question 
on which I focus: why are humans motivated to punish even apart from the good 
consequences that punishment can bring about? In the second section, I review some of 
the psychological work surrounding punishment, highlighting its connection with anger 
and outrage and pointing out a plausible role for anger in motivating retributive 
punishment. In the third section, I say more about what anger is by describing some 
well-established components of the anger syndrome and describing the most prominent 
cluster of strategies for explaining these phenomena, basic emotion theory. In the final 
section, I summarize the chapters to come and their role in explaining and evaluating the 
retributive motive. 
1. From retributive considerations to retributive motives 
First, retributive considerations favor punishment, which immediately raises the 
question of what punishment is. Here, I am concerned specifically with moral 
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punishment, which has three important features (cf. Walen 2014) for my purposes.3 First, 
punishment involves the imposition of a cost, usually in the form of hard treatment. 
Second, punishment is intentional. If I impose a cost on someone by accident or as an 
unintended (but perhaps foreseen) side effect of some other action, that cost is not easily 
understood as a punishment. Third, punishment is a response to wrongdoing. If 
someone imposes a cost on someone even though one believes him or her to be innocent 
of wrongdoing, such action does not fit well with other instances of punishment.4 5 
So then, how do consequentialist and retributive considerations justify the 
imposition of hard treatment in response to wrongdoing? On one understanding, a 
consequentialist evaluation of action (as right or wrong) “…depends only on [the 
action’s] consequences (as opposed to the circumstances or the intrinsic nature of the act 
or anything that happens before the act).” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2003) In other words, a 
consequentialist justification for punishment will refer to the ability (or likelihood) of 
punishment to bring about good or valuable outcomes. The good outcomes that justify 
punishment might vary (e.g. restraint or rehabilitation of the offender, deterrence of 
crime) along with the set of values in terms of which outcomes are evaluated (e.g. 
pleasure, pain, satisifed preferences, or even virtue and vice). Insofar as punishment 
brings about a better outcome than alternatives (as determined by the amount of value 
assigned to the outcome), there is a reason to punish. From a psychological perspective, 
                                               
3 These criteria have the flavor of a definition. Nevertheless, I do not think of these criteria as a definition 
or as necessary and sufficient conditions for an act to answer to the concept of punishment. Rather, these 
criteria are helpful in roughly circumscribing the phenomenon of punishment, which is properly understood 
as a unified phenomenon because all of its instances share common explanatory elements. 
4 Many legal philosophers follow Feinberg (1970) in claiming that punishment is distinct from other 
penalties (e.g. fees for parking violations) in that it has the function of condemning the wrongs that it 
penalizes. For my purposes, the third criterion, that punishment is a response to wrongdoing, distinguishes 
punishment from other penalties, so long as wrongdoing is understood in terms of mala in se offenses 
(offenses that are prohibited because they are morally wrong or objectively offensive) rather than mala 
prohibita offenses (mere offenses against what the law prohibits for other reasons). 
5 In chapter 4, I give a behavioral definition of punishment for the purposes of identifying a specific 
strategy for social interaction, and I argue that retributive motives are an adaptation for bringing about that 
behavioral strategy. While I believe there is an important connection between moral punishment and 
punishment as a behavioral strategy, it is important to keep these notions distinct. 
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people are moved by consequentialist motives when their actions are instrumental for 
bringing about good outcomes. 
The forward-looking focus of consequentialism (on future outcomes) contrasts 
with the backward-looking focus of retributivism: giving the offender what she deserves 
given the nature of the past offense. This contrast captures a central bone of contention 
that divides two traditional ethical theories: the relevance of desert for evaluating states 
of affairs. A central tenet of the Kantian tradition is that each person should have 
happiness in accordance with their virtue, presumably because happiness is what the 
virtuous deserve. By contrast, the purest kind of (hedonistic) utilitarianism (the 
forerunner of contemporary consequentialist theories) holds that an action is morally 
justified only if it leads to the best outcome, defined by the sum total of happiness for 
everyone and even if happiness is distributed broadly among the vicious or scarcely 
among the virtuous. 
Retributive justifications for punishment are squarely within the Kantian 
tradition. They focusing on which punishment is appropriate given the wrongdoing that 
one committed. Moreover, this sense of appropriateness is usually understood in terms 
of desert. In one sense, this motive to punish is deeply mysterious: “[it] appears to be a 
mysterious piece of moral alchemy in which the combination of the two evils of moral 
wickedness and suffering are transmuted into good.” (Hart 1967, 234–235) Part of the 
mystery here lies in the assumption that suffering is what retributive punishment aims at 
or that suffering is the object of desert (what a person deserves for wrongdoing). 
Nevertheless, even if one assumes that what an offender deserves for wrongdoing is hard 
treatment (regardless of whether this leads to suffering) there remain intractable 
questions about why a person’s wrongdoing makes it appropriate to impose hard 
treatment.  
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Several answers to this question have been attempted. Some are based on 
rectifying the advantages that people gain from acting wrongly, advantages that are not 
deserved (Morris 1968). Others are based on communicating censure or moral 
condemnation for wrongdoing, whether or not this communication has a good outcome 
(e.g. Duff 2001). Still others focus on vindicating the moral status of victims, which is 
compromised by wrongdoing (Hampton 1992). This vindication is thought of as an 
appropriate response to wrongdoing, independently of whether it brings about any 
future benefits.  
While all of the justifications above are retributive in nature, there are also 
consequentialist justifications for giving offenders what they deserve. For instance, if we 
want to construct a practice of punishment that deters would-be transgressors, the best 
way to do this might be to make would-be criminals believe that we will punish them in 
reaction to their culpable wrongdoing and not only when the punishment would have 
favorable consequences. This way, they will not be able to bargain their way out of 
punishment by doing something that would make it more profitable or beneficial for us 
not to punish them.6 Nor would they be able to choose a fortuitous transgression for 
which the deterrent benefit would exceed the cost of prosecution and punishment. It is 
difficult to think of a better way to deter premeditated wrongdoing than to make a public 
commitment to punish primarily based on culpable wrongdoing rather than on the 
consequences punishment will actually have in a given instance. 
Nevertheless, as a psychological phenomenon, retributive motives do not depend 
on any of these justifications. The motives themselves preexist any attempts by 
philosophers justify them or to make them intelligible. 7  Moreover, there remains a 
strong feeling that wrongdoers deserve to be punished whether or not one accepts any of 
                                               
6 As an example, Jason Beckman offered $19 million for leniency before being sentenced for a Ponzi 
scheme: http://www.startribune.com/local/183100491.html 
7 For an interesting historical explanation of how these motives became enshrined in western law, see the 
final chapter of Daly and Wilson (1988). 
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these justifications. Let us accept for a moment the consequentialist justification for a 
retributive practice of punishment (as expressed in the previous paragraph). We can 
imagine a case in which a murderer is publicly convicted of his crimes, and given the 
death penalty (let us suppose that this is the best deterrent for murder). Nevertheless, in 
this case, a merciful government official fakes the execution. Moved by the official’s 
mercy, the murderer finds herself completely morally reformed and becomes incapable 
of committing another murder. She assumes another identity and lives a prosperous life. 
So long as the truth were secure from detection, all the good outcomes of punishment 
would have been achieved in this case (e.g. general deterrence, rehabilitation, prevention 
of future crimes by the offender). Nevertheless, many will find it galling to imagine the 
murderer getting away with her crime.  
No matter how compelling one finds consequentialist justifications of 
punishment, and no matter how confident one is that the good outcomes of punishment 
are secured by other means, there is still an obstinate feeling that it is wrong to let the 
guilty go unpunished. I believe that the same feeling will tend to persist regardless of 
how compelling one finds other prominent attempts to justify it or to make it intelligible. 
For my purposes, the point is twofold. There is an interesting phenomenon to explain 
and a psychological motive to evaluate even aside from the patterns of reasoning that 
philosophers use to support retributive reasons to punish. 
From a psychological perspective, the most straightforward way to characterize 
the motive is not the patterns of reasoning that support it, but rather the patterns of 
action for which it is responsible. If one is moved by retributive motives, then there are 
cases in which one would punish, or report that punishment is fitting, even though one 
knows that punishment would not bring about any future benefit. Moreover, retributive 
motives explain this pattern, because they place value on punishment as appropriate, 
fitting, or deserved (however these notions happen to be fleshed out or rationally 
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supported) in response to past wrongdoing (rather than because of its future 
consequences).  
Importantly, the distinction I have drawn between retributive and 
consequentialist considerations is not captured by a key difference between 
consequentialist moral theories and duty-based, or deontological, theories. For some 
philosophers (R. Nozick 1974; Scheffler 1994), what distinguishes deontological theories 
is the acceptance of constraints on action that limit the permissibility of bringing about 
good outcomes or the obligation to do so. To accept such constraints is to deny one 
central consequentialist commitment: that it is morally right (perhaps even required) to 
bring about the better outcome. On my usage, retributivist considerations need not be 
subject to such constraints. For instance, someone can accept that the better outcome is 
the one in which the greater number of guilty offenders is punished and choose to bring 
about that outcome even if it would require withholding deserved punishment from a 
smaller number of equally guilty offenders.8 More concretely, I could accept that there 
are retributive reasons to punish Maria for her crime, but nonetheless forego punishing 
Maria in order to punish Sally and Rebecca for their crimes (also for retributive reasons). 
In other words, accepting retributive reasons for punishment does not entail that one is 
obligated to punish the guilty whenever it is in one’s power to do so or independently of 
the consequences of not punishing (for an alternative view, see Berman 2011).9  
                                               
8 Essentially, I am saying that a thoroughgoing retributivist need find nothing wrong with the practice of 
pleabargaining. 
9 As a further clarification, retributive considerations may sometimes violate the central tenet of 
consequentialism (that one is permitted or required to bring about the better outcome), but they need not do 
so as a matter of definition. For instance, by punishing a transgressor as they deserve I might diminish the 
amount of happiness in the world by making the transgressor less happy and without making anyone else 
any more happy. Now suppose I believe that I ought to try and promote happiness, but also that retribution 
is required of me in this case. I can consistently hold both of these beliefs if I also accept that the pursuit of 
retribution constrains the permissibility of bringing about the better outcome (e.g. in which the transgressor 
is more happy rather than less). By contrast, I might adopt a more pluralistic theory of value according to 
which retributive justice is itself a value worth promoting. On this kind of view, a world in which the 
transgressor is punished could be a better world than one in which she is not, even after factoring in her 
diminished happiness. In that case, to enact retribution is consistent with believing that it is always 
 9 
In sum, the psychological entity that I am interested in explaining and evaluating 
is the retributive motive. It is a motive to impose hard treatment in response to 
wrongdoing. It is best captured by the pattern of actions it produces: punishment (or 
punishment of a certain kind or severity) when it will obtain no future benefit (or less 
future benefit than an alternative punishment). It produces those patterns of action 
because it causes people to find punishment fitting (in some sense) as a response to past 
wrongdoing (where fittingness is understood independently of the consequences that 
punishment brings about). Like duty-based ethical theories in the tradition of Kant, the 
focus of retributive reasons on the past is often understood in terms of desert. Unlike 
some contemporary expressions of duty based theories, it does not, by definition, include 
any constraint on bringing about good consequences. 
2. The Phenomena of Punishment and Retribution 
 Fortunately, there is a wealth of studies in psychology and in behavioral 
economics relevant to retributive motives for punishment. Here I review some of this 
work. Importantly, this work suggests that anger influences many peoples’ judgments 
and actions concerning punishment, and may be responsible for the retributive bent of 
those judgments.10  
                                                                                                                                            
permissible to bring about the better outcome.  From both perspectives, the act of punishment is naturally 
understood as retribution, yet only on one of these perspectives does the justifiability of retribution require 
setting limits on my pursuit of the best outcome. While in the latter case the decision to punish might seem 
to have a purely consequentialist justification, the judgment actually has a non-consequentialist dimension. 
The world may be a better place because I punished the transgressor, but it is not a better place only 
because of the consequences of my action. This is because on my view “consequence” is understood in 
isolation from what happened before the act of punishment (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong above). So long as 
consequences are understood in this way, the difference between a world in which the transgressor is 
punished and one in which she is not cannot only be a difference in the consequences of my action, but also 
in their relation to what came before my action (the transgression). Moreover, one cannot understand the 
stated justification for punishment in isolation from what came before the act. Thus, one cannot understand 
this justification solely in terms of consequentialist reasons for punishment. 
10 There are other emotions aside from anger that might influence the development of retributive intuitions. 
For instance, when we consider the perspective of a transgressor, we are sometimes overcome with the 
guilt that he or she must feel. We can easily imagine that some transgressors would feel guilt or remorse 
even if they had not been caught. It will not always assuage a transgressor’s guilt to convince herself that 
the overall outcome will be better if she is not punished. This is just to say that sometimes, transgressors are 
in agreement with their victims that they deserve to suffer and that their suffering would be good in and of 
 10 
One line of evidence concerns the severity of punishment that people assign to 
offenders when considering various scenarios. This research licenses some inferences 
about which aspects of scenarios influence the severity of punishment assigned. There 
two key predictions that one can make about peoples’ punishment decisions based on the 
contribution of consequentialist and retributive motives to punish. First, if punishment 
decisions are influenced by retributive motives, then the severity of punishment will 
change in response to factors that influence desert (e.g. culpability, seriousness of crime). 
Second, if punishment decisions are influenced by consequentialist motives, then the 
severity of punishment will change in response to changes in the consequences of 
punishment (e.g. its deterrent value and its foreseeable side effects). For instance, 
probability of detection determines the severity of punishment required to achieve a 
certain level of deterrence. So if someone’s punishment judgments are motivated by the 
aim of deterrence, then the severity of punishment should increase as the probability of 
detection decreases.  
This prediction has not born out. Over the course of nine studies, Baron and Ritov 
(2009) asked both judges and internet participants to assign penalties for various crimes 
and also had them rate the seriousness of the crime and their anger at the crime (in some 
of the experiments). In almost every case, the seriousness of the crime or anger in 
response to it were much better predictors of the severity of punishment than the 
probability of detection for the crime. Only a few participants’ severity assignments 
tracked the probability of detection. Moreover, only when probability of detection was 
highly salient did it influence severity of punishment in the direction predicted by 
consequentialist motives. Contrary to their predictions, Baron and Ritov found that even 
when participants took on a policy-making perspective as opposed to making judgments 
                                                                                                                                            
itself. This belief is a product of their guilt, but I suspect that the evolutionary history of guilt has been 
shaped by its relationship to anger, such that the natural history of anger will end up explaining why guilt 
also lends itself to this intuition (see DeScioli and Kurzban 2009). 
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about a specific violation (e.g. “This item is about how future offenses should be 
penalized” as opposed to “about an offense already committed.”, p. 572), lower 
probability of detection did not lead to increased severity of punishment. 
Carlsmith (2008) explored the influence on punishment of a wider range of 
consequentialist considerations (e.g. “the publicity of the crime and subsequent 
punishment, the frequency of the crime, the likelihood of similar crimes in the future, the 
likelihood of detecting the crime, and the likelihood of catching the perpetrator.” 
Carlsmith, 2008, p.124) and retributive considerations (e.g. “the severity of the harm, 
the moral offensiveness of the behavior, the intent behind the action, the 
blameworthiness of the offender, and whether or not the offender was acting in a 
responsible manner.” Carlsmith, 2008, p.123-124). As a partial replication of previous 
work with colleagues (Darley, Carlsmith, and Robinson 2000; K. M. Carlsmith, Darley, 
and Robinson 2002b), he found that consequentialist considerations were poor 
predictors of peoples’ actual sentencing decisions, whereas retributive considerations 
were strong predictors. Even though peoples’ stated motives for punishment usually 
focused on deterrence, these reports did not correlate at all with peoples’ actual decisions.  
In another study, Carlsmith (2006) investigated peoples’ decision making 
process by allowing participants to selectively and sequentially access different 
information about a given criminal offense, probing for severity of sentence and 
confidence in sentence after each selection. Some of the information concerned 
retributive considerations (i.e. “Magnitude of harm”, “Perpetrator intent”, “Extenuating 
circumstances”). Other information had more to do with consequentialist considerations 
(i.e. “Likelihood of violence”, “Prior record”, “Self-control”, “General frequency”, 
“Detection rate”, “Publicity”). The key result was that people frequently chose to access 
information relevant to retribution prior to accessing information relevant to 
incapacitation or general deterrence. Moreover, Carlsmith reported that “…retribution 
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information improved confidence more than did incapacitation information.” (K. M. 
Carlsmith 2006, 446)  
Some of these studies (including Baron and Ritov 2009) indicate that anger is 
connected to retributive judgments. For instance, Carlsmith et al (2002a) found that in 
response to vignettes about punishment, moral outrage ratings were a strong predictor 
of punishment and mediated the influence of retributive considerations (i.e. absence of 
mitigating factors and seriousness of offense) on those judgments. 
Importantly, none of these studies manipulated anger to measure its effects on 
punishment judgments. However, others (J. S Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock 1998; 
Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1999) have done just that. In one of these experiments (J. 
S Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock 1998), one set of participants, the anger induction group, 
watch a video depicting a bully and an accomplice who assault and humiliate a teenager. 
Another set of participants, the control group, watched a video of abstract colors and 
shapes with negligible emotional content. Afterwards, participants read vignettes 
describing hypothetical harms to the participant and rated the degree to which the 
perpetrators ought to be punished. The punishment ratings of the anger induction group 
were higher than controls, demonstrating that incidental anger leaks into judgments 
about punishment. 
A more direct source of evidence about the influence of (non-incidental) anger 
comes from experiments on the ultimatum game (UG). In this game, one player, the 
proposer, receives a sum of money and is instructed to choose how much of it to share 
with another player, the receiver. The receiver then has the option of accepting or 
rejecting the offer. If she accepts, then both players get the portion of money assigned by 
the proposer. If she rejects, then neither player gets any money. Prima facie, peoples’ 
performance on one-shot UGs looks retributive. Low offers (e.g. $2 out of $10) are 
frequently rejected, even when people are playing with real money. Thus, receivers 
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frequently impose costs on proposers, even though (due to fact that the interaction is not 
repeated) there appears to be no visible benefit. This is just what we might predict if 
receivers have a retributive motive for rejecting low offers.  
Of course, appearances can be misleading. From this crude behavioral 
description of the rejection, we cannot infer much about the receiver’s motivation for 
rejecting the offer. Perhaps receivers want to enforce fairness norms that might benefit 
many people in the long run. Likewise, this behavioral description of the receiver’s 
rejection does not yet fit with the description of punishment above, because it is unclear 
whether the receiver interprets the proposer’s behavior as wrongdoing.  
Fortunately, there is an abundance of data on the UG to resolve these ambiguities. 
Receivers do judge low offers to be unfair (e.g. Pillutla and Murnighan 1996), and as such, 
this is good reason to suppose that they believe the proposer acted wrongly (by acting 
unfairly). While their unfairness ratings tend to correlate strongly with rejections, 
unfairness ratings do not entirely explain rejections. For instance, rejections of unfair 
offers are correlated with activation of the anterior insula (as measured by changes in 
BOLD signal detected via fMRI), an area of the brain associated with anger and disgust 
(Sanfey et al. 2003). Additionally, UG participants more frequently reject low offers if 
anger is induced (e.g. by journaling about an angering event in their past) prior to 
playing the UG (Srivastava and Espinoza 2009). In some of these anger induction 
experiments, participants are alerted to their emotional state and instructed to make 
sure that induced anger does not influence their performance on the UG. In these 
experiments, the rejection of unfair offers goes down even though their judgments of 
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unfairness remain relatively constant. So anger seems to motivate rejections of low offers 
over and above the mere judgment that low offers are unfair.11 
Of course, these results still only deal with incidental anger. In another study 
(Fabiansson and Denson 2012), participants were angered by a confederate who 
criticized a speech that they had just given. These participants then participated in 
several one-shot, computerized UGs with the speech counterpart and two other players 
(the offers in the game were actually automated, and a photograph of the “other player” 
was shown during play). Participants were more likely to reject unfair offers from the 
person who criticized their speech than from the two other fictitious players. The 
difference in rejection rate is not easily explained without referring to anger directed at 
the speech counterpart, nor is it easily explained by referring to any future outcome that 
participants hoped to bring about.12 Rather, the clearest explanation is that participants 
were angry at the speech counterpart, and this anger made them more likely to reject 
offers from the speech counterpart, regardless of whether this would bring about a future 
benefit. 
 At this point, two related worries arise. First, one might point out that people also 
make cold and detached judgments concerning punishment. This raises a question of 
how anger can influence punishment judgments even when people are not in the 
immediate grip of anger. I do not want to deny the possibility of cold punishment 
judgments. Nevertheless, even in the questionnaire studies above in which participants 
approach vignettes impartially, they still report feelings of (or perhaps dispositions 
toward) anger or moral outrage at offenses, and it looks like these feeling inform their 
judgments about punishment. I say more about this below.  
                                               
11 Moreover, it is not just the negative valence of anger that influences rejection. When sadness is induced 
and participants are instructed to ignore their sadness, their rejection of low offers does not diminish 
(Srivastava and Espinoza 2009, 485). 
12 It is not inconceivable that participants wanted to deter the speech counterpart from insulting others, but 
to me it seems much more likely that the motive was retributive. 
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Second, some will think that, due to the influence of anger, this behavior in the 
UG is more like revenge than retribution, concepts which many philosophers keep 
separate. According to Nozick, “Revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure at 
the suffering of another, while retribution either need involve no emotional tone or 
involves another one, namely pleasure at justice being done.” (Robert Nozick 1981, 367) 
Nevertheless, as Zaibert (2006) argues in detail, this supposed difference between 
punishment and revenge is not only sorely under-defended, but also highly implausible. 
To see the implausibility, one need only imagine the archetypal Godfather Don calling in 
a hit on someone who has just left his office. We can imagine him having exactly the 
degree of emotional detachment as a judge pronouncing the death sentence on a 
convicted murderer. By contrast, we can also easily imagine the judge sentencing, or 
perhaps the executioner punishing, with all the maniacal fury of a McCoy avenging 
herself on a Hatfield. In this case, one need not think that the judge or the executioner 
are really acting as avengers rather than punishers.  
More importantly, it is empirically false that retribution has no emotional tone. 
The high association between reports of anger or moral outrage at an offense seems to 
indicate that even when approaching criminal offenses impartially (as in the 
questionnaire studies above), there is usually some emotional tone or disposition toward 
the wrongdoer. Moreover, in one experiment, the degree of activation in brain regions 
associated with emotion (e.g. the amygdala) varied in proportion to the severity of 
punishment that subjects assign in response to vignettes describing criminal behavior 
(Buckholtz et al. 2008). Thus some emotional processing may influence punishment 
judgments even when those judgments are made from an impartial standpoint. 
Additionally, reported emotional states are not restricted to the UG or to the 
questionnaire studies reviewed above. Consider, for instance, a modification of the UG, 
called the dictator game (DG). In this version of the game, the receiver just passively 
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receives the offer of the proposer (the “dictator”) and has no option to accept or reject 
the offer. Nevertheless, when a third party is added to this scenario and given the option 
of deducting points from the dictator at a cost to herself (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher 
2004), we can observe actions that fit more readily into the phenomenon of punishment. 
This is because costs are imposed in response to an action that is judged unfair from an 
impartial standpoint (which seems to be the paradigmatic case for many philosophers 
and legal scholars). Even in this case, the third party reports anger in response to the 
dictator’s offer. Moreover, reported anger predicts punishment and mediates the 
influence of retributive considerations, such as the dictator’s culpability for low offers 
(Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009). The point is that reports of outrage and anger don’t just 
accompany judgments that someone deserves punishment, nor do they only accompany 
punishment behaviors that resemble revenge (as in the UG), but they also accompany 
behaviors that are imposed from an impartial perspective (and sometimes at a cost to the 
punisher). Henceforth, I will call these behaviors impersonal punishment as opposed to 
the more personal form of punishment observed in the UG.13 
 There probably are interesting psychological differences between impersonal 
cases of punishment and the kind of “hot” punishment that one finds in the UG. 
Nevertheless, in the remainder of this section, I argue that the difference between these 
phenomena is not that one of them lacks any influence from anger. Rather the difference 
resides in the nature of the influence that anger exerts over these distinct phenomena.  
Consider some affective differences between impersonal punishment and 
personal punishment (for instance, in the UG). In one experiement, van t’ Wout and 
colleagues (2006) found that when their participants played the UG (as the receiver and 
ostensibly against other humans) their skin conductance activity (a measure of affective 
response) was higher for lower offers and was correlated with rejections. However, when 
                                               
13 Usually, this kind of punishment is referred to as “third party punishment”.  
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people played the UG with a computer, neither relationship was observed. Similarly, 
Civai et al had participants play the UG (also as the receiver) both for their own 
monetary gain (the myself condition) and then on behalf of a third party (the third party 
condition). While rejection rates were very similar between the two tasks, rejection of 
offers was only accompanied by differences in skin conductance in the myself condition. 
No significant difference was found between rejection and acceptance of offers in the 
third party condition, presumably because low offers did not affect the participant’s pay 
out.  
Other studies suggest that, regardless of what participants report, anger and 
outrage are probably not experienced in conjunction with impersonal punishment. For 
instance, psychologist have yet to identify any cases in which outrage is elicited by the 
fact that someone violated a moral norm, as opposed to the fact that the violation 
harmed the subject or someone she cares about (Batson et al. 2007; Batson, Chao, and 
Givens 2009). At the very least, the difference in skin conductance between personal and 
impersonal punishment suggests that emotional arousal is lower for impersonal 
punishment. This might tempt someone to think that personal and impersonal 
punishment are distinct phenomena and that only impersonal punishment is influenced 
by anger. The latter inference does not cohere well with the data presented above. If 
anger does not influence impersonal punishment in some way, then it is difficult to 
account for reports of anger and outrage in conjunction with punishment judgments in 
questionnaire studies or punishment behaviors in economic games.  
Moreover, there are interesting neurological and genetic connections between the 
phenomena of impersonal punishment and personal punishment that should be 
accounted for. For instance Strobel and colleagues (Strobel et al. 2011) analyzed brain 
activation of participants who engaged in both an impersonal punishment task (as a 
third party in the DG) and in a personal punishment task (similar to the UG). Activation 
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in the nucleus accumbens and nucleus caudatus (brain regions associated with reward) 
differed significantly depending on whether the participant punished or not (as did other 
brain regions associated with emotion, e.g. the amygdala). Moreover, the difference was 
observed in both the impersonal and personal punishment tasks (though there was a 
difference in the magnitude of activation between personal and impersonal punishment). 
This suggests that the motivation to punish may be similar across impersonal and 
personal punishment.  
Strobel and colleagues also found genotype-specific differences in brain 
activation based on the contrast between punishment and non-punishment (across the 
impersonal and personal punishment tasks). That is, a specific allele for a gene 
controlling dopamine turnover predicted the difference in activation in several regions 
(including the nucleus accumbens and the amygdala) between punishment and non-
punishment, regardless of whether punishment was impersonal or personal.  
While the data is suggestive, I suspect that it is too soon to say with any 
confidence what the similarities and differences are between impersonal and personal 
punishment in economic games (and elsewhere if these results can be generalized). 
However, I suspect that anger influences the development of impersonal punishment, 
even if anger is not manifested or experienced during impersonal punishment. 
Specifically, I suspect that anger influences the development of the response-dependent 
category of the outrageous. Response-dependent categories are ones that include objects 
or states of affairs that elicit specific kinds of responses. For instance, the category of the 
outrageous probably refers (roughly) to that which elicits anger in normal observers. 
Philosophers have long discussed the existence and metaphysics of response-dependent 
categories and debated about their role in moral evaluation (e.g. Gibbard 1992; J. Prinz 
2007).  
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For my purposes, what is important about response-dependent categories like the 
outrageous is that one can judge that something falls under the category (or that 
something is outrageous), without experiencing or manifesting any anger or outrage. Not 
only is it likely that there is such a category, such a category would not develop were it 
not for experiences and observations of anger (in both oneself and in others). Thus, it 
makes sense that when considering a moral offense (as in the questionnaire studies 
above) one could judge that the offenses were more or less outrageous, without 
experiencing any actual outrage or anger. Moreover, insofar as anger directly influences 
punishment of wrongs to oneself (as in the UG), it may also influence how one thinks 
about outrageous actions directed at others. Specifically, it is easy to see how one could 
come to think of outrageous actions as those toward which punishment and retaliation 
is appropriate. If so, then we can imagine someone engaging in impersonal punishment 
because they judge an action to be morally outrageous, and because they judge that 
punishment is an appropriate response to morally outrageous action. If people make 
intuitive judgments in this way, then this sense of appropriateness could easily be 
rationalized as desert.  
If this is correct, then we have a mechanism by which anger can influence cold or 
impersonal judgments and actions regarding punishment by influencing the 
development of the category of the outrageous. Moreover, this would explain why 
judgments of outrage and anger often accompany impersonal punishment even though 
we have reason to believe that such actions are not accompanied by affective arousal. 
Finally, it is a mechanism by which retributive motives (and the accompanying notions 
of appropriateness and desert) can be extended from the personal domain (as in the UG) 
to the impersonal domain (as in responses to questionnaire studies and punishment in 
other economic games).  
 20 
Little evidence has been collected that would (dis)confirm this hypothesis. 
Moreover, it is unclear which competing hypotheses might also explain the data. There is 
some indirect evidence that childhood experiences with anger influence punitive 
judgments later in life. For instance, children whose parents practiced corporal 
punishment are more likely to affirm the death penalty as adults, and this effect is 
mediated by trait anger (M. Milburn et al. 1995; M. A. Milburn, Niwa, and Patterson 
2014). This effect falls short of directly confirming my hypothesis about the development 
of the category of outrageousness, but it does suggest that a child’s development 
influences their affective responses in a way that may also influence their punitive 
judgments. In any case, my hypothesis has a good deal of initial plausibility, and I will 
adopt it in what follows as a working hypothesis. 
3. The phenomena of anger and the theory of basic emotions  
The connection between anger and punishment raises the question of what anger 
is. Unfortunately, there is a surprising degree of divergence among researchers 
concerning anger’s function and characteristics. It has been described as “a fairly specific 
syndrome (or network) of motoric, somatovisceral, and cognitive reactions…” that is 
caused by aversive stimuli and that includes an aggressive impulse (Berkowitz 2012a); as 
an appraisal of an action as “a demeaning offense against me and mine” (Lazarus 1991); 
as a type of emotional arousal that can lead to aggression or a number of other outcomes 
depending on social learning (Bandura 1973); as a product of social construction that 
bears a complex relationship with aggression (Averill 1983); as a capacity that functions 
“(a) to influence others to obtain some benefit, (b) to express grievances and establish 
justice, and (c) to assert or defend social identities” (Tedeschi 1994); as an evolved 
mechanism to regulate the dispositions of others toward oneself (A. N. Sell 2011); and as 
a mechanism for enforcing a specific kind of moral norm (Rozin, Lowery, and Haidt 
1999).  
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While there are some important themes and commonalities shared between these 
theories and descriptions, debate continues concerning the nature of anger (see e.g. 
Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004; Roseman 2004; A. Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides 
2009). For the sake of clarity, some rely on stipulative definitions. For some theorists, 
something is properly called anger only if it is caused by a specific cognitive appraisal 
(Clore and Ortony 1993). On this view, an emotional state constitutes anger only if 
someone appraises an aversive event as intentionally caused by an agent. On the other 
hand, if an aversive event is appraised as unintentional or as lacking an agential cause, 
then it constitutes frustration. Others theorists defer to the prototypical structure of folk 
concepts of anger (Russell and Fehr 1994) in order to lump together the affective 
phenomena to which the word “anger” refers (Berkowitz 2012b). Evolutionary 
psychologists in the tradition of Cosmides and Tooby take a more theory-driven 
approach. They identify an adaptive problem: roughly, the need to get conspecifics to 
consider one’s interests when acting, and they assume (without further argument) that 
anger is the solution to this problem (see e.g. A. Sell).  
I cannot here offer a full criticism of these approaches. Suffice it to say that on 
each of these views, anger will end up looking like a conventional kind. Another example 
of a conventional kind is the culinary category of fruits (which is sometimes contrasted 
with the biological category of fruits). This is not a natural category because the 
difference between culinary fruits and vegetables is mind-dependent, reflecting a 
difference in the way that human palates respond to plant produce. Likewise, the 
characterizations of anger above reflect human stipulation, explanatory interests or 
linguistic practices rather than real divisions in nature. One problem with these 
approaches is that they tend to be arbitrary, sometimes ruling out possibilities by fiat. 
For example, the evolutionary psychologist’s specification of anger rules out two 
possibilities. First, the adaptive function they specify could be implemented by several 
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underlying biological or psychological entities, only one of which might answer to the 
word “anger”. Second, anger could implement this adaptive function along with several 
other distinct adaptive functions. It seems quite possible, given the tinkering nature of 
the evolutionary process, that what we call anger contributes to a number of different 
adaptive functions (or has contributed to a number of different adaptive functions 
during its evolutionary history) or that anger works synergistically with other 
psychological processes to produce adaptive behavior. If at the outset, one assumes or 
stipulates that anger is the faculty that solves a specific adaptive problem, then these 
possibilities are closed off without further justification. 
My purposes demand further justification. For me, the claim defended in the 
previous section, that anger produces retributive intuitions, is an interesting empirical 
claim. But the more latitude one has to choose a definition of anger to suite her purposes, 
the more stipulative and the less empirical such a claim would become.  
Fortunately, one need not be tempted in this manner. There are several clues that 
anger is not merely a conventional kind, the reference of which depends entirely on, say, 
human social practices, linguistic practices or explanatory interests (among other 
things). 14  As I describe in greater detail below, humans make involuntarily facial 
expressions, and even across cultures, there is general agreement about which facial 
expressions are expressions of anger and about what situations elicit those expressions. 
Even people who are born blind and deaf make involuntary facial expressions that the 
sighted can identify as expressions of anger. If anger were merely a conventional kind, 
then the development of these involuntary facial expression as well as their 
categorization would presumably depend on some kind of social transmission. In that 
case, we would not expect cross-cultural similarities in facial expressions and in the way 
people categorize them. Nor would we expect similarities in the situations that elicit a 
                                               
14 In chapter 3, I make the case that basic human anger is also a natural kind. 
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given expression (at least when there are boundaries across which cultural transmission 
does not occur). Moreover, we would expect the congenitally blind not to manifest facial 
expressions of anger. However, this is exactly what has been found concerning anger. 
These phenomena are not restricted to anger, but there is a broader class of 
emotions for which they can be observed, the basic emotions. These phenomena provide 
several clues about the underlying systems that produce them and about the 
evolutionary forces that shaped those systems. In the paradigmatic cases of anger, fear, 
disgust, sadness, joy, and surprise, basic emotions have facial expressions that are 
recognized and produced across all cultures that have been observed (Ekman, Sorenson, 
and Friesen 1969; C E Izard 1994).15 These expressions appear very early in development 
as does the capacity to recognize or respond to them (e.g. Carroll E. Izard, Hembree, and 
Huebner 1987). They appear spontaneously in those who could not have learned them 
from experience, as in those who are born both blind and deaf (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1973; 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1979). They are automatic in the sense that they come unbidden and are 
difficult to fake, suppress or control.  
Many of the facial expressions of basic emotions have similar expressions in 
chimpanzees and other non-human primates (e.g. Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1973; Parr, 
Waller, Vick, & Bard, 2007). This means that the sets of muscle contractions involved in 
human facial expressions of these emotions naturally occur in the social interactions of 
these species. The facial expressions of basic emotions are also tied to distinctive changes 
in physiological arousal. For instance, distinctive changes in heart rate and blood 
pressure associated with anger can be activated in response to angering situations as well 
as by voluntarily contracting the facial muscles involved in anger expression (e.g. 
Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). Recognizable changes in vocal characteristics have 
                                               
15 There may be other basic emotions that are not recognized via facial expressions but instead by their 
postural characteristics. Two prominent examples are pride and shame. See Clark (2009) for an argument 
that these emotions are basic. 
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also been found for each basic emotion, with anger being the most recognizable (Scherer, 
2003).16  
 Less important for my purposes are the manner in which these emotional 
responses can be elicited. Basic emotion can be elicited quickly and automatically, below 
the threshold of consciousness and sometimes in a way that entirely bypasses higher 
perceptual processing (LeDoux 1998). The situations that elicit basic emotions often 
constitute universal themes (Ekman 1999). For instance, the elicitors of fear are more or 
less captured by the theme of danger (Öhman 1986) and the elicitors of disgust are more 
or less captured by the theme of offensiveness and contamination (Rozin and Fallon 
1987). While these themes seem universal, cultural differences generate variations on 
these themes. There are also individual differences in elicitors within cultures, but some 
elicitors for a given emotion are easier to learn and more difficult to unlearn than others, 
with phobias (acrophobia, arachnaphobia, etc.) and taste aversions being prime 
examples. While none of these features are the sine qua non of basic emotions, all of the 
basic emotions that have been identified have most of these features.  
Basic emotion theories are committed to explaining these phenomena in specific 
ways. Indeed, these features of basic emotions place important constraints on both their 
proximate and ultimate explanation. Different facts about basic emotions (or different 
phenomena) constrain their proximate explanation by implicating certain kinds of 
internal mechanisms. For instance, the production facts include the existence of 
universal signals, distinctive physiology, and coordination between the two. They also 
include other facts about facial expressions: that regular development of facial 
expressions can occur despite deprivation; that they are involuntary and difficulty to fake, 
suppress or control. These production facts about each basic emotion are thought to be 
explained by internal mechanisms called affect programs. Affect programs are behavior 
                                               
16 For an accessible overview of this body of research, see Ekman (2003). 
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programs which store “the patterns for these complex organized responses, and which 
when set off directs their occurrence.” (Ekman, 1977)17  
An underlying theme that unites these phenomena is that most of them (e.g. early 
development, universal signals) provide evidence that the idiosyncrasies of individual 
experience must play a limited role in shaping these emotional responses. For instance, 
early development of emotional expression and recognition suggests that these 
emotional capacities develop faster and with more regularity than they would if they 
relied upon general-purpose learning mechanisms in response to the information 
present in individual experiences. This (among other features of basic emotions) 
suggests that as the inheritors of basic emotions, human beings have more knowledge 
and know-how than our individual experience could afford us.18  
When we ask what else, besides experience (and culture), might have shaped 
basic emotions, the best explanation is biological. Early on, basic emotion theorists 
suggested that basic emotions have genetic bases and dedicated neural substrates 
                                               
17 See Griffiths (1997, 88–91) for a nuanced discussion of the possible control mechanisms for affect 
programs. A more detailed sketch of the putative mechanisms that explain basic emotion phenomena would 
include the following. The elicitation facts (including fast, automatic, and unbidden occurrence) suggest 
that emotional responses are triggered by dedicated automatic appraisal mechanisms. The limited variation 
facts (including easy learning, difficult unlearning, and universal themes) suggest that appraisal 
mechanisms (automatic or otherwise) are calibrated by prepared learning mechanisms. The recognition 
facts such as early recognition and selective impairment of emotion recognition (e.g. Calder et al. 2004) 
may suggest domain-specific and perhaps emotion-specific recognition mechanisms that operate either 
empathically or on the basis of innate facial or postural templates. One set of phenomena, notable for its 
absence in the foregoing includes further dissociation facts, which suggest that for at least some basic 
emotions, some of the internal mechanisms mentioned (e.g. for elicitation, production and recognition) are 
emotion-specific. For example, Panksepp and Biven (2012) is a recent and accessible discussion of the 
dissociation facts and their implications. 
18 Culture is an important repository of knowledge that fills the gap between our sparse experience and our 
abundant knowledge (Richerson and Boyd 2004). Moreover, emotion is likely to be an important means by 
which cultural information is transmitted (e.g. Kelly 2011). But while cultural variation and transmission 
can explain many of the differences in emotion elicitors, cultural commonalities do not seem to explain 
common themes to which each basic emotion responds. It is more plausible to suppose that the explanatory 
arrow goes the other way, that shared emotional themes explain cultural commonalities. Emotions seem to 
develop in human infants before culture has fully taken root, thus emotions are also likely to explain the 
limits on the range of cultural variants observed in emotion elicitors. For instance, disgust seems to explain 
which etiquette norms persist over time (Nichols 2004, chap. 4), and it also seems to explain many of the 
cross-cultural features of purity norms (Kelly 2011, chap. 4). The general point is that basic emotion theory 
is consistent with social constructivist views of the emotions (see esp. R. Mallon and Stich 2000).  
 26 
(Ekman, 1977). However, it is often difficult to characterize the exact sense in which 
traits are genetically determined (see e.g. Griffiths & Machery, 2008). This is because 
developmental processes that produce these traits often depend on environmental 
regularities (non-genetic determinants) for species-typical outcomes (cf. Griffiths, 2001; 
Ron Mallon & Weinberg, 2006). However these details are to be worked out, there is a 
clear sense in which basic emotions are innate. We have basic emotions because of our 
biological constitution and not because of environmental regularities.  
The intellectual pedigree of basic emotion theory bears a close relationship with 
the ethological tradition of Konrad Lorenz. Not surprisingly, the notion of innateness 
employed within basic emotion theory closely resembles his concept of “phylogenetic 
information”. Responding to the criticisms of developmental biologists in his later work, 
Lorenz allowed that there may not be any clear and useful distinctions between traits 
that are innate or acquired. Nonetheless, he believed that “there is a sound distinction to 
be drawn between…two sources of adaptive information.” (Browne, 2005) One source of 
adaptive information comes from learning; this ontogenetic information is acquired, not 
given. Another source of adaptive information derives from evolutionary history; this 
phylogenetic information is given, not acquired. One important empirical method for 
demonstrating that a trait is shaped by phylogenetic information is through deprivation 
experiments. By depriving an organism of relevant experiences (e.g. depriving a bird of 
exposure to its species-typical bird song), one can sometimes show that the organism 
nonetheless retains a specific form of adaptedness to its environment (e.g. if after 
deprivation, the bird is nonetheless capable of singing its species-typical bird song). For 
example, when children are born blind, they are deprived of visual experiences that 
would be relevant to the acquisition of normal facial expressions of anger through 
learning. Nonetheless, these children display species-typical anger expressions in the 
appropriate contexts. In Lorenz’s terms, facial expressions of human anger are best 
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explained by the possession of phylogenetic information and are thus innate 
adaptations.19  
Of course, the idea of phylogenetic information cannot be understood without the 
concept of adaptedness. Accordingly, there is broad agreement among basic emotion 
theorists concerning the adaptedness of basic emotions. In harmony with Lorenz, the 
adaptive fit between emotions and the relevant environments is supposed to be best 
explained by our ancestry and the selective pressures that operated on it: “…emotions 
evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life tasks.” (Ekman, 1999) 
These fundamental life tasks include avoiding poisons, parasites, and predators as well 
as dealing with gains, losses, and resource competition.20 These situations are thought by 
many to constitute “…commonly recurrent (across generations) adaptive situations.” 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1990, pp. 407–408) Basic emotions were shaped by these recurrent 
situations, endowing us with knowledge or know-how that is given (by our ancestry) and 
not acquired (by individual experience).  
The linkage of basic emotions to facial expressions suggests that their 
fundamental life tasks all have important interpersonal dimensions. Ekman, for instance, 
thinks that “…the primary function of emotion is to mobilize the organism to deal quickly 
with important interpersonal encounters, prepared to do so by what types of activity 
                                               
19 While I mentioned above some of the controversies surrounding the concept of innateness, an interesting 
proposal has been put forward recently (O’Neill) that I think nicely captures the sense of innateness 
employed by Lorenz and others. According to this account, innateness is the insensitivity of the 
development of a trait to specified environmental variation. This view proposes a terminological corrective 
to claims of innateness. These claims should never be made in absolute terms, rather claims of innateness 
are relative to specified environmental variation. In the present case, facial expressions of human anger are 
innate with respect to deprivation of visual and auditory information. One might also interpret the early 
cross-cultural experiments evaluating the recognition of basic emotions (Ekman et al., 1969; C. E. Izard, 
1971) as substantiating a claim of innateness with respect to cultural variation. 
20  As LeDoux (1998) points out, solving fundamental life tasks requires very different kinds of 
functions. Thus, he suspects that “…there must be different brain systems to take care of these different 
kinds of functions.” (p. 126) So in what follows, I will not assume that there is a single automatic appraisal 
mechanism or affect program that functions to produce the variety of basic emotions. Instead, I will call the 
affect programs for different emotions by different names (the anger affect program as opposed to the fear 
affect program), but acknowledge the possibility that we may eventually discover some of them to refer to 
the same brain systems. For instance, Gray (2003) might be taken to suggest that anger and fear are the 
product of a single system. 
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have been adaptive in the past.” (Ekman, 1999) Insofar as basic emotions aid in the 
avoidance of poisons, parasites and predators and help to deal with gains, losses and 
resource competitions there is likely to be an interpersonal dimension to all these tasks. 
We avoid poisons and parasites together, and we negotiate resource competition 
primarily with other members of our species. If this is right, it makes sense that basic 
emotions are tied to our biological constitution. As Ernst Mayr notes, “Since much of the 
behavior directed toward other conspecific individuals consists of formal signals and of 
appropriate responses to signals, and since there is a high selective premium for these 
signals to be unmistakable, the essential components of the phenotype of such signals 
must show low variability and must be largely controlled genetically.” (Mayr, 1974, p. 
657)  
In sum, we can condense basic emotion theory into the following claims about 
basic emotions: basic emotional responses are innate adaptations that contain 
phylogenetic information for dealing with recurrent, interpersonal situations in our 
selection history. Moreover, these adaptations include affect programs that coordinate 
various response components of a given emotion syndrome. At least some of the 
psychological states answering to the term “anger” appear to be instances of a basic 
emotion. 
As well established as this theoretical framework is in some circles, there have 
been influential criticisms of it (Barrett 2006). So it is worth pointing out that my view is 
consistent with some data that conflict with basic emotion theory (according to some). 
First, while I am committed to there being an evolved anger syndrome in some humans 
that coordinates automatic facial expressions and physiological changes, (perhaps also 
postures and motivations), I am not necessarily committed to the claim that each 
symptom of the syndrome (physiological changes, production of facial expressions, 
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recognition or discrimination of facial expressions etc.) will be regularly manifest within 
individuals, across individuals or across cultures.  
By contrast, some basic emotion theorists are committed to defending the 
universal recognition of certain facial expressions. Nevertheless, the widespread 
recognition of certain facial expressions is only a symptom of something else, namely 
that in some environments, an emotion syndrome can produce visible changes in facial 
expression, and that in those environments, people can become consciously aware of the 
similarity of those expressions (or their difference from other expressions). For instance 
the Dani people of West Papua cannot reliably distinguish between facial expressions of 
disgust and anger. Nevertheless, the ability to discriminate the two expressions would 
just be a symptom of the existence of two distinct underlying syndromes. This symptom 
could easily be eliminated if a culture had strong norms against overt confrontation or 
against the expression of anger. This would prevent people from becoming consciously 
aware of the difference between the two expressions even if there were real differences 
between them at the level of production. So the fact that some cultures cannot 
distinguish disgust and anger does not provide direct evidence against the claim that 
these two distinct evolved emotion syndromes exist. For similar reasons, it is not clear 
that we should expect to find recognition, discrimination or even distinct physiological 
changes for each basic emotion across all cultures or individuals.  
In many cases, universality itself is only a symptom that some phenomenon is 
shaped or constrained by inheritance (though it could be a symptom of other things as 
well). Even if it lacked true universality, anger might still exist in many cultures as an 
evolved emotion syndrome shaped by inheritance. This is because there could be 
populations in which the syndrome has been weeded out or lost through genetic drift. 
Universality is a symptom of shared inheritance, but so is near-universality.  
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Variation is possible in many dimensions of an emotion syndrome across cultures, 
across persons and even within persons. This is partly due to distinctively human 
capacities for emotion regulation – which are highly flexible and distinct from basic 
emotion systems. As a result of these capacities, different individuals can regulate their 
emotions differently, and the same individual can regulate emotions differently at 
different times or under different conditions. Similar things might be said for capacities 
to regulate physiological arousal and to habitually inhibit unbidden facial expressions. 
The existence of an evolved syndrome is also consistent with a plurality of 
psychological states, all of which answer to the term “anger”. This could happen if, for 
instance, states of anger constitute serial homologies (e.g. Clark 2009). Serial 
homologies are repeated structures within an individual organism the classic example of 
which are the vertebrae. Each vertebra is an instance of the same original structure, 
repeated within the same organism to comprise the organism’s backbone. There has 
been some suggestion that psychological structures, like emotions, could also be 
repeated within an organism. As a result, we could imagine a person with several 
different psychological states that all have a similar structure. For instance, we could 
imagine how a state of righteous indignation and a state of childish frustration could be 
distinct, but could also motivate similar behaviors, for example retribution and reactive 
aggression, respectively. These might be different psychological states with different 
underlying mechanisms and different elicitors (e.g. moral violation as opposed to 
removal of a reward contingency), and yet have a highly similar motivational structure 
(e.g. cost imposition in reaction to provocation) due to their derivation from a  common 
preexisting structure. The concept of serial homology shows how it is possible to have a 
number of distinct psychological states that all answer to the term “anger”. In conclusion, 
an evolved anger syndrome is consistent with variation in manifestation (within 
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individuals and across cultures and individuals) and is consistent with multiple forms of 
anger. 
4. Chapter summaries 
In the course of this dissertation, I bring together numerous strands of research in order 
to begin a natural history of anger and punishment. The overall argument is that anger is 
not unique to humans and was shaped largely for its role in negotiating resource 
competition (in an era of adaptedness shared with non-human animals), as were the 
retributive motives produced by anger. Moreover, this natural history has clear 
normative implications for the justification of punishment. 
 In chapter 1, I begin by making the case that, at least in principle, the natural 
history of anger can undermine the role of retributive considerations in justifying 
normative theories of punishment. At the heart of this argument is a simplified “just so” 
story about the evolution of retributive motives. Nevertheless, this story is sufficient to 
animate the in-principal argument against retributive considerations. Moreover, this in-
principle argument may generalize to other non-consequentialist considerations, ones 
that favor actions like keeping promises, cooperating with others, and avoiding 
intentional harm to others. 
 In chapter 2, I begin moving from a “just so” story toward a more 
methodologically rigorous explanation of retributive motives. I appeal to a selection 
model for resource competition to explain how retributive motives could have arisen in 
organisms that lack the capacity for complex, strategic social interaction. As such, the 
selection model applies (if at all) to events very far back in our evolutionary history, prior 
to the evolution of complex social organization. Nevertheless, instead of tying this 
explanation directly to human evolution, I show that this selection model explains the 
structure of one pattern of aggressive behavior in rats and rodents more broadly, which 
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has been carefully characterized through observation and experiment over the past 
several decades. 
 In chapter 3, I further flesh out this explanation of retributive motives by arguing 
for a homology between human anger and the system responsible for this pattern of 
rodent aggression. This means that the rodent aggression system and human anger 
derive from a trait of the last common ancestor of humans and rodents. Along the way, I 
develop evidential criteria and constraints for adjudicating competing homology claims. 
 Finally, in chapter 4, I forestall a set of serious misgivings about this approach 
and pave the way for further developing the natural history of anger and punishment. 
These misgivings arise out of the fact that there are vast differences between rats and 
humans, and that some of these differences reside in the patterns of behavior that anger 
can give rise to. Whereas anger causes highly stereotyped aggression in rodents, human 
anger leads to highly flexible behaviors, only some of which include physical aggression. 
I argue that despite appearances, rat aggression is actually highly flexible and cannot be 
explained without appealing to an angry motivational state that is integrated with 
internal representational states of individual rats. I conclude by conjecturing at how the 
relatively primitive retributive motives of our common ancestor with rats could have 
been shaped by the process of evolution to be sensitive to more complex social aims and 
to produce highly variable behaviors manifested by angry people today. 
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Chapter 1  
The Evolution of Retribution: Intuitions Undermined 
 
Work in the last decade of empirical moral psychology suggests that emotions are 
responsible for at least some deontological moral intuitions. These intuitions are 
revealed by widespread tendencies to judge or act 1  contrary to a consequentialist 
evaluation of actions.2 Deontological intuitions are thus a primary source of evidence 
against some consequentialist theories. Nevertheless, if emotions are responsible for 
these intuitions, as empirical studies suggest, then there is reason to reconsider their role 
in philosophical theorizing.3 A prominent criticism of deontological intuitions, offered by 
Joshua Greene and Peter Singer, is that empirical moral psychology reveals epistemic 
defects in the emotions responsible for deontological intuitions. 4  On this view, 
consequentialism is vindicated because one important source of evidence against it is not 
good evidence after all. 
These criticisms of deontological intuitions include evolutionary debunking 
arguments. For instance, one of Joshua Greene’s criticisms is this: emotions were 
                                               
1 I intend intuitions to include non-inferential inclinations to judge a proposition only by considering its 
content and non-inferential inclinations (not) to perform an action only by considering some representation 
of the action or situation. Cf. (Sosa 2007, 233; Sinnott-Armstrong 2008, 209) The non-inferential nature of 
intuitions refers to the fact that one can have a feeling that something is right or wrong without any 
accompanying justificatory explanation for the feeling. On my view, “intuition” is a theoretical term 
capturing a set of phenomena with common explanatory elements (perhaps they are all caused by some 
psychological process or another) that are explananda or objects of study in scientific fields like 
philosophy, moral psychology, behavioral economics and social psychology. Deontological intuitions refer 
to a subset of these phenomena that has a common underlying psychological cause. Accordingly, one can 
have a deontological intuition without judging its content true or its practical conclusion prudent or morally 
right, but I do not think anything hinges on this terminological decision. Some philosophers argue that 
intuitions are properly understood as judgments. Whether or not there exists phenomena 
involving inclinations to judge or act (regardless of whether they in fact lead to judgment or action) does 
not depend on how philosophical debate proceeds. If the phenomena exist, then these phenomena are a 
proper object of study regardless of whether they consistently give rise to actual judgments.  
2 More specifically, they are tendencies to judge or act contrary to an act-consequentialist decision 
procedure: “On each occasion, an agent should decide what to do by calculating which act would produce 
the most good.” (Hooker RRR). Since this definition of deontological intuitions pits them directly against 
consequentialism, I use “deontological intuition” and “anti-consequentialist intuition” interchangeably. 
Thanks to [name revoked] for pointing out tendency of empirical moral psychologists to conflate 
consequentialist decision procedures and consequentialist standards of rightness. 
3 See e.g. the introduction of Kamm, (1993). 
4 (Singer 2005; J. D. Greene 2008) 
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selected for their role in increasing fitness and deontological intuitions are a byproduct 
of this evolutionary function, thus emotions would have produced deontological 
intuitions whether or not these intuitions were true. The most common objection to this 
argument is that it proves too much. It threatens to undercut a wider set of evaluative 
intuitions, ones that share the same kind of evolutionary explanation and some of which 
support consequentialism and evaluative realism.5  This is a problematic feature of 
Greene’s and Singer’s evolutionary debunking argument, because it vitiates their aim of 
defending consequentialism. Moreover, there is a suspicion that similar problems will 
plague any evolutionary debunking argument pitched at the level of first-order moral 
discourse.6  
I believe that this is not an essential feature of evolutionary debunking arguments. 
Thus, my purpose here is to give an evolutionary debunking argument against 
deontological intuitions (or at least a subset of them) that avoids this charge and 
therefore applies directly to normative ethics, undermining only deontological intuitions. 
To make this argument, I propose a friendly amendment to Greene’s dual process 
account of moral intuition. Rather than capturing the difference between deontological 
and consequentialist intuitions in terms of the difference between emotion and cognition 
(as do Greene and Singer), I capture the difference with a distinction between 
prospective and non-prospective processes. Non-prospective processes place non-
derivative value on actions (or action types), value that does not derive from the action’s 
consequences. Anger is an example of a non-prospective process, because it places non-
derivative value on actions of revenge and retribution.  
Once this distinction is in place, I present a novel debunking argument. If anger 
produces retributive intuitions (which are one species of deontological intuition) because 
                                               
5 (See e.g. Berker 2009; Kahane 2011; Mason 2011) 
6 (E.g. Kahane 2011; Mason 2011; Vavova 2014) 
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of the biological consequences (e.g. increased fitness) of those intuitions, then the 
intuitions are not good indicators of non-derivative value. This severs the putative 
evidential connection between retributive intuitions and the non-derivative, or 
retributive, value of punishment. Thus, retributive intuitions are not good evidence for 
retributive theories of punishment (according to which punishment has non-derivative 
value). 
1. Greene’s Evolutionary Debunking Argument 
1.1 Debunking arguments  
I begin by briefly characterizing debunking arguments. Debunking arguments 
attempt to undermine beliefs, intuitions, values or judgments by impugning their causal 
source. In their debunking arguments, Greene and Singer evaluate the putative 
evolutionary causes of deontological intuitions in addition to their immediate 
psychological causes. For an example of the latter kind of debunking argument, consider 
the moral intuitions involved in two classic moral dilemmas. In the trolley scenario, a 
trolley car is hurtling toward five unsuspecting workers and one faces the option of 
flipping a switch to divert the trolley to a track with a single worker. In the footbridge 
scenario, the trolley poses the same threat to five workers and one faces the option of 
pushing a large man off a footbridge and in front of the trolley to stop it in its tracks. 
There is an intuitive difference between hitting a switch to save the five and pushing a 
man off a bridge to save the five. Moreover, this difference has been taken to support 
moral principles like the doctrine of double effect.7 However, one might think that if 
these intuitions “reflect the influence of morally irrelevant factors…[then they are] 
unlikely to track the moral truth…”.8 For instance, Greene and colleagues have argued 
that the intuitive difference between the cases is best accounted for by the exertion of 
                                               
7 Foot makes this argument in (1978) 
8 (J. D. Greene 2008, 70) 
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personal force with intention to harm in footbridge and by its notable absence in 
trolley.9  Greene hypothesizes that the response to footbridge is thus driven by an 
aversive emotional response that is triggered by these factors. To Greene and others, 
whether cases differ along some of these dimensions (e.g. personal/impersonal) seems 
morally irrelevant, so he claims that these emotion-driven intuitions do not track the 
truth and thus do not count as evidence against consequentialism.10  
While Greene talks about “truth tracking” and “morally irrelevant factors” to 
describe the epistemic defect in deontological intuitions, I will instead cast debunking in 
terms of evidential defeat. A piece of evidence rarely provides conclusive support for a 
conclusion because evidence can sometimes be defeated or overturned.11 For example, 
one might have evidence that a painting is a Monet because of the report of an art dealer. 
This evidence could be defeated in two ways. If I received a conflicting report from a 
museum curator, whose authority is unsurpassed, then this evidence would outweigh my 
other evidence. It would thus constitute a rebutting defeater, because it outweighs my 
other evidence by giving me stronger reason to deny that the painting is a Monet. 
Alternatively, if I received word that the art dealer had lied about the provenance of 
several paintings in the past (not including the putative Monet), this could undercut my 
other evidence entirely, constituting an undercutting defeater.12 Rather than providing 
evidence against the art dealer’s claim, it severs the evidential connection between the 
art dealer’s report and the state of affairs that it reports. In other words, it gives me 
reason to think that the dealer’s report is not a good indicator of the state of affairs that it 
reports. While the undercutting defeater does not give me reason to believe that the art 
piece is not a Monet, it does eliminate my primary reason for thinking that it is. I find it 
                                               
9 (e.g. J. D. Greene et al. 2009) 
10 Though Greene criticizes these intuitions in a number of other ways (see e.g. J. Greene 2003; J. D. 
Greene 2008). 
11 (see e.g. J. L. Pollock 1987) 
12 Pollock (e.g. J. Pollock 1986) was the first to recognize the distinction between undercutting and 
rebutting defeaters. 
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natural to say of this case that the evidence of the art dealer’s dishonesty debunks my 
evidence that the painting is a Monet. So I propose to understand debunking arguments 
in terms of undercutting defeat.  
While this example is framed in terms of a person’s testimony and the states of 
affairs it reports, we might just as well apply these evidential considerations to 
psychological processes and the states of affairs they represent. For instance, we can 
imagine that the psychological processes that produce deontological intuitions are in 
some way disconnected from the states of affairs that they “report” (via the intuitions 
they produce). If one came to know about this disconnect, then one should not rely on 
deontological intuitions and should not include them in one’s evidence base. In that case, 
one would have an undercutting defeater for deontological intuitions or equivalently, 
one’s deontological intuitions would be debunked. While I will present Greene’s 
argument in his own terms (e.g. truth-tracking), later I will cast my own argument in 
terms of severed evidential connections and undercutting defeat. 
1.2 An evolutionary debunking explanation for emotional processes 
Greene proposes an evolutionary explanation for the differences in moral 
judgment between cases like trolley and footbridge: 
The emotions most relevant to morality exist because they motivate behaviors that 
help individuals spread copies of the genes they possess within a social context… 
[Evolutionary] theories explain the widespread human tendency to engage in 
cooperative behaviors (e.g., helping others and speaking honestly) and to avoid 
uncooperative behaviors (e.g., hurting others and lying), even when relatives and 
close associates are not involved… 
I will simply assume that the general thrust of these theories is correct: that our basic 
moral dispositions [which are motivated by moral emotions] are evolutionary 
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adaptations that arose in response to the demands and opportunities created by 
social life.13  
Here, Greene is borrowing from evolutionary theories that attempt to explain human 
altruism. These explanations highlight situations in which altruism contributes to an 
organism’s ability to spread copies of its genes or to a group’s ability to survive or 
multiply. 14  These theories go some distance in explaining why we have evolved 
dispositions to avoid hurting others, inter alia (e.g. dispositions for punishing, keeping 
promises or for helping others).  
Moreover, there is a reason why these dispositions would only manifest in cases 
like footbridge. Opportunities to harm others in distant and detached ways, as in trolley, 
were not available to our ancestors, and Greene thinks that this is a “…contingent, 
nonmoral feature of our evolutionary history.”15 Finally, there is a reason why emotions 
rather than slow, effortful, deliberative processes would implement these dispositions. 
Emotions are “fast and frugal”. They are a simple and efficient way of responding to the 
types of recurrent situations that they were selected to deal with.16 They are elicited by a 
small range of factors (e.g. that an action involves personal force) that are nonetheless 
reliable indicators of the relevant situation, and they result in adaptive inclinations to 
behave or judge (e.g. against hurting and toward helping). Greene concludes from this 
evolutionary genealogy that deontological intuitions do not track the truth. 
1.3 The evolutionary debunking argument proves too much (or nothing at all) 
                                               
13 (J. D. Greene 2008, 59–60) 
14 For instance, a kin selection explanation of altruism appeals to the benefits that accrue to helping one’s 
kin, even at a cost to oneself. Since kin are more likely to share copies of the same genes and since kin-
helping can facilitate the spread of those copies, genes that induce altruism toward kin can spread in a 
population under certain conditions. See (Hamilton 1964) Other evolutionary explanations attempt to 
identify selective benefits of altruistic behavior in a much larger range of cases, for instance some appeal to 
the selective benefits of living in larger groups and transmitting knowledge through culture. See (Richerson 
and Boyd 2004; S. Bowles and Gintis 2004). 
15 (J. D. Greene 2008, 70) 
16 (Tooby and Cosmides 1990; Ekman 1999) 
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However, one of the premises in Greene’s argument is ambiguous. What exactly 
is the morally irrelevant factor introduced by the evolution of alarm-like emotions? It 
could be that emotions evolved to respond to a morally irrelevant factor, namely 
personal force. Alternatively, it could be that emotions evolved in response to a morally 
irrelevant factor, namely that deontological moral inclinations helped our ancestors to 
spread their genes. If we opt for the former, then it is unclear what role evolution plays in 
this argument. If one already knows that it is morally irrelevant whether an action 
requires personal force and if one already knows that this is what makes footbridge and 
trolley seem different, then we already have a debunking explanation of the intuitive 
difference and evolution adds nothing. On the other hand, if one has good reason to 
believe that personal force is relevant to moral evaluation, then the fact that emotions 
evolved to respond to them should only vindicate the emotional response.  
If evolution is doing any additional work, it must be showing that the processes 
responsible for these intuitions evolved in response to morally irrelevant factors: that 
deontological inclinations helped our ancestors spread their genes and not that 
deontological intuitions are true. In other words, the function of evolution must be to 
convince us of something like the following: for all we know, if deontology were false, 
evolution would shape our emotions to give us the same stock of deontological intuitions. 
Nevertheless, this kind of evolutionary consideration could easily undermine 
intuitions that support consequentialist theories. Consider the fact that consequentialism 
is vacuous without a theory of value. Without some idea of what outcomes should be 
valued or disvalued, there would be no way to determine which action would be right by 
the lights of a consequentialist moral theory. One would be unable to evaluate the 
consequences of actions. Moreover, intuitions about what things are valuable will 
inevitably influence any theory of value. This makes consequentialism vulnerable to a 
well known evolutionary critique. For instance, if the arguments of Sharon Street are 
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correct, then we hold many if not all of our evaluative intuitions not because they are 
true (in the sense required by realist theories of value) but because they allowed our 
ancestors to more effectively spread their genes. 17  This applies to even the most 
uncontroversial of evaluative intuitions: that pain is bad, that it is bad to hurt others, and 
that it is good to help them. These arguments are supposed to result in a more global 
form of evaluative skepticism than Greene wants; one that vitiates any value theory on 
which his consequentialism might draw.18  
If we can undermine deontological intuitions just by pointing out this kind of 
evolutionary influence, then a similar conclusion should follow in the case of evaluative 
intuitions more broadly. Therefore, Greene’s evolutionary considerations threaten to 
debunk not only deontological intuitions but also the intuitions that ground any 
consequentialist theory of value.19 The challenge for an argument like Greene’s is to point 
out evolutionary considerations that undercut deontological intuitions without 
undercutting a much broader range of evaluative intuitions. This is what I aim to do in 
the following section. 
2. Debunking Vindicated 
2.1 How best to understand the dual process framework: reaction versus prospection 
                                               
17 (Street 2006) 
18 Things get slightly murky at this point because Greene is actually a moral antirealist of some kind. While 
his arguments seem targeted directly at moral realists, perhaps Greene really only wants to defend an 
antirealist version of consequentialism against deontological intuitions. In fact, he does briefly criticize 
what he calls “anthropocentric morality” a moniker meant to encompass antirealist and constructivist 
metaethical theories that might maintain deontological intuitions despite their genealogy (E.g. Korsgaard 
1996). He argues that even from these metaethical standpoints, one should not count these intuitions as 
evidence if they are influenced by morally irrelevant factors. This argument turns on the same ambiguity as 
above. Either the morally irrelevant factors concern what we evolved to respond to or they concern what 
we evolved in response to. If it is the former, then evolution adds nothing to the argument. If it is the latter, 
then it is hard to see how evolutionary considerations do not vitiate the evaluative intuitions that are the 
basis for an anti-realist consequentialist’s theory of value if they really do vitiate the deontological 
intuitions that are the basis for an anti-realist or constructivist deontology. 
19 Similar points have been made elsewhere. See Vavova (2014), Kahane (2011), Mason (2011) and Berker 
(2009). 
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A central part of Greene and Singer’s debunking arguments is Greene’s dual 
process theory of moral intuition according to which consequentialist and deontological 
intuitions have distinct psychological underpinnings. 20  The distinct evolutionary 
etiologies of these psychological processes are supposed to distinguish the epistemic 
value of the intuitions they produce. Specifically, the evolutionary history of the 
emotional processes responsible for deontological intuitions, is supposed to undercut 
these intuitions in a way that the evolutionary history of consequentialist processes does 
not. 21  Nevertheless, the preceding arguments suggest that a successful evolutionary 
debunking of deontological intuitions also requires distinguishing deontological 
processes from the broader class of evaluative processes. Below, I make a friendly 
amendment to Greene’s dual process theory, one that identifies a distinguishing feature 
of processes responsible for deontological intuitions. However, only later (in section 3.2) 
will I show that it adequately distinguishes these processes from other evaluative 
processes in terms of their epistemic value.  
The main contrast Greene employs is between cognitive and emotional processes. 
Emotional processes have what Greene calls “behavioral valence”, meaning that these 
“alarm like” emotions have the following properties. First, they include inclinations to 
behave in specific ways or to judge those behaviors as appropriate. Second, they are 
elicited in response to a limited range of factors (such as the presence/absence of 
personal force), and finally, once triggered they can override cognitive processes. By 
contrast, cognition involves slow, flexible, and controlled processes.22 Cognition aligns 
with consequentialism because both are “systematic and aggregative”: “…the advantage 
                                               
20 The dual process view has actually been the most successful aspect of Greene’s research program. There 
is a wide range of evidence that there is indeed more than one (though perhaps also more than two) 
processes responsible for moral intuitions. However, there remains some debate about what distinguishes 
the two processes and whether a division of the processes aligns with the distinction between 
consequentialist and deontological intuitions. See (Cushman, Young, and Greene 2007; Cushman 2013; 
Kahane et al. 2012; Paxton, Bruni, and Greene 2013; Kahane 2012). 
21 (Cf. Singer 2005, 350) 
22 (See e.g. Evans 2003; Stanovich 2004) 
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of having such neutral representations is that they can be mixed and matched…without 
pulling the agent in multiple behavioral directions at once…”23 In other words, these 
representations are supposed to make possible the kind of systematicity characteristic of 
consequentialism, because they can take all of the consequences of an action into 
account. This is the most important contrast for Greene: cognitive processes can 
consider an indefinite number of different factors when deciding how to act, whereas 
emotional responses are triggered by only a few kinds of factors. 
While Greene believes that there is a natural mapping between the content of 
consequentialism and the properties of cognitive processes and “between the content of 
deontological philosophy and the functional properties of [emotional responses]…",24 
these distinctions do not align. First, it is possible to imagine processes that consider 
multiple factors, but that are not fully consequentialist in their deliberations. For 
instance, retributivism about punishment is a deontological theory since a retributive 
justification of punishment refers to what a transgressor deserves based on what she did 
in the past rather than on the good outcomes that would attend punishment. 25 
Nevertheless, moral agents can weigh consideration of desert against other 
considerations to yield an all-things-considered judgment. For instance, I might be 
motivated to punish a person because of what she deserves, but I might nonetheless 
adjust the severity of the punishment in relation to the consequences of punishing. In 
that case, I have a backward-looking, non-consequentialist motive for punishment that 
aggregates with other factors by a process that can consider whatever factors seem 
                                               
23 (J. D. Greene 2008, 64) 
24 (J. D. Greene 2008, 63) 
25 I suspect that this remains true even if there is a valued outcome, perhaps justice, that attends deserved 
punishment. To me, it seems unlikely that proponents of such a value would promote it rather than 
respecting it. That is, if one believes that it is intrinsically good to punish the deserving for past 
transgressions, then it seems inconsistent to then say that one should sometimes withhold punishment for 
the sake bringing about a greater quantity of deserved punishment. If my primary aim in an act of 
punishment is giving Jones her just deserts for a specific transgression, then the fact that this will cause 
Jones’ brother to withhold punishment from three other deserving transgressors does not plausibly give me 
a reason not to punish Jones.  
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relevant to the question at hand.26 Thus, what is distinctive about the psychological 
processes that consequentialism maps onto is not that they consider or weigh multiple 
factors (since they could easily consider non-consequentialist factors as well), but rather 
that they are prospective, or outcome based. That is, they place value on actions 
according to their anticipated, internally represented, outcomes (relative to the agent) 
and decide what to do only based on (positively or negatively) valued outcomes.  
Notably, work in animal behavior and computational neuroscience has revealed 
neural systems in human and non-human animals that place value on actions with 
reference to a causal model relating the action to its outcome.27 In contingency learning 
experiments, a rat learns not (only) that pressing a bar is a good kind of action to 
perform, but that pressing the bar produces a specific outcome, namely the delivery of a 
certain kind of food.28 If the rat is satiated with (or conditioned to aver) that kind of food, 
or if pressing the bar ceases to deliver it, the rat will diminish its bar pressing behavior. 
One of the best explanation of these patterns is that the rat develops a causal model of 
the outcome of pressing the bar and changes its actions when the hedonic outcome is less 
favorable or when the causal model updates to include a relevant change in contingency. 
A second problem with Greene’s alignment of distinctions is that we can imagine 
there being emotion-like responses that are only sensitive to one or two factors, but that 
nonetheless line up with consequentialist rationales. For instance, one could design a 
robot with an alarm-like response to the detection of a doomsday device. When triggered 
this response would do whatever is required to destroy the doomsday device. Moreover, 
the emotion-like response need not take anything else into account (besides the 
                                               
26 See Kahane ((2012, 531–533)) for a similar argument that deontological reasoning often requires 
weighing different duties against one another. This too seems like a process that can take many factors into 
account. Though he does not draw the same conclusions that I do concerning prospective processes. 
27 Though it is not clear to me that these models are essentially causal. Perhaps in humans they can 
represent other assymetrical dependency relations such as the in virtue of relation or other non-causal 
explanatory relations such as those involved in mathematical explanations. Relations of this sort seem 
crucial for comparing the value of different possible worlds. 
28 (E.g. Balleine and Dickinson 1998) 
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existence of an armed doomsday device) to accord with a purely consequentialist 
judgment about what to do. Thus, being triggered in response to a few kinds of factors is 
not a distinctive feature of processes that produce deontological intuitions. Rather, I 
think the kinds of processes that map onto deontological intuitions, if any, are non-
prospective processes.  
Non-prospective processes form a disjunctive class because there are many ways 
to motivate action and moral judgment that are not prospective. For instance, some 
processes place value on actions according to past experiences involving actions of that 
kind. In a recent experiment, participants were asked to physically enact simulations of 
harmful actions (e.g. holding a fake gun to another person’s head and pulling the 
trigger).29 Physiological indicators of aversion prior to performing these actions were 
greater than when participants performed nearly identical actions (e.g. holding a spray 
bottle in the air and pulling its lever) and greater than when they observed other people 
physically simulating the same harmful actions. The aversive reaction to these actions is 
not readily understood as an aversion to their consequences (e.g. the pain or discomfort 
of the “victim”). Rather the better explanation is that participants had a stronger 
aversion to performing actions of a certain type, namely ones that resemble taking 
someone’s life by putting a gun to their head and pulling the trigger.  
Other non-prospective processes are reactive, in the sense that the aim of action 
(or the reason for which it is selected) is represented in relation to past or present 
occurrences (as opposed to internally represented future outcomes). While such a 
process may be directed at a future outcome in some external sense (e.g. directed at the 
outcome by design), it is not guided by an internal representation of a future outcome. 
For such a process, “…the orientation towards a future state…can merely involve change 
from the present, – change from now: disappearance of pain, disappearance of the 
                                               
29 (Cushman et al. 2012) 
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desired object being out of reach.”30 For instance, a heat seeking missile need not be 
guided by an internal representation of its target or of the “desired” outcome of hitting 
its target. Of the many ways one could design such a missile, one of the simplest would 
be for it to receive feedback signals that indicate whether a heat source is reducing or 
increasing its distance in a given direction. When appropriately connected to its controls, 
this feedback can guide the missile to its target. Again, one need not include in the 
missile’s program any internal representation of its aim (hitting a moving object) or its 
physical target (such as the geometrical structure or distinctive color patterns of the 
target or its spatial location relative to other objects). It only requires feedback signals 
that adjust its path in reaction to the path of its physical target and that direct it toward 
the achievement of its aim.  
There is evidence from animal behavior, neuroscience and psychology that 
prospective and non-prospective systems operate independently of each other (and 
sometimes antagonistically) in a range of animal species including humans.31 Moreover, 
it is likely that in many of Greene’s examples reactive processes are producing the 
empirical results that Greene attributes to alarm-like emotions.32  
2.2 An evolutionary function of one reactive process  
With the distinction between prospective and non-prospective processes in hand, 
I can now articulate a new debunking argument. If some non-prospective processes were 
selected for their fitness enhancing consequences but also cause deontological intuition 
because of these consequences, then the function of non-prospective processes 
                                               
30 (Frijda 2010, 572) 
31 I cannot review this evidence here, and in any case, much of it has been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere, 
see Cushman (2013) and Crockett (2013). While Cushman focuses on the distinction between two learning 
systems, he does not mean to exclude other kinds of non-prospective action selection mechanisms (personal 
communication). The psychologist Nico Frijda has long emphasized the importance of impulsive 
motivation, which has precisely the characteristics of the non-prospective processes that I discuss. See 
(Frijda 1986; Frijda 2010)   
32 While space does not permit a thorough demonstration of this claim, I will consider Greene’s example 
concerning retributive punishment in detail below. 
 46 
(producing good outcomes) disconnects them from the states of affairs that they report 
(that actions have value aside from their outcomes). Thus, the evolution of non-
prospective processes gives us an undercutting defeater for deontological intuitions. In 
this section, I sketch out this argument with reference to a specific reactive process, 
namely anger.  
Consider a suggestion about anger similar to those made by Green, Singer and 
even Parfit33: anger is responsible for the intuitions that support an anti-consequentialist, 
retributive principle. 
R – The value (or justification) of an act of punishment is not (or not only) derived 
from the consequences of punishment.34 
Greene appeals to evolutionary accounts of altruism to explain why an emotional 
response like anger would lead to the intuitions that support R: “…we have a taste for 
retribution, not because wrongdoers truly deserve to be punished regardless of the costs 
and benefits, but because retributive dispositions are an efficient way of inducing 
behavior that allows individuals living in social groups to more effectively spread their 
genes.”35 Here as elsewhere, Greene is appealing to evolutionary considerations of the 
sort that would also undermine the theories of value that consequentialism requires. For 
the argument to work in favor of consequentialism, we need a slightly different story 
about why the evolutionary function of anger makes it untrustworthy with respect to R.  
To understand this function, it helps to get oneself in the grip of a puzzle. It is 
obvious that humans cooperate in a wide range of circumstances. There is cooperation 
not only among people who are genetically similar (a phenomenon that the theory of kin 
                                               
33 (Parfit 2011, chap. 429) 
34 Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging me to clarify a previous formulation. There is some 
psychological evidence for intuitions that support this principle (e.g. K. M. Carlsmith, Darley, and 
Robinson 2002b; K. Carlsmith and Darley 2008). If this and related research is not entirely convincing on 
this count, the reader can take this claim as a hypothetical assumption to demonstrate the validity (if not 
soundness) of the debunking argument. 
35 (J. D. Greene 2008, 71) 
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selection explains) and not only among people that frequently interact (a phenomenon 
that theories of direct reciprocity explain) and not only among people who signal an 
intention to reciprocate (a phenomenon that indirect reciprocity and costly signaling 
explain) but also, puzzlingly, “...among genetically unrelated people, in non-repeated 
interactions, when gains from reputation are small or absent.” 36  This last kind of 
cooperation is beneficial because it may have allowed our ancestors to live in larger 
groups and receive the benefits of doing so.37 Nevertheless, it remains controversial how 
we evolved the tendency to do so. Punishment could help explain this phenomenon, 
because it can help to secure cooperation. Nevertheless, punishment is costly. Even 
granting that the group level benefits of punishment (the ones that accrue to individuals 
in large cooperatives) outweigh the immediate costs,38 what would motivate relatively 
short-sighted individuals to consistently punish in the conditions characteristic of life in 
large groups (non-iterative interactions amongst genetically heterogeneous individuals 
where reputation is difficult to track)? What would make someone willing to commit to 
punishment in the face of its momentary costs?  
 Fehr and Gächter set out to answer these questions (among others) with an 
economic game.39 They set up the purest instance of the kind of interactions that we are 
concerned with (ones that are non-repeating and anonymous) by having groups of four 
people (anonymous to each other) play a "public goods" game. They gave participants an 
endowment of 20 monetary units (MUs) and then gave them the opportunity to invest it 
in a group project. The group project would return .4 MUs to each group member for 
every one MU invested, and at the end of the round, each player received information 
about how much other group members donated. To see how participants changed their 
strategy over time and with changing conditions, Fehr and Gächter had participants play 
                                               
36 (Fehr and Gächter 2002, 137) 
37 (E.g. Richerson and Boyd 2004) 
38 (E.g. Robert Boyd, Gintis, and Bowles 2010) 
39 (Fehr and Gächter 2002) 
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the game several times, but they told participants that they would never interact with 
anyone more than once.  
The structure of this game creates incentives and costs that militate against 
donating much to the project. For instance, the best possible outcome for any one 
individual would be to invest none in a case where everyone else went all in. In that case, 
the free-rider would walk away with 44 MUs, whereas everyone else would gain a modest 
4MUs, walking away with 24. Moreover, if I am the only one to contribute all my 
endowment, then I will end up with less than half my endowment, while everyone else 
turns a profit. This constrains how people actually play the game. In one experimental 
condition, after six iterations of this version of the game, Fehr and Gächter report, 
“...58.9% of the subjects contributed nothing and 75.6% contributed 5 MUs or less.”40 
 In another version of the game, Fehr and Gächter introduced the possibility of 
punishment. They told participants that at the end of the round (after receiving 
information about how much others in the group invested) each participant had the 
opportunity to spend some of their MUs to punish another group member. For each MU 
contributed toward punishing an individual, that individual would lose three MUs (with 
the loss was capped at 30). With the possibility of punishment in place, the average 
investment immediately shot up to more than 12 MUs. On the sixth iteration of the 
punishment condition, Fehr and Gächter report, “...38.9% of the subjects contributed 
their whole endowment and 77.8% contributed 15 MUs or more.”41 Not only was the 
threat of punishment effective in securing cooperation, punishment also occurred quite 
frequently, with more than 80% of subjects punishing at least once across the six 
iterations of the punishment condition. 
                                               
40 (Fehr and Gächter 2002, 138) 
41 (Fehr and Gächter 2002, 138) 
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 Conjecturing that emotions were responsible for this pattern of punishment, Fehr 
and Gächter followed up at the end of the game with questions about participants’ 
feelings toward another player given how that player’s investment compared to that of 
the rest of the group: “You decide to invest [5] francs to the project. The second group 
member invests [3] and the third [7] francs. Suppose the fourth member invests 2 francs 
to the project. You now accidentally meet this member. Please indicate your feeling 
towards this person.”42 Subjects rated both their anger and annoyance at the free-rider 
on a seven-point scale (one being “not at all” and seven being “very much”). Even with 
this rather modest discrepancy, 17.4% of participants indicated “very much” anger. 
Moreover, the higher the discrepancy between the investment of the free-rider and that 
of the other group members, the more anger participants reported (84% indicated five or 
greater in response to a vignette with a greater disparity between the free rider and 
others). Punishment in the public goods game followed a similar pattern. The higher the 
discrepancy was between the free-rider’s investment and the average investment of the 
others, the greater the punishment (the more MUs that were lost). Moreover, the most 
common form of punishment in the game was when above-average investors punished 
below-average investors.  
 For my purposes, this study holds a pinch of evidence and a generous helping of 
illustration. It provides a pinch of evidence that anger is a reactive process that results in 
punishment and that punishment secures cooperation of the relevant kind. The study 
suggests that anger is a reactive process in that it leads to an impulse to punish in 
response to the past actions of a free rider even in cases in which anticipated outcomes 
(such as maximizing profits) do not favor punishment. This is plausible because 
participants knew that they would not encounter the free-rider again, yet participants 
punished free-riders proportionally to the severity of their free-riding. Moreover, they 
                                               
42 (Fehr and Gächter 2002, 139) 
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punished free-riders just as frequently on the last round of the game, in which no one in 
the game would benefit from punishment. Finally, the threat of punishment in the game 
secured the benefits of cooperation even between people who were unrelated, who had 
no idea of each other’s reputation, and who had reason to think they would not interact 
with each other again. Importantly for my purposes, the study also illustrates how anger 
could possibly play an adaptive role in securing cooperation across a broad range of 
conditions because it is a reactive process. It supports a “how possibly” explanation for 
the evolution of altruism according to which a reactive processes was selected for its role 
in securing cooperation, and that is all I really need if I want to show how evolutionary 
considerations could, in principle, undercut deontological intuitions without 
undercutting evaluative intuitions more broadly. 
2.3 An undercutting defeater for deontological intuitions 
 Let us suppose that this adaptationist story is correct and that anger is a reactive 
process. In order to secure the non-immediate consequences of cooperation, the 
reactivity of anger leads us to act based on the past action of the free-rider rather than 
because of immediate outcomes relevant to punishment (e.g. improved investment in a 
cooperative venture). In so acting, we manifest an inclination toward punishment that is 
not motivated by the consequences of punishment. If so, then in the context of 
punishment, anger includes a set of inclinations to act in accordance with R (to act as if 
the value of punishing did not depend on its consequences). However, if we are inclined 
to judge and act as if the value of punishment is not based on outcomes precisely 
because this feeling was adaptive for securing good outcomes, then the feeling is not 
trustworthy regarding R. There is a disconnect between, on the one hand, the value of 
punishment reported by intuition and, on the other hand, the manner in which these 
intuitions arose. According to R, punishment is supposed to have value apart from its 
consequences but these intuitions arose because of their consequences.  
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Suppose for the sake of argument that there is some state of affairs that makes 
punishment valuable independently of its consequences (or a state of affairs that makes 
R true). The retributive intuitions produced by anger could not possibly have an 
evidential connection to that state of affairs. Anger produces intuitions that support R 
because such intuitions deter freeriding, but the fact that these intuitions deter freeriding 
lacks an evidential connection to the states of affairs that R reports. More specifically, 
(and for reasons that I discuss in more detail in the following section) deterrence (or any 
other consequence of punishment) cannot be an indicator of any value that a 
punishment might have aside from its consequences (for reasons that I discuss in more 
detail in section 2.4). Thus, the putative evolutionary function of anger in the production 
of retributive intuitions serves as an undercutting defeater for those intuitions with 
respect to R. 
Perhaps an analogy will flesh out the line of reasoning. Suppose that Geppetto is 
designing the psychology of a cyborg that he calls Pinocchio. Geppetto wants to make 
Pinocchio very realistic, and his aesthetic sensibilities favor a slightly scrawny boy. He 
foresees that this design preference will result in real boys picking on Pinocchio. Thus, he 
programs into Pinocchio a strong drive to resist bullies. He reasons that the policy of 
resisting bullies, even in cases where immediate consequences militate against doing so, 
will lead Pinocchio to suffer less from bullies in the long run. Bullies will realize that it is 
less costly to pick on other scrawny boys who are less scrappy, and they will bother 
Pinocchio less as a result. Geppetto wants Pinocchio to have the capacity for prospection, 
but Geppetto cannot guarantee that Pinocchio will be able to consistently anticipate the 
long-term value of resisting bullies.43 Therefore, Geppetto designs Pinocchio with a drive 
to resist bullies that is not derived from the immediate prospective value of doing so. 
                                               
43 In any single encounter with a bully, Pinocchio would anticipate suffering immediate losses that he 
would not suffer if he did not resist; losses that favor giving in over resisting. 
 52 
This drive gives Pinocchio an urge to react to the provocations of bullies rather than only 
to respond to the immediate prospects (largely negative) of doing so.44 To Pinocchio, 
the urge to resist is there whether or not it will result in a good outcome, thus to him, the 
urge does not to derive from the anticipated outcome of resisting.45 Once Geppetto 
completes his design, Pinocchio will be inclined to act and judge in accordance with the 
principle that resisting bullies has value not derived from its consequences or non-
derivative value.46 He might even discover that his intuitions about resisting bullies 
support the following principle and come to consciously believe it. 
B - The value of acts of resistance toward bullies is not (or not only) derived from 
their consequences. 
From the third-person perspective, it seems obvious that Geppetto’s design has 
distorted Pinocchio’s axiological beliefs about resisting bullies. If someone were to tell 
Pinocchio of Geppetto’s design choices, he should no longer believe B. With the right 
information, he should conclude that his inclinations to resist bullies are not good 
evidence for B. Since Pinocchio’s inclinations to resist bullies are disconnected from any 
source of value that resistance might have aside from its consequences, he has an 
                                               
44 Notice that when a desire is characterized as non-derivative in this way, it need not be indefeasible by 
consequentialist considerations. That is, overturning or defeating such a desire with a competing desire to 
maximize consequences does not make the defeated desire any more derivative. For instance, if a bully 
threatens lethal force, Pinocchio might overcome his urge to resist because of the catastrophic 
consequences of doing so. However, notice that this would not mean that the urge is derived from 
anticipated outcomes. That is, when Pinocchio has this urge prior to the threat of lethal force, it is not an 
urge to bring about an outcome. Rather, the right way to describe the situation is that Pinocchio feels an 
urge to resist that does not derive from the consequences of doing so, but he does not give in to that urge 
because of the catastrophic consequences of doing so. Retributive intuitions are similarly defeasible by 
consequentialist considerations. For instance, I suspect that most retributivists would say that even if 
punishment were good in itself, it would be reasonable and right not to punish someone because doing so 
would have catastrophic consequences. That is, retributive intuitions seem defeasible in just the way 
Pinocchio’s non-consequentialist urge could be. 
45 Essentially, Geppetto programs Pinocchio with a subjective commitment device, a concept owing to the 
work of several economists, (e.g. Frank 1988).  
46 It is tempting to think that non-derivative value is identical to non-instrumental value. However, I think 
these concepts are distinct. For instance, a personal insult can be understood as instrumental for “getting 
even”, but this is not to say that the value of the insult is derived from its consequences. Rather a successful 
insult is constitutive of “getting even”. To me, this looks like an example in which an insult has non-
derivative value (from the perspective of the insulter), but in which it is understood as instrumental for 
another aim, getting even. 
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undercutting defeater for those intuitions. Therefore, Pinocchio should not believe B on 
the basis of his intuitions. 
 If this argument is compelling in Pinocchio’s case, then it should also be 
compelling in the case of R. If the adaptationist story about anger is correct, then the 
intuitions that support R secure good biological consequences in the long run just as they 
would if they were designed to do so. As such, they are similarly disconnected from any 
non-derivative value that punishment might have.47 Thus, insofar as anger influences our 
intuitions about punishment, we are not justified in believing based on intuition that 
punishment has non-derivative value. 
2.4 A more detailed explanation of the disconnect 
The defeater I have offered is supposed to sever the evidential connection 
between retributive  intuitions and the retributive principle R. How does this work? The 
argument shows that retributive intuitions are not a good indicator of non-derivative 
value (reported by R). To demonstrate this more clearly, let us take a closer look at the 
concept of indication. One state of affairs can indicate another if the states are highly 
correlated with one another, either because one state of affairs causes (or constitutes) 
the other or because both states of affairs have a common cause (or constitutive base) 
(Dretske 1999). 48  The requirement of a causal or constitutive dependency relation 
between two variables, is intended to rule out coincidental correlations between them. 
For instance, from 1999 to 2009 there was a strong correlation between the number of 
people who drowned in swimming pools and the number of films that Nicolas Cage 
appeared in (see www.tylervigen.com). However, this does not mean that Cage 
                                               
47 Notice that the argument does not hinge on any conflation of biological and moral goods. If the intuitions 
were shaped to bring about good consequences of any kind (e.g. biological or moral), then they cannot 
indicate non-derivative value of any kind, whether moral or biological. 
48 Dretske cashes out the dependency relation in terms of causation. I suspect that the dependency relation 
that explains a correlation need not be causal; it could also be constitutive dependency. See Berker 
forthcoming for a detailed discussion of the constitutive grounding relation in connection with debunking 
arguments. 
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appearances are an indicator of drowning deaths (or vice versa), because the correlation 
could be entirely coincidental. 
Now, even if there were a correlation between retributive intuitions (the 
inclinations that support R) and non-derivative value (for punishment), the correlation 
could not possibly be explained by any of the relevant causal or constitutive dependency 
relations. Thus, any correlation will be coincidental and retributive intuitions cannot be 
an indicator of non-derivative value. 
Consider the three possible explanations for the correlation. Suppose that 
retributive intuitions cause or constitute a state of affairs in which punishment has non-
derivative value. If non-derivative value of punishment was constituted by the existence 
of retributive intuitions and if retributive intuitions were selected for their deterrent 
value, then the non-derivative value of punishment would depend on (either causally or 
constitutively) the deterrent value of retributive intuitions. Such a dependency seems 
impossible. Given the definition of non-derivative value, there should be cases in which 
punishment has non-derivative value but in which the deterrent value of retributive 
intuitions fails to obtain. For instance, there are possible contexts in which retributive 
inclinations do not deter freeriders. When those with retributive inclinations represent 
only a small percentage of a population, punishment for freeriding becomes so unlikely 
as to obliterate the deterrent effect of these inclinations (see e.g. S. Bowles and Gintis 
2004). It seems that if punishment has non-derivative value, then it should retain its 
value even in those circumstances. But if this is correct, then any correlation between the 
deterrent value of the intuition and the non-derivative value of punishment will be a 
coincidence, due to the fact that most of the time, acts of punishment just happen to 
occur in a context in which retributive intuitions do have deterrent value.  
Now suppose that the non-derivative value of punishment causes or constitutes 
the states of affairs in which retributive intuitions exist or are manifested. This 
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possibility seems to be almost entirely ruled out by the evolutionary explanation of 
retributive intuitions. If that explanation is correct, then we would have retributive 
intuitions whether or not punishment has non-derivative value. So it also seems unlikely 
that the manifestation of retributive intuitions depends in any way on the non-derivative 
value of punishment. If these intuitions were selected for their good outcomes, then 
there is no reason to think that their manifestation would depend on punishment having 
non-derivative value. Rather, their manifestation will depend on whatever conditions are 
necessary for them to have deterrent value. Of course, retributive intuitions might 
happen to be manifested in cases in which punishment has non-derivative value, but this 
would be entirely coincidental. 
Now suppose that retributive intuitions (either their existence or manifestation) 
and the non-derivative value of punishment have a common cause.49 This too seems 
impossible if the evolutionary explanation is correct. Again, the existence of retributive 
intuitions depends only on their deterrent effect. So it is hard to see how some other 
factor could cause retributive intuitions to exist and also cause punishment to have non-
derivative value. Likewise, it is hard to see how a third factor could cause instances of 
punishment to have non-derivative value and cause retributive intuitions to be 
manifested. If these intuitions were selected for their deterrent function and if this 
function depends on the frequent manifestation of retributive intuitions, then it appears 
unlikely that non-derivative value would be caused by any of the conditions that elicit 
retributive intuitions. If the two happen to co-occur then this would be entirely 
coincidental. 
The problem with all of these possibilities is that non-derivative value and 
deterrent value are, by their definition, independent sources of value. As a result, they 
                                               
49 We need not consider the possibility that they have a common constitutive base, because as a matter of 
definition, they do not. 
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are constituted by different facts, and any connection between the two sources of value 
will be coincidental. Non-derivative value is constituted by facts about an action aside 
from its consequences, whereas deterrent value is constituted by facts about the action’s 
outcome aside from the intrinsic features of an action or what came before the action. 
Any overlap between these sources of value is likely to be coincidental.   
2.5 What the argument does not show 
 Now, the argument might tempt someone to conclude that retributive 
inclinations are untrustworthy in the sweeping sense that we are never justified in acting 
or judging on their basis, but this conclusion certainly does not follow. A key feature of 
the argument is that it only severs the evidential connection between retributive 
intuitions and the retributive principle R. It does not undercut their evidential support of 
other beliefs or principles. The Pinocchio case also helps to illustrate this. Even if he 
should not believe that resisting bullies has non-derivative value, he may be warranted in 
acting on his urge to resist. Geppetto’s forethought and beneficent design may give 
Pinocchio some warrant for acting on his urge to resist bullies. Likewise, the argument I 
have given gives us no additional reason to mistrust our retributive intuitions when 
applied to practical questions about when to punish (as opposed to axiological questions 
about whether it has non-derivative value). However, we cannot guarantee that natural 
selection positions us to have retributive intuitions with moral worth. 
Here is another way to put the point. The argument debunks retributive 
intuitions as evidence for retributive standards of rightness, but does not debunk the 
intuitions as evidence for a retributive decision procedure. A retributive standard of 
rightness might say that punishment is right if and only if it is deserved (given the nature 
of a past offense). If the debunking argument is correct, then retributive intuitions do not 
provide good evidence for such a standard (at least insofar as this standard implies that 
punishment has non-derivative value). Nevertheless, this is not to say that retributive 
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intuitions do not provide good evidence for a retributive decision procedure, especially if 
such a procedure can be justified because of its good consequences (e.g. deterrence).  
By analogy, Pinocchio may very well be justified in accepting the following 
decision procedure: if you have an urge to resist the bully, then do so. Such a decision 
procedure would be warranted insofar as Pinocchio is not a masochist and insofar as 
Geppetto’s design tends to diminish bullying in the long run. Similarly, we may at times 
be justified in punishing on the basis of retributive intuitions (in accordance with a 
retributive decision procedure). This is because the consequences of doing so may align 
with our moral or non-moral aims. On either way of putting the point, the undercutting 
defeater only applies to the support that our intuitions seem to provide for R. I cannot 
think of any reason to think that they are untrustworthy in the more sweeping sense. 
2.6 Generalizing the argument  
Importantly, this conclusion only pertains to retributive moral intuitions, not to 
all deontological intuitions. Nevertheless, if the evolution of other moral emotions 
follows this same pattern (placing non-derivative value on action in order to improve 
fitness), then a similar argument can be given concerning deontological intuitions more 
broadly. Greene provides reasons to generalize.50 The idea is that moral emotions are 
domain-specific adaptations, where the specific domain of each moral emotion is a 
recurring situation that constitutes one of the “…demands and opportunities created by 
social life.”51. In programming us with emotions, nature declines to “…leave it to our 
powers of reasoning to figure out that saving a drowning child is a good thing to do…”52 
or that hurting others and lying are bad things to do. In other words, many moral 
emotions lead us to react to specific kinds of situations (ones that involve inter alia 
assistance, punishment, promises, testimony, and incentives to harm) in specific ways 
                                               
50 (See esp. J. D. Greene 2008, 59–60, 72) 
51 (J. D. Greene 2008, 60) 
52 (J. D. Greene 2008, 60) 
 58 
rather than responding only to the prospective value of acting. This is because the 
immediate prospects these situations present lean in favor of declining assistance, 
avoiding confrontation and punishment, breaking promises, lying to others, and doing 
physical harm to get what one wants. Moreover, acting against these inclinations is 
supposed to be adaptive for its role in supporting human cooperation. If this is right, 
then we can generalize the argument to undercut intuitions that support a broader range 
of deontological principles, specifically, any deontological principle that the value of a 
certain action is not (or not only) derived from its consequences. The case of anger and 
punishment allows us to see the kind of problem that would be raised for other 
deontological intuitions. Nevertheless, from a methodological perspective, the case needs 
to be made one moral emotion and one deontological principle at a time.53  
3. Objections and replies 
3.1 The argument proves too much 
The most obvious objection to the argument is that there is also a disconnect 
between evaluative intuitions and the sources of value they report. For instance, 
nociceptive processes produce intuitions that seem to support the claim that that pain is 
bad, and they were selected to do so because of their tendency to aid survival. Here, we 
may have a similar disconnect. The intuitions report the objective badness of pain, 
whereas nociceptive processes produce those intuitions because of the biological 
badness of bodily insult and injury. If there is a disconnect between objective badness 
and biological badness, then we have an undercutting defeater for these evaluative 
intuitions. Therefore, the objection goes, the case against non-prospective processes 
seems to again prove too much, since it also undercuts the evaluative intuitions that 
                                               
53 For one, I am not sure that the moral emotions can all be explained in this way. For another, it is not yet 
clear to me that all cases of non-derivative valuing derive from domain-specific adaptations of this kind. 
 59 
support a theory of value (necessary for consequentialism). In other words, it does not 
undermine deontology any more than it undermines consequentialism. 
3.2 Reply: the putative disconnect between evaluative intuitions and objective values is 
different 
 While evaluative intuitions may be on shaky footing, their footing is independent 
of deontological intuitions. This is because my argument against deontological intuitions 
points out a distinct undercutting defeater. The undercutting defeater severs the 
evidential connection between deontological intuitions and non-derivative value by 
showing that deontological intuitions cannot indicate non-derivative value. The defeater 
severs this specific evidential connection not only because deontological intuitions were 
shaped by evolution but also because of the content of the deontological principles in 
question: that certain actions have non-derivative value. If an inclination was selected 
for good outcomes like deterrence, then it cannot indicate that acting in accordance with 
that inclination has non-derivative value (as deontological principles state).54 Thus, I am 
giving a reason to doubt the evidential value of deontological intuitions (with respect to 
deontological principles) that we do not have for doubting other evaluative intuitions 
(which support other principles besides deontological principles).  
It is an entirely different question whether an inclination that produces good 
biological outcomes can indicate that certain actions have moral value (regardless of 
whether this value is non-derivative). This is one question that the evolutionary 
debunking arguments of Street attempts to answer. Moreover, it is a question that does 
not hinge on whether non-derivative value enters into the content of the evaluative 
                                               
54 At least, this is true so long as non-derivative value is understood directly in terms of the value of acting 
and not in terms of value that is derived from the acceptance of a certain ethical decision procedure or 
practice (which might have a consequentialist justification). Consider an example. Rawls (1955) 
distinguishes between justifying actions within a practice of promising or punishing (both of which involve 
ignoring certain reasons one might have not to promise or not to punish) and justifying the practice itself 
(perhaps in terms of its consequences). Reasons that one accepts from within a practice (and which are in 
some sense supported by the consequences or aims of the practice) do not count as non-derivative reasons 
if they are grounded in the consequences of the practice. 
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beliefs in question. Moreover, my argument focuses on the relation between derivative 
and non-derivative value, whereas these debunking arguments focus on the relation 
between biological and moral value. There are important differences between these 
relations. As I argued above (in section 2.4), non-derivative value and deterrent value are, 
by their definition, independent sources of value. By contrast, there is room in 
conceptual space for biological goods like survival to (partially) constitute objective 
goods like flourishing.  
The point is that the defeater that I have proposed for deontological intuitions 
severs their evidential connection with deontological principles in a way that does not 
apply to evaluative intuitions more broadly, so the debunking argument does not prove 
too much. Thus, we have a clear case in which evolutionary considerations have 
implications for first order moral discourse, somewhat independently of metaethical 
concerns raised by the evolution of our moral faculties. 
4. Conclusion 
In their efforts to undercut some of the primary evidence against their theories, 
some consequentialists have employed evolutionary debunking arguments against 
deontological intuitions. So far, these arguments have met with little success, because 
the evolutionary considerations offered may undercut a much wider range of intuitions. I 
presented an argument that overcomes these challenges. I argued that non-prospective 
processes – processes that motivate action but not based on an action’s outcome – might 
explain a range of deontological moral intuitions. These intuitions seem to support anti-
consequentialist principles, according to which the value of various kinds of action does 
not derive from that action’s outcome. Nevertheless, the evolutionary function of some 
non-prospective processes is to bring about certain outcomes. If this is right, then it is 
quite plausible that we would have these intuitions even if they were false, even if the 
relevant actions were only valuable because of their consequences. 
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 Of central importance for the argument I have just given, the defect in non-
prospective processes is not just that they aim at reproductive fitness, but more 
specifically that they increase reproductive fitness by influencing organisms to react to 
certain types of situation or action rather than approach them prospectively. The 
adaptiveness of this tendency reveals a disconnect between the intuitions that these 
processes produce and the states of affairs they seem to report (through their support of 
principles like R). So far, this specific defect only undermines deontological intuitions. 
The argument does not seem to apply to evaluative intuitions more broadly because 
biological values and objective sources of value do not necessarily have an independent 
constitutive base. 
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Chapter 2  
Spiteful Punishment and Retribution: Strategy and Motive for Non-Strategic 
Organisms 
 
Kathi Sylvester was working as a crossing guard one day at a school in Surprise, 
Arizona when Timothy Francisco approached the crossing in his car. He signaled no 
intention to stop, and in response, Sylvester “smacked” his driver-side window and 
brandished her stop sign, thereby urging him to obey the traffic regulations for school 
zones. In reaction, Francisco got out of his car and punched Sylvester in the face, leading 
to a broken jaw and an overnight hospital stay.  
One interesting feature of Francisco’s actions (and perhaps Sylvester’s as well) is 
that they were clearly reactive. In response to her unintended provocation, Francisco 
imposed a serious cost on Sylvester in the form of physical and emotional harm, and it is 
unlikely that he acted because of the anticipated outcome of his action. Even if Francisco 
thought he could get away with assaulting Sylvester, it certainly wouldn’t have done him 
any good to do so. If he was in a hurry to get somewhere, as the details of the case 
suggest, stopping his car and getting out probably put him in a bigger rush when left the 
scene of the assault. If he was concerned about his reputation, he certainly would have 
gained little by assaulting someone who had not made any serious threats to it. Even if 
the assault had reputational effects, it is unlikely that as a result of his augmented 
reputation he would deter enough poor treatment to offset the probable costs of 
assaulting Sylvester. Additionally, the more widespread his reputation became for this 
incident, the more likely that Francisco’s crime would be detected by authorities. While it 
is not entirely unlikely that Francisco got pleasure or satisfaction from punching 
Sylvester, neither would this seem to balance out the risks of assaulting her.  
Of course, this could all derive from short-sightedness. On this hypothesis 
Francisco acted with some of the outcomes of his action in mind, but did not think 
through all of the possible outcomes. When Francisco later turned himself in to the 
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authorities, he admitted that he let Sylvester “get to him”. This amounts to an admission 
that he should not have let her “get to him” and that he would not have acted so 
impulsively if he had not. By his own admission, Francisco’s actions reveal a regrettable 
lack of foresighted control. Additionally, the salience of institutionalized punishment for 
crimes like assault makes it unlikely that Francisco thought through the possible costs of 
his action. We need an explanation of why these salient costs were obscured or 
outweighed by the desire to retaliate. Why did the impulse to react to provocation 
overwhelm Francisco’s foresight? A salient possibility is that Francisco was angry and 
that his anger subverted the more careful prospective deliberation that he might have 
otherwise engaged in.  
Francisco is not alone in the possession of angry, reactive impulses, and this is 
part of the reason that blame seems an appropriate response to his impulsive action. At 
times, anger impels each of us to react against our better judgment if we do not actively 
resist the impulse. Why is this so? 
Many suspect that biological or cultural evolution offer the best explanation for 
reactive, retributive impulses connected with anger (see e.g. Frank 1988; Petersen et al. 
2010; McCullough, Kurzban, and Tabak 2012). This is the sort of explanation appealed 
to in the how-possibly explanation of retributive intuitions in the first chapter. One 
peculiarity of the view presented there is that the retributive motivation inherent to 
anger was presented as a group level cooperative adaptation, one that helps to protect 
cooperation by motivating retributive punishment of defectors, or punishment that is not 
motivated by the anticipated outcomes of punishment. Nevertheless, as we saw in 
Francisco’s case, the reactivity of anger is not secluded to its influence on moral 
punishment – directed at norm violations. It is unlikely that it only functions to enforce 
the kind of extreme cooperation (in non-iterative, non-reputational interactions with 
non-kin) that we see in human beings. Rather, a psychological state like anger may also 
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have a role to play in the tendency of a vervet monkey to attack the kin of the monkey 
who just attacked him (e.g. Cheney and Seyfarth 1989); or in a capuchin monkey’s 
rejection of unequal rewards (e.g. Brosnan and de Waal 2003); or perhaps even in the 
behaviors of more distant mammalian lineages. In this chapter, I address this peculiarity 
in the evolutionary explanation of the previous chapter. I argue that current evolutionary 
explanations of retributive punishment are actually insufficient to explain why anger 
includes a retributive motive and why this motive produces an impulse that easily results 
in spiteful action. I then present a novel proposal concerning the origin of this 
disposition. 
In the following section, I point out how current evolutionary explanations of 
retributive motives rely on the prospective capacities of organisms. On these models, 
punishment is understood as a behavior modification strategy, and the prospective 
capacities of the punishee are necessary for the strategy to succeed. I pose two problems 
that arise from this understanding of retributive punishment, and I argue that these 
problems point to the necessity of a more ancient evolutionary explanation of the 
retributive motivation inherent to anger, one that precedes the development of complex 
prospective capacities. In the second section, I develop just such an explanation. This 
explanation demonstrates the necessity of a retributive motive to implement a uniquely 
stable strategy for resource competition. In the penultimate section, I show that this 
model does explain certain features of an anger-like motivational state of rodents. 
Nevertheless, I will not make the argument that this motivational state is of the same 
kind as anger in humans, a task I leave for the following chapter. I conclude by 
abstracting from this case some of the benefits of understanding the phylogenetically 
ancient adaptations that humans may possess. 
1. Limitations on Idealized Models of the Evolution of Punishment 
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In this section, I argue that prominent models explaining retributive motivation 
suffer from explanatory deficiencies. To make that argument, I need to say a good deal 
more about these models. The models can be used to explain, among other things, the 
existence of punishment.1 I understand punishment as a behavioral strategy by which 
one entity (e.g. organism or group of organisms) diminishes the fitness of another entity 
in response to (or proximally caused by) a provoking incident involving that entity, 
usually an incident that diminishes the fitness of the punisher (cf. Nakao and Machery 
2012). I leave the details open to broad interpretation, because I think there are several 
possible types of punishment that are conceptual possibilities. For instance, the 
definition is satisfied by one organism diminishing the absolute, relative or inclusive 
fitness of another organism at some or no cost and is even satisfied by a group 
diminishing the fitness of another group or a group diminishing the fitness of an 
individual. Behaviors like these all seem to me to count as punishment. Nevertheless, the 
definition does exclude predation behaviors. While predators do diminish the fitness of 
their prey, they do not usually do so in response to a provoking incident. The models I 
will consider have two other features that require further elaboration. They require 
prospective capacities on the part of the punishee, and the punishment strategies they 
explain cannot be implemented by prospective capacities. 
1.1 Prospective capacities of the punishees 
The models of human punishment that I will criticize explain its existence and 
maintenance as a behavior-modification strategy. This kind of explanation is pursued by 
a majority of evolutionary models of punishment (see e.g. Nakao and Machery 2012) 
with the exception of those I consider shortly. The most plausible proximate explanation 
for the ability to learn from punishment (on the part of the recipient or audience of 
                                               
1 The phenomena on which many of these models focus is actually human cooperation. Nevertheless, on 
these models, punishment in some form seems to be necessary for certain forms of cooperation and cultural 
evolution. As such, the models can be used to explain the existence of punishment as an adaptation for 
cooperation. 
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punishment) is the possession of prospective capacities. Recall that prospective 
processes select actions based on the internally represented outcome of the action. 
Moreover, the consequences of actions are calculated with reference to a learned causal 
model (e.g. Gläscher et al. 2010). The selection models that I criticize require that agents 
be able to learn causal relationships to anticipate the outcome or expected utility of 
social interactions. When applied to these models this means that a punishee or audience 
can acquire information from the punisher, from the act of punishment or from its 
consequences and can use that information to tailor some of their decisions to the 
strategic demands of each situation. For example, self-interested agents with prospective 
capacities can learn from punishment of themselves and others that certain selfish 
behaviors leads to punishment at least when a known punisher is present. As a result, 
the likelihood of punishment can offset the material benefits of selfish behavior in the 
relevant situations and in a way that coerces self-interested agents to modify their 
behavior. 
Importantly, successful punishment strategies in models of direct reciprocal 
altruism (as in Axelrod 1984; Trivers 1971) often do not require behavior modification, 
because they involve forms of punishment either that benefit the punisher by cutting 
their losses or that affect interaction partners without modifying their behavior.2 Thus, 
the problem I will pose does not apply to many of the models within this broader family.  
On the other hand, reputational models usually do require agents with 
prospection. Consider the commitment model (Frank 1988). This model attempts to 
explain how humans are able to solve commitment problems like the following: 
Deterrence. Suppose Smith grows wheat and Jones raises cattle on adjacent plots 
of land. Jones is liable for whatever damage his steers do to Smith’s wheat. He can 
                                               
2 For example, an organism can punish another organism by killing it. For a range of biological examples 
of this form of punishment, see Nakao and Machery (2012) 
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prevent damage altogether by fencing his land, which would cost him $200. If he 
leaves his land unfenced, his steers will eat $1000 worth of wheat. Jones knows, 
however, that if his steers do eat Smith’s wheat, it will cost Smith $2000 to take him 
to court…Smith threatens to sue Jones for damages if he does not fence his land. But 
if Jones believed Smith to be a rational, self-interested person, this threat is not 
credible. Once the wheat has been eaten, there is no longer any use for Smith to go to 
court. He would lose more than he recovered. (Frank 1988, 48) 
The problem concerns how Smith can make a credible threat, when Jones knows that it 
is not in Smith’s immediate interest to go to court. In a case like this, a retributive 
motivation can serve as a commitment device3, meaning that it would motivate Smith to 
follow through with his threat and thereby punish Jones, even if it is not in his 
immediate interest to do so. Smith is likely to benefit in one of two ways from possessing 
this commitment device. One possibility is that Smith will retaliate against Jones’s 
noncompliance and thereby foster a beneficial reputation for following through with his 
threats. (For instance, if Smith’s neighbors Amjad, Baggi, and Castro each subsequently 
decide to raise cattle on their property, then Smith’s threats will be more credible to 
them than they were to Jones, providing a net benefit to Smith if they comply with his 
wishes.) The other possibility is that Jones complies because, as a result of Smith’s 
retributive motivation, he already has such a reputation.4 Either way, Smith is likely to 
get reputational benefits from retributive motivation.5 Moreover, it is easy to see how 
                                               
3 More specifically, it is a subjective commitment device, contrasted with objective or external commitment 
devices, which might offer, say, material incentives for following through with a threat. For instance, Smith 
might put the money necessary to sue Jones in an escrow account for his lawyer, the reimbursement of 
which is contingent on Jones building a fence. In this way, Jones would “tie himself to the mast” with an 
external commitment device. 
4 Frank (1988) also goes to great pains to show how reliable signals of moral sentiments like outrage might 
be achieved, so that those who possess them rarely violate their self-interest despite having a tendency to 
do so.  
5 One might expect that the reputational benefits of punishment would be factored into the decision to 
punish and that this would make the decision purely strategic in the sense of being guided by internally 
represented future benefits. However, punishment motives need not be prospective in order to be sensitive 
 68 
these benefits could translate to fitness benefits. This kind of explanation of retributive 
motivation requires prospection because the benefits of punishment only obtain if other 
agents are influenced by the reputation of the punisher and if they can use this 
information to tailor some of their behaviors to the demands of situations involving that 
specific individual. On this model, the reputational benefits have their effects by entering 
into the strategic considerations of those deciding whether to comply when threatened. 
Also among the models I will criticize are prominent group selection models, 
which aim to explain the evolution of human cooperation by appealing to the group level 
benefits of temporarily spiteful punishment (e.g. Robert Boyd, Gintis, and Bowles 2010; 
S. Bowles and Gintis 2011). These models generally focus on large, cultural groups and 
demonstrate that a strategy of retributive punishment can protect cooperation in large 
groups or prevent group extinction and thus enable cooperation to persist and spread as 
a result of cultural group selection. On these models, retributive punishment ends up 
being adaptive because it correlates with group cooperation, which can yield higher 
fitness benefits to punishers than the relative within-group costs of punishing. The latter 
would be very low when most people cooperate or when there are low cost forms of 
punishment such as social gossip and ostracism.  
These models depend on prospection because the models evaluate the conditions 
in which purely self-interested agents will cooperate due to the likelihood of punishment. 
This assumption requires prospection because the evolution of punishment in these 
                                                                                                                                            
to factors that are strategically relevant to the effectiveness of the commitment device. For instance, 
audience effects, whereby a behavior is mediated by the presence of other individuals, typically can be 
explained by the eliciting conditions of the behavior rather than by an anticipation of the effects on the 
audience. Many non-human species display audience effects (e.g. Marler, Dufty, and Pickert 1986) but 
nonetheless lack the ability to represent the mental states of other organisms. Moreover, there is reason to 
suspect that some human emotions are unconsciously influenced by the presence of an audience (Fridlund 
1991). Thus, there is good reason to believe that reputational effects can be achieved without the significant 
computational costs of representing their effects in prospective deliberation. Thus, there is good reason to 
suppose that punishment motives can be sensitive to strategically relevant factors without any internal 
representation of the strategic effects of those factors.  
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models depends on individuals being able to predict the likelihood of punishment given 
prior interactions with or observations of punishers.6  
My criticisms will also apply to recent partner selection models. These models 
explain the evolution of cooperation by appealing to partner selection as an evolutionary 
pressure resulting from the necessity of engaging in mutually beneficial cooperative 
ventures (e.g. Baumard, André, and Sperber 2013). In these models, individuals succeed 
by being selected as partners in mutually beneficial ventures. Whether an individual 
selects a potential partner depends on whether the individual appears attractive as a 
partner. For instance, if someone is known to be untrustworthy in various ways, he will 
be less attractive as a partner because other individuals know that the he may defect or 
unfairly divide or conceal the returns of the mutual venture. By contrast, individuals with 
a tendency to punish unfair behaviors would be highly attractive accessories in mutually 
beneficial ventures. Prospective partners know, for instance, that they can trust such a 
person to oppose or punish someone else who attempts to make off with an unfair share 
of the returns. Given that attractive partners have increased likelihood of success and 
thus survival, we can explain the widespread tendency to punish unfair behaviors in 
terms of this tendency. Obviously, partner selection requires some degree of prospection 
in order to decide which partner is the most attractive for a collaborative venture. The 
partner must be able to anticipate the likelihood that potential partners will act in certain 
ways in order to decide which partnership will produce the most profitable outcome.  
1.2 Punishment is not motivated by prospection 
While all of these models require prospective capacities of punishees, they 
indirectly constrain the use of prospective capacities in punishers. In all of the models 
that I will consider, punishment has a cost and the benefits of punishment, if any, are 
                                               
6 Moreover, the explicit target of these models are groups of hunter-gatherers in the Pleistocene, well after 
the human and chimpanzee lineages had diverged and during which tool use became more common (e.g. 
Samuel Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz 2003). Thus, it is also likely that the organisms to whom these 
models apply had prospective capacities. 
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deferred or intangible. This means that punishment in these models is often temporarily 
spiteful, because it imposes a cost on the punishee at an immediate cost to the punisher. 
Importantly, the punishment strategies that are successful on these models cannot be 
implemented by the prospective capacities that we find in human and non-human 
animals. Prospective processes will usually weigh against temporarily spiteful 
punishment because of its immediate material costs and lack of immediate material 
benefits.  
One might think that prospective capacities could implement temporarily spiteful 
punishment so long as an organism is capable of long-distance prospection or extreme 
foresight. For instance, one might prospectively balance the immediate costs of 
punishment against its future consequences, say deterrence, and decide in favor of 
punishment7 Nevertheless, well-established, cross-species work on temporal discounting 
shows that the prospective capacities of almost any species place exponentially greater 
weight on immediate rewards than more distant rewards (e.g. Critchfield and Kollins 
2001). For example, the far off, intangible consequence of deterrence will as a matter of 
psychological fact, usually have much less value in the calculation of expected utility than 
the immediate costs of punishing. Moreover, for punishment to proliferate in the models 
in question, it has to take place in precisely this kind of situation, in which its benefits 
are far off or intangible. Thus, long-range prospection as it is implemented in most 
animals could not plausibly function as the proximate motive for temporarily spiteful 
punishment that these models aim to explain.8  
Alternatively, one might think that punishment could be motivated by the 
prospective value of satisfying retributive preferences, such as the preference that non-
                                               
7 It is important to notice here that prospection is not the same as foresight. Calculating the immediate 
benefits of an action by itself can be a prospective enterprise. For instance, one could use a causal model to 
calculate the immediate rewards of one action compared to another without giving any thought to more 
temporally distant rewards. This doesn’t require a great deal of foresight, but it is a clear case of 
prospection on my understanding of that term. 
8 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Frank’s discussion of the matching law (1988, ch. 4). 
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cooperators be penalized for their non-cooperation. The proposal is that this preference 
could offer its own non-material incentive that weighs against the material incentives not 
to punish. There are two problems with this proposal. One is a consequence of the fact 
that this is a non-material benefit. It follows that the reward function for this preference 
is not determined by any material benefit, like food or sexual fulfillment. That is, the aim, 
achievement of which satisfies the retributive preference, cannot be described in terms of 
future material benefits. Moreover, we cannot describe the object of these preferences 
without referring to the past: righting a past wrong, settling a past score, meting out just 
deserts of past actions, paying back past insults, balancing the scales that were upset in 
the past. While it is reasonable to think that the future satisfaction of these preferences 
could factor into the operation of prospection, the nature of these motives is still 
essentially reactive. Their satisfaction depends on reacting to past events rather than 
achieving an aim that refers entirely to the future. Thus, there is an ineliminable reactive 
component to this “prospective” implementation of temporarily spiteful punishment.  
There is another problem with the idea that punishment is motivated by 
prospection that considers retributive preferences. It is that a retributive preference, as 
prospectively weighed against other incentives, is not a satisfactory explanation for many 
instances of temporarily spiteful punishment. For instance, in the case of Timothy 
Francisco, we have some reason to doubt that he engaged in prospective deliberation (or 
perhaps even subpersonal prospective computations) that weighed the satisfaction of his 
retributive preference against other concomitant outcomes. It is unlikely that the 
satisfaction of retributive preferences could have outweighed his other preferences (e.g. 
not to be imprisoned for assault). The bypassing of prospective considerations seems to 
be a general aspect of impulsive actions. 
We can conclude that temporarily spiteful punishment is a behavioral strategy 
that probably requires a non-prospective motive, largely because temporarily spiteful 
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punishment is not directed at the immediate material benefits of punishment. In other 
words, temporarily spiteful punishment requires retributive motives for its 
implementation. Thus, evolutionary models that appeal to the adaptiveness of 
temporarily spiteful punishment strategies offer a promising way to explain the existence 
of retributive motives, since these motives are necessary to implement successful 
strategies. 
Importantly, this claim does not apply to prominent models of reciprocal 
altruism (e.g. Axelrod 1984), because successful punishment strategies in these models 
usually do achieve an immediate material benefits and thus do not require a retributive 
motive. For instance, Axelrod’s model of reciprocal altruism tested several different 
strategies in an idealized game called the prisoner’s dilemma. In the prisoner’s dilemma, 
players can cooperate or defect. If both cooperate, both receive a modest payout say $8. 
If one defects while the other cooperates, the defector receives the maximum payout say 
$10, whereas the cooperator receives the lowest payout, say $1. Finally, if both players 
defect then both receive a payout that is not the lowest but is less than the payout if both 
cooperate say $3. In the one-shot prisoners dilemma, the best strategy is to defect. 
Regardless of what the one player does, the other player will improve her payout if she 
defects. Suppose for instance, that my partner defects, if I cooperate, I get $1, and if I 
defect, I get $3. Now suppose that my partner cooperates, if I cooperate, I get $8, and if I 
defect, I get $10. In both cases, I do better if I defect. However, Axelrod found that when 
the dilemma is iterated with a specific partner, unconditional defection is not the optimal 
strategy. Specifically, a tit-for-tat strategy outperformed 40 other strategies carefully 
designed to defeat it. This strategy begins by cooperating, then replicates what its 
partner did on the previous iteration of the dilemma. This strategy does punish defection 
in one round by defecting in the subsequent round, but importantly, this punishment is 
not costly since the payoff for defection is better regardless of which choice the other 
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player makes. Moreover, this strategy is more successful than other strategies because it 
achieves good outcomes when the other player is cooperating and cuts losses otherwise. 
Rather than being temporarily spiteful, this punishment strategy benefits the punisher 
and allows the punisher to avoid losses.  
The success of this kind of strategy is thus unlikely to explain retributive motives 
for punishment. For instance, Trivers (1971) does posit a retributive motive that 
functions to ensure reciprocation in situations like the prisoner’s dilemma, but Frank 
(1988, 37–38) argues that this motive is more costly than a tit-for-tat strategy, which can 
be motivated purely by self-interest. A retributive motive would presumably lead to 
punishment of a non-cooperator even at a cost and regardless of whether one will 
interact with the individual again. If, on the other hand, one is motivated purely by self 
interest, one would only punish a defector to achieve a higher payout, to cut losses or 
coerce the partner to cooperate (as in tit-for-tat). Moreover, one would only punish at a 
cost when interactions are repeated, otherwise it would lead to immediate losses that 
would not be recouped by cooperation in subsequent interactions. The point is that tit-
for-tat strategies do not require retributive motivation to serve their purpose in models 
of reciprocal altruism, so these models do not provide a satisfying explanation of 
retributive motives. 
1.3 Problem 1 for models with prospection: presupposing the explanandum 
The dependence of evolutionary models on prospective capacities creates two 
problems for models of agents with prospection. One is that in these models a great deal 
of the explanatory burden rests on the assumption that there is a range of strategies 
concerning punishment including a strategy of temporarily spiteful punishment. For any 
selection model, a certain amount of variation needs to exist for selection to operate on it. 
In this case, the models evaluate the success of different punishment strategies, and in 
doing so, they presuppose the existence of the range of strategies they evaluate. Of course, 
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it is a well-known limitation of selection based models that they assume a certain 
amount of variation in traits rather than explaining it. Moreover, the ability of a selection 
model to explain the target phenomenon depends on the plausibility of the relevant 
assumptions (Sober 2009). However, even if these assumptions are plausible for the 
selection models I consider, the existence of temporarily spiteful punishment as a variant 
requires a good deal of explanation in its own right. This is because of the complex 
capacities required to implement this strategy in organisms with prospective capacities. 
Notably, the motive for temporarily spiteful punishment must override the 
prospective motivation to avoid immediate costs. While these models require organisms 
with prospective capacities to influence the punishee, the decision to punish cannot be 
motivated by the prospective capacities that humans and other animals possess. This is 
because the inclination to punish needs to persist despite the immediate losses that 
attend it. Given that prospective capacities benefit organisms in a very broad range of 
contexts, it is plausible to assume that prospective capacities will be applied to many 
different kinds of decisions, including the decision to punish. Insofar as organisms do 
apply their prospective capacities to decisions about punishment, they will be less likely 
to punish. Thus, to implement a strategy of temporarily spiteful punishment in 
organisms with prospective capacities, the influence of these capacities has to be 
mitigated in the domain of punishment. At the very least, we need an explanation for 
how organisms with prospective capacities would reliably punish at a cost when the 
benefits are deferred. It seems that the best explanation of this phenomenon in humans 
is that retributive motives override or influence prospective capacities.  
This is problematic because a trait like this has a high degree of interaction 
complexity in that it requires a complex interaction with prospective capacities in order 
to override what material self-interest would demand in the context of decisions to 
punish. It is hard to see how this sort of trait could arise de novo (e.g. from a single point 
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mutation or from several simultaneous mutations) in an organism with prospective 
capacities. It seems unlikely that a small change in genetic material could lead to a 
complex tendency to punish (e.g. at a cost and only under certain conditions) including a 
complex interaction with prospective capacities (e.g. overriding or strongly influencing 
the decisions to punish).  
Rather, it seems much more likely that in this case evolution had some prior 
material to work with from which to fashion this more complex trait. For instance, there 
is a widespread tendency in the animal kingdom to react aggressively when conditioned 
rewards are withheld (e.g. Looney and Cohen 1982)). Likewise, there is a widespread 
tendency to respond aggressively to provocation. For instance, when an animal is 
attacked by a conspecific, there is a tendency to engage in counter-aggression or to 
redirect aggression toward another conspecific (Barash and Lipton 2011). However, if 
this is correct, then our ancestors may have already had something quite like a 
retributive motive for natural selection to have acted upon prior to the development of 
complex prospective capacities. Yet if that is the case, then these explanations are not 
satisfying explanations of why humans have retributive motives in the first place. Instead 
they are explanations for why that trait was co-opted, and thereby maintained, to protect 
cooperation, to attract cooperative partners or to solve commitment problems. Thus, 
even if the models make plausible assumptions about ancestral variation in punishment 
strategies, they still may not offer a satisfying explanation for the existence of retributive 
motives, because it seems likely that such motives already existed prior to the contexts in 
which these other functions became adaptive. 
1.4 Problem 2 for models with prospection: leakage 
Another problem for these models was first introduced by Jon Elster: 
…when assessing the impact of an emotional disposition on reproductive fitness, one 
has to take account of all effects of the disposition, indirect as well as direct. In the 
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case of anger, for instance, it may be true that irascible people often get their way, but 
that is only part of the story. Others will learn to recognize them as irascible and walk 
around them rather than have any dealings with them. Sometimes one has no choice, 
but often one can find alternative and more reasonable partners. Irascible people will 
find themselves shunned, which detracts from opportunities for mutually favorable 
interactions with others… I am not saying that the net effect of irascibility is negative, 
only that one cannot show it to be positive simply by citing a positive impact in 
isolation from other effects. (Jon Elster 1999, 48–49) 
Here, Elster’s primary target seems to be accounts like the commitment model. Yet he 
subsequently generalizes the point to selection based explanations and, in particular, 
their use of idealized models to explain emotions: 
…whether the account relies on the signaling function of the emotions, on their 
ability to underwrite the credibility of threats and promises, or on their efficacy in 
sustaining motivation over time, it would just be another story. Modeling always 
implies simplification…Yet when the question is whether a phenomenon exists 
because of its net reproductive benefits or in spite of its net reproductive costs, telling 
a story to demonstrate that it has some benefits or costs is not likely to be useful. 
(Jon Elster 1999, 49–50) 
 This problem applies to each of the models I discuss above. Each model considers 
a limited range of idealized situations involving punishment. In the commitment model, 
the focus is the problem of deterring via threat backed by reputation. In group selection 
and partner selection models, the focus is on a tightly constrained form of cooperative 
venture (with fixed cost and return functions). Moreover, the models evaluate the 
benefits and costs of punishment with respect to these idealized situations in isolation 
from other kinds of situation.  
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Simply put, the problem is one of leakage. We cannot guarantee that the best 
solution to a certain idealized problem situation will not have negative effects that leak 
into other types of situation. Yet if a trait has more net costs in total than a competing 
trait, then it will not survive natural selection regardless of whether it would be the most 
successful response to the one type of situation considered in isolation. Since these 
models do not account for the potential effects of punishment strategies in all situations 
in order to weigh all of the costs and benefits of retributive punishment, they leave us 
with an incomplete (though not necessarily inaccurate) explanation of why retribution 
survived natural selection.  
Importantly, Elster’s argument is most problematic for models of the evolution of 
organisms with prospection. The main example Elster gives to support the potential 
leakage from one type of situation to another is that individuals can learn to recognize 
irascible people and avoid interacting, presumably because of the likely outcomes of such 
interactions. That is, individuals can tailor their decisions to the strategic demands of 
each situation, treating situations differently based on the individual characteristics (e.g. 
irascibility) of the person with whom they might interact. I think the problem is this: 
when we introduce the ability to anticipate outcomes based on causal relationships (e.g. 
one that includes the information that irascibility increases the likelihood that the 
irascible person might treat me poorly), the effects of an agent’s actions in one situation 
can have many more effects on the agent in other situations. For instance, suppose 
someone is trying to choose a mate and that Brown is known to be irascible and Mendez 
is not. As a result of his irascibility Brown might be less likely to be chosen than Mendez. 
In general, when you introduce the ability to anticipate an outcome based on a causal 
model, almost anything could become relevant to anything else.9 It follows that an 
                                               
9 The frame problem in artificial intelligence and robotics depends on the fact that almost anything could be 
relevant to the outcome of an action. That is, the computational difficulties inherent in the design of robots 
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agent’s behavior in one kind of situation could have effects on that agent (via the 
prospective abilities of her peers) in an indeterminate range of other situations. 
By contrast, in organisms without complex prospective capacities, there is a more 
limited ability to learn from experience and to predict the consequences of behavior on 
the basis of experience. 10  As a result, there are fewer social interactions where an 
organism can make decisions based on the specific characteristics of its partner. If an 
organism cannot anticipate the consequences of getting on the wrong side of an irascible 
individual, then it will not be able to avoid that individual, and the consequences of 
irascibility will not as readily leak into other kinds of situation. This is why the kind of 
model I consider in the following section offers safer idealizations. 
2. Safer Idealizations: Models of Resource Competition in Non-strategic 
Organisms 
The models I consider in this section are ones that do not depend on the 
prospective capacities of organisms. In the organisms to which these models apply, there 
is less leakage between different types of social interaction because there are fewer ways 
in which an individual’s behavior in one interaction can influence the outcome of other 
interactions and interaction types. Moreover, insofar as these models can explain the 
adaptiveness of a retributive motive prior to the evolution of complex prospective 
capacities, they mitigate the problem of interaction complexity posed above. Moreover, 
they make it possible to understand how a retributive motive could have co-evolved with 
prospective capacities. Thus, these models may also provide a basis for understanding 
how subsequent interaction complexity might have gradually arisen. 
                                                                                                                                            
that can interact with the world in real time derive from the intractability of explicitly representing all of the 
factors that might be relevant to a candidate course of action. See e.g. Dennett (1984)  
10 While many species, including rats have capacities for prospection, the capacity to represent the value of 
an outcome is limited to the immediate future. Moreover, the contingency relations that animals are capable 
of learning are constrained by the temporal contiguity of the action and its effect (among other things). It 
should be clear that these limitations do not allow many nonhuman animals to learn from punishment in the 
manner required by the selection models discussed above. 
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In this section, I describe a model that can explain the necessity of retributive 
motives in non-strategic organisms. It is a game theoretical model that captures some of 
the dynamics of frequency dependent selection. This kind of selection exerts different 
pressure on a trait depending on the frequency of variant traits in a population. 
Biologists can evaluate the effects of this kind of selection on social interaction strategies 
using computer simulation of game theoretic models. Given various strategies for 
interacting in games like the prisoner’s dilemma, one can use computer simulations to 
evaluate the average payoff of a strategy when played in populations consisting of 
organisms with various other strategies.  
For instance, we could easily evaluate the relative success of a tit-for-tat strategy 
in a population consisting entirely of serial defectors. If we imagine that the prisoner’s 
dilemma is repeated ten times for each encounter and there are ten encounters over an 
individual’s lifetime, we need only sum up the outcome of each encounter with a serial 
defector and multiply it by ten. When tit-for-tat goes up against serial defection, it get $1 
on the first round and the defector gets $10 because tit-for-tat starts by cooperating. For 
the other nine rounds, tit-for-tat will match the defector’s behavior and both will get a 
payout of $3. So we get 1+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3 x 10 = $280 for tit-for-tat as compared 
with 3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3 x 10 = $300 for serial defection (since the serial defector 
will only encounter other defectors in this population). Likewise, we could easily evaluate 
the success of tit-for-tat in a population half of which are serial defectors and half of 
which are tit-for-tat strategists. Given that the probability of interacting with a serial 
defector is 0.5, we just add up the expected number of encounters with serial defectors 
and add it to the expected number of encounters with other tit-for-tat strategists. We get 
(1+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3) x 5 + (8+8+8+8+8+8+8+8+8+8) x 5 = $540 for the average 
tit-for-tat strategist as compared with (10+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3) x 5 + 
(3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3) x 5 = $235 for the average serial defector. 
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In these models, successful strategies are more likely to be present in subsequent 
generations, and so these models can tell us which strategies selection is likely to favor 
given the frequency of other strategies in the population. The concept of an 
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) captures the factors that allow a given strategy to 
persist in a population. Thus it allows a clear way of predicting and explaining the 
existence of some traits. Maynard Smith and Price offer this definition: “Roughly, an ESS 
is a strategy such that, if most of the members of the population adopt it, there is no 
“mutant” strategy that would give higher reproductive fitness.” (Smith and Price 1973, 
15) Given this definition, we can expect drift and selection to gradually weed out almost 
all other strategies from a population aside from the ESS. Thus, if frequency dependent 
models apply to a given species-typical behavior, the evolutionary stability of the 
modeled behavior can offer a powerful explanation for its species-typicality. 
The model I am interested in explains a variety of phenomena that are 
widespread in the animal kingdom. For instance, it explains why aggressive interactions 
regarding resource competition are rarely protracted and why the outcome of these 
interactions tend to be determined by prior ownership of a resource. Moreover, the 
model applies to a wide range of contests in the animal kingdom, ones that are used to 
determine ownership of various resources such as a territory. Specifically, the model 
applies to contests where nonlethal strategies are used. In these contests, the cost of an 
aggressive encounter builds up over time, and the disputed resource goes to the 
organism that persists the longest. Thus, game theorists call this kind of game the “war 
of attrition” (Maynard Smith 1974).  
It turns out that there is no pure strategy for this game that is evolutionarily 
stable. A pure strategy in this case would be one in which an organism persists for a fixed 
amount of time, m, at each contest. No pure strategy will work because a competing 
strategy can be shown to have better expected payoffs regardless of the value of m (see 
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Smith and Price 1973). Rather the ESS will be a mixed strategy in which the length of 
persistence is drawn from a specific probability distribution, the mean of which is 
determined by the value of the resource and the cost of persisting. Specifically, the mean 
of the probability distribution is a duration of persistence the cost of which equals the 
value of the resource under dispute. In a population that consists entirely of this strategy, 
no pure strategy can invade. However, the expected value of this strategy is still only zero 
in a population in which everyone adopts it (see Maynard Smith 1974). The organism 
playing this strategy (in such a population) is unlikely to gain anything when the average 
cost of persisting and the average benefit of winning are summed up.  
Maynard Smith points out that a better strategy would be to decide competitions 
with a coin toss. In a population dominated by the mixed ESS (described above), the 
probability that an organism would win any given contest is .5 anyway. So instead of 
wasting energy determining who by chance happens to persist longest in a given match, 
everyone would benefit if the contest was instead determined by coin toss. With such a 
scheme in place, no one would accrue the costs of persisting. By flipping a coin, we 
introduce an arbitrary asymmetry into the contest, and everyone is better off if the 
asymmetry is used to resolve contests by convention. The expected value of adopting a 
conventional strategy that determines contests by coin toss would be half the value of the 
disputed resource for each contest, which is far better than any strategy that ignores the 
coin toss (zero for the ESS that ignores the asymmetry). If we look to nature, there is an 
asymmetry that can be used in just this way: whoever found the disputed resource first, 
or in other words, whoever happens to “own” it. If all such contests are dyadic 
interactions, then on average, an organism will be the owner of the resource in about half 
of the contests in which it becomes involved. Thus, ownership can be used in the same 
way as a coin toss might be used. If a population of organisms were to decide contests in 
the favor of resource owners, this convention should have the same effect as deciding 
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contests by a coin toss. Game theorists call this the “bourgeois convention”. The set of 
strategies that use the bourgeois convention to settle contests I will call “bourgeois 
strategies”. Just like the coin toss strategy, an organism following the bourgeois 
convention can expect to get half the value of all the resources that it competes for in a 
population of organisms that follow the convention.   
The success in evolutionary models of bourgeois strategies may help explain why 
owners of resources usually win fights in rodent species and in a variety of other species 
as well.  It may also explain why marking behaviors, like urinating strategically at the 
boundaries of one’s territory, are so common among mammals. Even in absence of 
strategic marking behaviors, animals will inevitably urinate and defecate on their 
territories at a higher frequency than they would elsewhere. Thus, a territory will often 
end up smelling like its owner, making smell a difficult-to-fake signal, or index, of 
ownership (Maynard Smith and Harper 2003). Given the reliability of this index, it is 
easy to determine which contestant in a territorial dispute is the owner of the territory. 
Thus, territory ownership is an unambiguous asymmetry that can be exploited to 
determine the outcome of contests.  
Importantly, the stability of bourgeois strategies depends on ownership being 
backed up by force. The owner of a resource must play a “reserve” strategy of fighting for 
a specific length of time, in case the convention is not respected. Otherwise, a bourgeois 
convention will not be stable against a “mutant” strategy that ignores the asymmetry. 
The idea is that if the bourgeois convention is not backed up by a reserve strategy on the 
part of owners (e.g. if they were to relinquish the resource when an intruder attacks), 
then a certain range of mutant strategies can “call bluff” and win almost every contest 
with minimal cost in a population of bourgeois strategists. The set of bourgeois strategies 
that include a reserve strategy, I will call “bourgeois reserve strategies”. Interestingly, 
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selection on the reserve strategy results in an ESS in which owners persist until the cost 
of fighting equals the value of the disputed resource (Rubenstein 1981).  
Notice that in a population of bourgeois reserve strategists, the reserve strategy 
will never be observed (unless through some mistake in who is the owner). If everyone in 
the population respects ownership, then intruders will forfeit the resource to the owner 
before the owner plays the reserve. It follows that the motivation to play the reserve 
strategy cannot be prospective. If, as explained above, the stability of the bourgeois 
strategy depends on there being a fixed tendency to play the reserve strategy when the 
convention is violated, then the motivation to play the reserve strategy cannot depend on 
the prospective value, or anticipated reward for doing so. In a population of bourgeois 
strategist, there would be no anticipated reward for playing the reserve, because most 
organisms would never have played the reserve strategy and thus would have no reason 
to anticipate a reward for initiating the strategy. Thus, evolutionarily stable strategies for 
resource competition require that organisms play the reserve strategy in the face of 
immediate costs. Since the reserve strategy also imposes costs on the intruder in 
response to the intrusion, the strategy can lead to instances of temporarily spiteful 
punishment. It follows that it requires a retributive motive to implement it. That is, it 
requires a motivation to impose costs that is not motivated by the immediate material 
benefits of doing so. 
In fact, the very structure of frequency-dependent selection lends itself to a 
similar conclusion. The bourgeois reserve strategy cannot develop by learning about the 
consequences of playing the reserve. This is because the factors that conduce toward the 
evolutionary stability of this strategy are not factors that are invariantly present in the 
experience of all organisms in a species. For instance, an organism with a bourgeois 
reserve strategy could be nested in populations consisting of combinations of 
innumerably many strategies. In some of these conditions, for instance in a population 
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dominated by the bourgeois reserve strategy, organisms will not experience any success 
at all with the reserve strategy. Again, this is because fights will not persist at all in a 
population of bourgeois strategists. However, evolutionary stability requires playing the 
reserve strategy against mutant strategies that attack owners and persist until the cost of 
fighting greatly exceeds the value of the resource. Mutants like this will do no better than 
bourgeois reserve strategists in a population consisting entirely of bourgeois reserve 
strategists, but only if reserve is played every time a mutant competes (or in other words, 
only if the population really consists of bourgeois reserve strategists rather than merely 
bourgeois strategists). In such a population, the mutant may win every fight for a 
resource, but it will take on considerable costs in half of its disputes, whereas the 
bourgeois reserve strategists will never take on costs for persisting (except in the rare 
encounter with the mutant) but will get the resource in about half of their fights. Thus, 
the bourgeois reserve strategy is only stable against this kind of mutant strategy because 
of the tendency to persist in fighting regardless of whether it has been successful in the 
past. In other words, learning from individual experience would not tend to converge on 
the bourgeois reserve strategy across all of the conditions required for its stability. Since 
learning would not reliably produce the relevant phenotype, it cannot be the mechanism 
by which the bourgeois reserve strategy develops.  
This is a kind of “poverty of the stimulus” argument. If the motivation to play the 
reserve strategy depended on prospective processes, then it would require learning the 
contingency of reward on playing reserve.11 In that case, there would be no reason to 
expect that individuals would end up using the evolutionarily stable strategy regarding 
when to play the reserve. Thus the bourgeois reserve strategy has to develop invariantly 
across variation in fighting success and it has to be non-prospective. 
                                               
11 This just follows from the definition of prospection.  
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Given the problems of interaction complexity and strategic complexity in the 
previous section, this is clearly a better explanation for why some organisms have a 
retributive motive. The fact that the model applies to organisms without prospection 
eliminates strategic complexity and limits the interaction complexity required to 
implement the strategy. The only capacities required of an organism are that it needs to 
identify situations of resource competition and to attack for a specific duration if the 
intruder does not retreat. While this is still a complex capacity, eliminating the 
interaction with prospective capacities leaves us far less mystified about how such a 
variant could have originated. Moreover, it is easy to see how this capacity could be built 
up from more basic capacities, for instance, the capacity to attack a conspecific with an 
unfamiliar smell. The model has the added benefit that it would explain why a retributive 
motive would be constrained by proportionality, since the optimal duration of fighting 
for the reserve strategy is determined by the value of the disputed resource. 
However, this is not yet an explanation for why human beings possess a 
retributive motive. It could only offer such an explanation if this motive were preserved 
in Homo sapiens. So far, we have no reason to expect that it has been, nor do we have 
any reason to think that human (or even primate) resource competition is anything like 
the war of attrition. Likewise, it not yet obvious that human anger was shaped by these 
evolutionary forces. While I cannot offer such an argument here, I will make it plausible 
that the selection pressures captured by the war of attrition model are responsible for the 
structure of an anger-like motivational state of rats. In the following chapter, I argue that 
this motivational state is continuous with human anger. 
Consider the instinctive patterns of territorial behavior in rats. These behaviors 
have been investigated in great detail using a resident-intruder experimental paradigm 
(For a review, see D. C. Blanchard and Blanchard 1984). In these experiments, resident 
rats (rats who have occupied a cage or colony for a few weeks) will attack unfamiliar male 
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rats introduced into their cage. The attacks of the resident and the defensive maneuvers 
of the intruder comprise sets of stereotyped behaviors. Each attack behavior of the 
resident is paired with a matching defensive maneuver of the intruder. The resident 
adopts a set of stereotyped postures and attacks aimed at biting the dorsal (back-side) 
surfaces of the intruder. On the other hand, the intruder adopts a distinctive set of 
stereotyped behaviors aimed at avoiding or blocking the resident’s attempts to bite its 
back.  
While these behaviors are certainly stereotyped, they are not brittle and reflexive. 
Rather, they have a high degree of flexibility. For instance, attacks of residents vary 
depending on the defensive strategy adopted by the intruder. Moreover, as discussed in 
the fourth chapter, the aggressive aim of biting the back can also produce instrumental 
behaviors (R. J. Blanchard et al. 1977).  
These attacks can continue with little reprieve until the intruder rat has been 
either killed or removed, though the most likely consequence in the wild would be for the 
intruder to leave the resident’s territory very early on in the interaction (Ewer 1971).  
Moreover, these attacks are different than the kind of attacks that would be directed 
against predators or prey (Panksepp 1971). Since the dorsal surfaces of rats are less 
vulnerable to injury and do not easily permit damage to vital organs, this form of attack 
does not seem to have a lethal function (D. C. Blanchard and Blanchard 1984; D. C. 
Blanchard and Blanchard 1988). Rather the attacks seem to function to drive off the 
unfamiliar male without inflicting lethal injury. 
What scientists have discovered about these behaviors (the parity of the 
behaviors produced by resident and intruder rats, the stereotyped nature of these 
behaviors, their presence in socially naïve rats, and the coherent aim of the behaviors) 
indicates that they are produced by two different behavior programs: the confrontation 
and avoidance programs. Moreover, these programs seem to have evolved in response to 
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each other and the confrontation system seems to have been largely shaped by the 
demands of resource competition. Finally, like anger, the confrontation system is 
reactive. Resident rats will attempt to bite the back of an intruder rat independently of 
any anticipated reward or independently of any previously established contingency 
between back biting and reward (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1961).  
The war of attrition model leads to four predictions that are accurate concerning 
these patterns of conspecific aggression in rats. First, as I argued above, in order to 
implement the ESS, the tendency to attack an intruder needs to develop largely without 
the benefit of learning from social encounters. This is what scientist have observed. 
These patterns of confrontation and avoidance are present even in socially naïve rats, 
ones that have had no prior opportunity to observe or participate in aggressive or playful 
interactions with other rats (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1961).  
Second, given that territories have extremely high value and that the costs of 
persisting are low, we can predict that under the right conditions, residents will attack 
for long periods of time with little reprieve. This effect has been observed (Michael 
Potegal and TenBrink 1984; Michael Potegal 1992). These results also suggests that the 
motivation to attack may be fixed independently of any aggressive goal (other than the 
retreat of the intruder), as we would expect given the fixed duration of attack for the 
bourgeois reserve strategy. 
Third, the ESS requires that organisms “respect” ownership, in the sense that it 
will attack if it is the owner and retreat if it is an intruder. This is exactly what is 
observed. A territory owner always attacks unfamiliar male rats under conditions in 
which a territory is valuable and the intruder’s presence is threatening. Since the primary 
benefit of a territory for rats is to serve as a nesting site, territories become much more 
valuable when females occupy the territory. Accordingly, whenever females have 
occupied a territory, the male resident of that territory will attack unfamiliar male rats 
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after inspection and sufficient exposure (R. J. Blanchard et al. 1977). The only exceptions 
to this pattern are expected: when the owner’s sense of smell has been blocked, when the 
unfamiliar male is prepubescent or has been castrated (K. J. Flannelly and Thor 1978). 
The former exception results from the fact that rats primarily identify one another by 
their sense of smell. It is obvious why we would expect owners not to attack young or 
castrated males. They do not pose a challenge to the territory owner given that the 
function of the territory is for reproduction. 
Likewise, intruders always adopt avoidance behaviors and never win the 
confrontation. The only exception to this is when laboratory rats confront a wild rat 
intruder. The best explanation of this exception is that lab rats have been bred for 
hundreds of generations to be less aggressive, so the defensive attacks of wild rats are 
overwhelming to any lab rat. Nonetheless, there is good evidence that the same patterns 
of confrontation and avoidance obtain in wild rats and that the usual pattern is for 
intruders to flee the owner of a territory (Ewer 1971; D. C. Blanchard and Blanchard 
1984). 
Fourth, the scent of a territory plays an important role in determining the 
behavior of the resident and intruder. Residents make threat displays and then attack 
after sniffing the anogenital region of the intruder, and as mentioned before they do not 
adopt these postures when their sense of smell has been blocked (J R Alberts and Galef 
1973).12 Moreover, it is likely that the unfamiliar smell of a resident and its territory is a 
proximal cause of the intruder’s adoption of avoidance behaviors. Specifically, it may 
decrease the intruder’s confidence in aggressive encounters, whereas the pervasiveness 
of the resident’s own scent markings may increase its confidence (D. Adams 1976). 
                                               
12 Likewise, the aggression of lactating female rats is diminished if their sense of smell is blocked (Kolunie 
and Stern 1995; Ferreira, Dahlöf, and Hansen 1987). 
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In sum, the ESS in the war of attrition model leads us to expect asymmetry of 
behavior based on ownership13. With modest assumptions it also leads to the prediction 
that this behavioral tendency will be elicited by olfactory cues and will lead to fixed 
behavioral tendencies of confrontation and avoidance in the resident and intruder rat, 
respectively. These are precisely the phenomena that scientists have observed. Thus, the 
war of attrition model offers a plausible explanation for the structure of the 
confrontation system, and it is plausible that the selection pressures captured by the 
model shaped this system.  
3. Conclusion: Understanding Phylogenetically Ancient Adaptations 
Importantly, the war of attrition model does not compete with the other 
explanations of punishment I have discussed. It is quite possible that the motivational 
states required for an ESS in the war of attrition were subsequently co-opted for different 
purposes at different points in evolutionary history. So a retributive motive for resource 
competition could have been co-opted to serve a reputational function or to support 
cooperation in large groups. Moreover, given its role in resource competition, it is easy to 
see how the motive could come to have effects in closely related domains of cooperation 
or deterrence, both of which concern resources in which an organism has an obvious 
stake. Organisms cooperate to acquire mutually beneficial resources and they are 
benefitted when other organisms are deterred from compromising those resources.  
While it is compatible with these explanations of the function of the retributive 
motive, the war of attrition model is clearly a better explanation of how a retributive 
motive could have originated. 14  I argued that other selection models suffer from 
difficulties when used to explain the origin of retributive motives. The problem of 
interaction complexity makes the explanation of the motive less satisfying, since it is 
                                               
13 While there is some debate about whether ownership is always the asymmetry that determines behavior, 
other assymetries on which an ESS might be based are strongly correlated with ownership (see Maynard 
Smith and Harper for a detailed discussion). 
14 Though, recall that the retributive motive is not the primary explanandum of the other models. 
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difficult to see how a trait with such a complex relationship with other traits could have 
arisen due to simple changes in development or genetics. The problem of strategic 
complexity shows that these explanations are necessarily incomplete, since idealized 
models do not factor in all of the effects that the trait could have. The more primitive 
explanation of retributive motives offered by the war of attrition model helps to mitigate 
both of these problems; though I do not think it completely resolves them. This case 
shows that we may sometimes achieve greater insight into the origin of a capacity by 
looking further back in time at the more primitive selection problems from which it may 
have arisen.  
There is another reason why it is beneficial to look at the patterns of aggression in 
less cognitively complex organisms. Due to the simplicity of their behavioral repertoire 
in relation to humans, it is a simpler matter to identify separate behavioral systems and 
assign them adaptive functions. While humans may have some of the same behavioral 
tendencies, they are masked by our enhanced abilities to regulate our emotions. 
Harmon-Jones and his colleagues put it this way: 
Basic emotions, such as anger, provide organisms with relatively complex and 
biologically prepared behavioral potentials that assist in coping with major 
challenges to their welfare (Panksepp 1998). However, these inherited behavioral 
tendencies exist only as potential ways of behaving in organisms with larger, more 
complex brains. Thus, although humans may possess the same emotional instincts as 
other animals, we may not be as controlled by the dictates of emotions and thus we 
have more choices (Panksepp 1994). That is, our emotions may be regulated and thus 
may not directly affect behavior. (Harmon-Jones, Peterson, and Harmon-Jones 2010, 
61)  
While one might be skeptical that any of the same underlying causes could be involved in 
human and non-human aggression (a skepticism I confront in the fourth chapter), it is 
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important to recognize that human psychology did not arise out of an evolutionary 
vacuum. It is not implausible that at least some dimensions of our emotional responses 
will be potentiated by phylogenetically ancient mechanisms. Nevertheless, we cannot 
just infer from superficial behavioral similarities that a specific psychological capacity of 
rats (e.g. the motivational states of resident rats) shares a common evolutionary history 
with a specific human emotion (Machery and Mallon 2010).  The next chapter draws out 
this inference more carefully. In it, I show that the confrontation system in rats is 
connected with human anger through shared ancestry, making the war of attrition a 
plausible story about the ancient origins of anger. 
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Chapter 3  
Angry Animals: Adjudicating Two Competing Homology Claims 
 
Many philosophers of biology believe that the homology concept will be central to 
a scientific understanding of psychological kinds such as emotions. They argue that traits 
defined in terms of homology – features of organisms that derive from a trait of a 
common ancestor – have many of the desirable properties of natural kinds. For instance, 
they are homeostatic property clusters, which are projectable in the sense that they 
support extrapolative inferences (P. Griffiths 2006; P. E. Griffiths 1997; Assis and 
Brigandt 2009; Brigandt 2009). However, the recommendation that the mind be carved 
up into homologs by itself does not place useful constraints on scientific attempts to 
discern natural divisions within human and animal minds. This is because no one has 
adequately explained how homology claims can be subjected to hypothesis testing. 
Consider an example. Many emotion researchers and theorists have suggested 
that anger is an innate adaptation that may be shared with nonhuman animals (e.g. 
Ekman 1999; Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides 2009). This raises the question of which 
behaviors might be manifestations of anger in non-human animals. Given the tight link 
between anger and aggression in humans, some aggression researchers propose that 
innate patterns of aggression in nonhuman animals are manifestations of anger. In other 
words, they propose that the system responsible for these phenomena is homologous 
with human anger, meaning that these complex traits are derived from a common 
ancestral trait. 
As plausible as this may sound, there have been two incommensurate proposals 
along these lines, and there has been little progress in adjudicating between them. 
According to the ethological hypothesis, a repertoire of confrontational behaviors 
observed in “resident”, territory-holding, rats reflects “an underlying emotional state” 
that is a primitive version of anger (D. C. Blanchard and Blanchard 1984, 17 see also; D. 
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C. Blanchard and Blanchard 1988; D. C. Blanchard and Blanchard 2003b). This 
behavioral repertoire is set in opposition to avoidance behaviors observed in intruder 
rats1, which reflect fear. Moreover, the hypothesis holds that these two distinct emotional 
systems provide the best way of understanding angry aggression and fearful aggression 
in humans. Another proposal, the neurophysiological hypothesis is that human 
experiences of anger “emerge” from a pan-mammalian brain system that produces 
defensive behaviors that can be observed when areas within the ventral hypothalamus 
(among other areas) are electrically stimulated (Panksepp and Biven 2012; Panksepp 
1998; Panksepp and Zellner 2004). These behaviors are set in opposition to predatory 
behaviors, which are neurally dissociable from the defensive behaviors. In other words, 
this hypothesis holds that there are two neural systems for aggression, and that one of 
them, the RAGE system, provides the primary neural substrate for human anger and is 
the proximate cause of “the feeling states and behavioral acts” (Panksepp, 1998, p. 14) 
distinctive of human anger. Moreover, the proponents of this hypothesis claim that we 
can best understand certain types of human aggression, impulsive and instrumental 
forms of aggression, in terms of the neural systems for defense and predation, 
respectively. 
Importantly, these hypotheses are incompatible. Within the neurophysiological 
tradition, the neural dissociation between predatory and defensive aggression is the 
main reason to consider them fundamental, distinct categories of aggression. However, 
confrontation and avoidance behaviors do not exhibit this kind of clean neural 
dissociation (Siegel 2004, chap. 1). Moreover, the kinds of defensive aggression in rats 
produced by electrical brain stimulation is distinct from the aggression observed in 
                                               
1 The Blanchards actually refer to these behaviors as “offensive” and “defensive”, respectively, and to the 
systems responsible for them as the “offense system” and the “defense system”. For the sake of clarity, I 
use the terms “confrontation” and “avoidance” instead – as well as the corresponding “confrontation 
system” and “avoidance systems” – as terms of art to prevent the conflation of Panksepp’s notion of 
defensive aggression with the Blanchards’ notion of defensive aggression. 
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ethological research in the sense that it lacks features that are diagnostic of these forms 
of aggression (e.g. Kruk 1991). In other words, the aggression phenomena identified by 
these different research programs are behaviorally distinct and distinct neural 
mechanisms are responsible for them. As a result, they make incompatible inferences 
about what anger is and, more specifically, about which aggression phenomena are its 
manifestations. The bimodal classification schemes for aggression (defensive versus 
predatory and confrontational versus avoidant) that distinguish these respective 
phenomena are incommensurate.   
While proponents of these hypotheses aim to identify homologies, there has been 
little progress in adjudicating between them. There are two reasons for this. One is the 
target problem: they have not carefully identified the human psychological trait that is 
the target of comparison. Another is the evidence problem: it is unclear how cross-
species comparisons support homology claims. More specifically, it remains obscure how 
comparative evidence can play a role in adjudicating competing homology claims. While 
the issues pertaining to the target problem have received a good deal of attention in 
philosophy of biology, the evidence problem has been neither raised nor resolved. In this 
paper, I show a way forward by developing evidential criteria of homology and an 
evidential constraint on homology claims. I then apply these criteria and the constraint 
to the case of human anger and animal aggression to make it clear how hypothesis 
testing can proceed and which of the hypotheses above is supported by the evidence. 
In the following section, I lay out some of the considerations that favor the use of 
cladistic categories (biological categories determined by common descent) in the 
introduction and modification of psychological and behavioral kind concepts (such as 
anger and aggression). I then argue that these considerations favor basic human anger 
as the target for the neurophysiological and ethological hypotheses. In section 2, I 
describe in detail the two hypotheses concerning human anger and the aggression 
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systems of non-human animals. While these hypotheses are homology claims, most of 
the evidence presented in their support is of questionable relevance to homology. In 
section 3, I say more about homology thinking. Homology thinking is a historical mode 
of thinking that explains similarities by appealing to common descent. To understand 
what kind of evidence supports homology, I point out a range of hypotheses with which it 
competes and set out the kind of evidence that favors homology over and above them. In 
section 4, I show how these criteria can be applied in the case of anger and aggression. A 
straightforward application of the criteria provides stronger support for the ethological 
hypothesis. Basic human anger has several similarities with the confrontational 
behaviors of resident rats, similarities that provide some evidence that these traits are a 
product of common descent. On the other hand, there is currently no evidence that the 
RAGE system uniquely corresponds with human anger. The similarities identified by the 
neurophysiological hypothesis hold not only with anger but also with other human 
emotions, such as fear. I conclude by highlighting the value of cross-species comparison 
for specifying psychological kinds. 
1. The Identification Problem: Targeting Human Anger 
First, I address the target problem by connecting it to a closely related problem, 
that of determining the meaning and reference of theoretical terms. This question looms 
large in a vast array of sciences, especially in areas of psychological research. For 
instance, it looms whenever we have questions like the following: what are emotions (or 
memory or attention or creativity or imagination, etc.)?; what different kinds of emotion 
(or memory, attention, creativity, imagination, etc.) are there?; and what is anger (or 
fear, semantic memory, episodic memory, visual attention, etc.)? At the outset, these 
questions are shaped by preconceptions about the domain of interest. Memory research, 
we might imagine, began with a vague question about human information storage. 
Nevertheless, it gradually became clear that there are quite different information storage 
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phenomena (e.g. short term and long term memory) that are unlikely to be explained by 
the same underlying process. The coarse categories of human memory or information 
storage then fall to the wayside as these refined categories take precedence in 
psychological research. This simple example illustrates that we do not just continue to 
lump phenomena together into the same category (e.g. generic memory or information 
storage) with which we posed a question, nor should we. Rather, our inquiry is and 
should be guided by the constraint that the phenomena of interest share common 
explanatory elements (e.g. short term memory processes), ones that support 
extrapolation from one instance of a category to another instance or to the whole 
category (e.g. short term memory processes across individual difference, across people in 
different cultures, across species, etc.).  
However, the reference of theoretical terms, such as short term visual memory 
and anger or even charge and gravitation, is not only determined by the phenomena that 
their referents are supposed to explain. Reference is determined in part by the theory in 
which the term is embedded.2 An  examination of the history of theoretical terms like 
“phlogiston” and “caloric” – their use across different theories and their ultimate 
elimination – supports this claim (Kroon 1985). The reference of these terms (or lack 
thereof) is not merely determined by an explanandum phenomenon, but also by the 
distinctive explanatory project of the theory. Phlogiston was not defined simply as “that 
which explains combustion and related phenomena”, otherwise it would have ultimately 
been identified with oxygen. Rather the reference of the word was overdetermined (see 
e.g. Nola 1980; Kroon 1985; Stanford and Kitcher 2000) because the use of the term was 
governed by the constraint that its referent explain combustion in a particular way, 
namely by exiting from burning materials (rather than by bonding with burning 
materials). In other words, the epistemic function of the term in testing theoretical 
                                               
2 See Griffiths (1997, vol. 1997, chap. 7) for a more detailed treatment of these claims. 
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claims demanded that the term’s reference be overdetermined by addition of the theory’s 
proposal as to how phlogiston explains combustion (Kroon 1985). 
When these considerations are transposed to research on human anger, we find 
that research on it is so preparadigmatic that very little consensus has been reached even 
regarding the phenomena that anger will ultimately explain. It is even unclear which 
explanatory projects offer competing accounts of how anger explains a given set of 
phenomena. For instance, anger has been described in all of the following ways: as a 
syndrome that is caused by aversive stimuli and that includes an impulse to reactive 
aggression (Berkowitz 2012b); as an appraisal of an action as “a demeaning offense 
against me and mine” (Lazarus 1991); as a product of social construction that bears a 
complex relationship with aggression (Averill 1983); as a reaction aimed at making 
outcomes more equitable (Donnerstein and Hatfield 1983); as an evolved mechanism to 
regulate and recalibrate the dispositions of others toward oneself (A. Sell, Tooby, and 
Cosmides 2009); and as a mechanism for enforcing a specific kind of moral norm 
(Rozin, Lowery, and Haidt 1999). 
This diversity of explanatory interests animates several worries about the 
reference of anger as a theoretical term. First, many function ascriptions are consistent 
with the folk usage of the word “anger” and its corresponding concept(s). Second, it 
seems unlikely that the explanatory interests underlying these diverse descriptions and 
function ascriptions will eventually converge. Third, it seems unlikely that each and 
every one of the theoretical entities that answer to the name “anger” in these accounts 
will end up referring to a projectable category (e.g. across species, cultures, and 
individual differences). Fourth, even if more than one of them do, they will probably not 
refer to the same projectable category. Thus, insofar as theorizing about anger is guided 
by the constraint that the explanandum phenomena be lumped into categories with 
common explanatory elements, it seems likely that we will eventually reinterpret or 
 98 
discard many of the explanandum phenomena for these diverse accounts of anger. Even 
when we do, we may find more than one projectable category of anger. 
This theoretical milieu poses two closely related problems. One is that it is 
unclear how research on anger should proceed. We cannot assume that these various 
approaches are referring to the same underlying entity or even that they mean the same 
thing by “anger”, so it is unclear which theories stand in competition with one another. 
Another problem relates to the target problem. Looking to psychological research on 
anger by itself offers us little guidance in targeting anger for the purposes of cross species 
comparison. How then should we proceed? The argument of this section is that cross 
species comparisons, when properly understood, place important constraints on the kind 
of theory in which anger will enter as a term. I will briefly explain what these 
comparisons are supposed to accomplish and thus how these comparisons should be 
understood. I will then show how they help constrain the target of cross species 
comparisons with anger in human beings.   
 One thing that cross species comparisons do is to provide a way of testing claims 
about how common descent constrains psychological traits. Why should we be interested 
in such claims? One reason has to do with natural kinds, their function within scientific 
theories and the natural kind status of some biological categories, specifically ones that 
are defined in terms of common descent. Among other things, natural kinds refer to 
categories that are projectable, meaning that one can make reliable extrapolative 
inferences about unobserved instances of the category based on features of observed 
instances. The leading theory of natural kinds holds that the projectibility of natural kind 
categories (at least in sciences like biology) is explained by causal homeostatic 
mechanisms (R Boyd 1991). These mechanisms unite categories by providing a common 
explanation of property correlations between their instances. In other words, possession 
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of the homeostatic mechanism explains the reliability of extrapolative inferences 
between instances of a category.  
Some biological categories, namely cladistic categories, are defined in terms of 
common descent, which is itself a causal homeostatic mechanism. That is, common 
descent explains property correlations because descendants of a common ancestor will 
inherit many of the same properties from the ancestral organism. Cladistics is an 
approach within biological taxonomy that classifies organisms into clades, or groups of 
organisms all the members of which descend from a common ancestor (or rather, a 
common ancestral population). Moreover, most of the organisms within a clade will 
usually possess a range of homologous traits, or trait that are shared because they were 
inherited from a common ancestor. For instance, all tetrapods possess forelimbs 
constituted by bones with a common structure, and they share this trait, in modified 
forms, because they all inherited this trait from a common ancestral organism. In other 
words, homologies are clusters of correlated properties that organisms share because of 
their common descent. Common descent is the homeostatic mechanism that explains 
our ability to extrapolate reliably from the properties of one tetrapod forelimb to those of 
another. 
Thus, when cladistic categories like homology guide the postulation and 
modification of psychological kind concepts, we have some reason to expect that these 
kinds will converge on projectable categories. Within this framework, we can understand 
cross species comparisons as tests of homology claims. They can indicate whether the 
traits of different organisms derive from common descent. As such, cross species 
comparisons test whether these traits are projectable categories. If the same 
psychological kind is found in two species and if its presence in both is best explained by 
common descent, then there is a modicum of confirmation that the kind concept refers 
to a category with some degree of projectibility because of its grounding in common 
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descent. On the other hand, if the comparisons misfire even in closely related species, 
then there may be reason to re-conceptualize the relevant kind concept. This is because 
the grounds are undermined for one of the homeostatic mechanisms, common descent, 
that might support the projectibility of the category. 
Consequently, if we are going to target anger for the purpose of cross species 
comparison of this kind, then the reference of anger needs to be fixed according to a 
theory that explains a set of phenomena in a particular way, namely by inheritance. 
Again, common descent explains shared features of organisms in large part because of 
inheritance from common ancestors. Likewise, if common descent explains part of the 
structure of anger, it follows that inheritance will factor into this explanation. Moreover, 
many of the phenomena of anger need to be explained by inheritance as opposed to 
culture or individual experience.  
Fortunately, there is a significant family of theories according to which human 
anger phenomena are explained in terms of inheritance rather than in terms of culture or 
individual experience: basic emotion theory as articulated by the affect program 
tradition of emotion research. Following Darwin (1872), Ekman and others (Ekman et al. 
1987; Ekman, Sorenson, and Friesen 1969; C. E. Izard 1971) pioneered this approach by 
finding pan-cultural, involuntary, facial expressions for some emotions, called basic 
emotions (e.g. anger, fear disgust, sadness, and joy). The universality of these facial 
expressions serves as an indicator that these facial expressions derive from inheritance 
(rather than cultural transmission or individual experience). These expressions then 
served as a scaffold for consolidating related phenomena that are also explainable by 
basic emotions. For instance, the coordination of different physiological response 
patterns for each involuntary facial expression of emotion (Ekman, Levenson, and 
Friesen 1983) provides some reason to expect that these physiological responses are 
governed by the same underlying entity as facial expressions of basic emotions. 
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Early on, Ekman (1977) suggested that basic emotions have genetic bases and 
dedicated neural substrates. However, it is often difficult to characterize the exact sense 
in which traits are genetically determined (see e.g. P. E. Griffiths and Machery 2008). 
This is because developmental processes that produce these traits often depend on 
environmental regularities (non-genetic determinants) for species-typical outcomes (P. 
E. Griffiths 2001; Ron Mallon and Weinberg 2006). However these details are to be 
worked out, there is a clear sense in which basic emotions are innate. We have basic 
emotions because of biological inheritance and not because of environmental regularities 
or cultural inheritance or learning from individual experience.  
Culture and individual experience cannot explain many of the phenomena of 
basic emotions. For instance, involuntary facial expressions of basic emotions appear 
very early in development as does the capacity to recognize or respond to them (e.g. 
Carroll E. Izard, Hembree, and Huebner 1987). They appear spontaneously in those who 
could not have learned them from experience, as in those who are born both blind and 
deaf (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1973). They are automatic in the sense that they come unbidden 
and are difficult to fake, suppress or control (e.g. Ekman and others 1971). Many of the 
facial expressions of basic emotions have homologous expressions in chimpanzees and 
other non-human primates (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1973; L. Parr et al. 2007a). This means 
that the sets of muscle contractions involved in human facial expressions of anger 
naturally occur in the social interactions of these species. Finally, recognizable changes 
in vocal characteristics have also been found for each basic emotion, with anger being the 
most recognizable (Scherer 2003). Again, these features of basic emotion phenomena 
(e.g. early development, universal signals) provide evidence that the idiosyncrasies of 
individual experience play a limited role in shaping them. For instance, early 
development of emotional expression and recognition suggests that these emotional 
capacities develop faster and with more regularity than they would if they relied upon 
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general-purpose learning mechanisms in response to the information present in 
individual experiences.  
In sum, the affect program tradition has amassed a good deal of evidence to 
indicate that involuntary facial expressions of anger (among other basic emotions) are 
part of a broader set of phenomena that are innate and adaptively tailored to deal with 
specific situations. While this capacity has yet to be fully specified or understood, there is 
some reason to expect that these phenomena will be explained in large part by common 
inheritance. Given that no other theory has offered an account of anger as an inherited 
trait with clearly articulated response components, the basic emotion of anger, or basic 
human anger, is the best target for any hypothesis that attempts to connect aggression 
phenomena in non-human animals to anger in humans. 
2. Two Comparisons 
Now that we have a clear target, we can consider each of the two comparative 
hypotheses proposed. The two hypotheses arise out of separate research traditions, but 
there are several similarities in the manner in which the hypotheses are derived (see 
Table 1 for a summary overview). Both traditions focus on a specific set of phenomena 
(e.g. the behavioral repertoire of a resident rat), with the goal of elaborating and 
explaining those phenomena in a particular way. Moreover, both traditions postulate a 
system that is responsible for the explanandum phenomenon. What does it means to 
postulate a system? Neither hypothetical system discussed below has been described at a 
sufficient level of detail to think of it as a mechanism. That is, there is not yet a list of the 
parts of the system or the interactions within it that would be capable of producing the 
phenomena in question (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). Nevertheless, a 
complete explanation of the phenomena would probably involve a description of the 
mechanisms that constitute the system. Thus, “system” is a way of referring to whatever 
mechanisms explain the relevant phenomena in a certain way. For both hypotheses, the 
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postulated system is compared with anger. In order to elaborate these hypotheses, I need 
to say a little about each research tradition, its explanandum phenomena, and the system 
it postulates to explain those phenomena (see summary in Table 1). I will also present 
some of the main lines of evidence offered in support of each hypothesis, pointing out 
that this evidence has little to do with homology.  
Table 1. Comparison of competing hypotheses 
 Ethological hypothesis Neurophysiological  
hypothesis  
Research tradition Ethology Neurophysiology 
 
Explanandum phenomenon Resident male rats’ 
confrontation of intruder 
rats 
Attack elicited by 
hypothalamic stimulation 
in cats  
Category of aggression Confrontational attack as 
opposed to avoidance 
strategies 
Defensive as opposed to 
predatory aggression  
Postulated emotion system Confrontation system RAGE system 
Adaptive function Defend resources against 
challenging conspecifics 
Defend against threats to 
self and resources  
Sources of support Distinct motivations and 
behaviors 
 
Similarities with anger: 
 sympathetic arousal 
(e.g. heart rate, 
blood pressure, 
piloerection) 
 hormonal changes 
 pre-programmed 
features (e.g. threat 
displays) 
 approach 
motivation 
 reactivity/ 
impulsivity 
 hostility? 
 Elicitors (e.g. 
challenge) 
Reliable neurological 
dissociation 
 
Similarities with anger: 
 sympathetic arousal 
(e.g. heart rate, 
blood pressure, 
piloerection) 
 hormonal changes  
 pre-programmed 
features (e.g. threat 
displays) 
 reactivity/ 
impulsivity  
 hostility? 
 elicitors (e.g. threat) 
 
 
2.1. The Ethological Hypotheses 
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The ethological hypothesis holds that human anger is comparable to an 
aggression system characterized in rats. This claim has been championed by Caroline 
and Robert Blanchard (2003a; 1988; 1984), David Adams (1976; 2006), and Michael 
Potegal (1994; M. Potegal and Stemmler 2010) and builds primarily on work in the 
ethological tradition of Konrad Lorenz (2003), Niko Tinbergen (1963), and Eibl-
Eibesfeldt (1979). Nevertheless, there has been a great deal of neuroscientific research on 
the avoidance behaviors discussed below (e.g. Canteras 2002). 
The explanandum phenomenon identified by this tradition is the confrontational, 
as opposed to avoidant, behaviors of rats in a resident-intruder experimental model.3 In 
this model, a resident rat is put in a cage of which it is the primary occupant4. After a 
residency of some weeks, a male intruder (sometimes anesthetized) of a similar size is 
placed in the cage and left without a path of escape. The result is that the resident rat 
adopts a set of motivations and strategies that are oriented primarily toward 
confrontation, whereas the intruder adopts a set of motivations and strategies (including 
a distinctive form of attack) that are oriented toward avoidance.  
These differences in motivation and strategy are diagnostic for classifying 
instances of aggression and for positing distinct systems. For example, the two 
behavioral repertoires include different kinds of threat and different kinds of attack. In 
resident rats, the attacks target bites at the dorsal surfaces of the neck and back, whereas 
the avoidance strategies of the intruder block the resident’s access to the back and 
attacks focus on the resident’s snout. The resident’s attack is accompanied by a 
motivation to approach, whereas the intruder’s attack, as well as other avoidance 
behaviors, are accompanied by the aim of escaping the confrontation or, failing that, 
avoiding (or deterring) bites to dorsal surfaces. In a more natural setting, these 
                                               
3 The same kind of attack can also be observed in female rodents defending their pups. 
4 An ovariectomized female is often added to avoid social isolation. The point is that the cage is the male 
rats territory, in that he has marked it with his scent.  
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motivations and strategies are identifiable but are usually adopted by both combatants at 
different times in a given encounter. So the upshot of the resident-intruder experimental 
paradigm is that it leads to a polarization of confrontation and avoidance strategies that 
it is not usually possible to observe in the wild. This model constitutes the Blanchards’ 
contribution to this line of research, who following the work of others (Scott 1976), use a 
mixture of ethological and experimental methods to isolate and analyze these forms of 
aggression and to probe the motivations that underlie them. Another phenomenon that 
may involve confrontational aggression is the aggression of lactating female rodents 
toward unfamiliar adults (D. Albert et al. 1987). 
Blanchard and Blanchard (1984, 1988) argue that the characteristics of 
confrontation and avoidance behavioral repertoires constitute evidence for the existence 
of two underlying emotion systems, which give rise to these behaviors: “[Avoidant] 
attack, and indeed the entire pattern of [avoidance] behavior, reflects fear. And 
[confrontational] attack, we maintain, similarly reflects an underlying emotional state, 
constituting at least a primitive analogue of what we call in humans ‘anger’.” (D. C. 
Blanchard and Blanchard 1984, 17) 5  That there are unified systems organizing 
confrontational and avoidant behaviors is evidenced by the directedness of each system 
toward accomplishing a characteristic set of aims: 
The more that [avoidance behavior] is examined, the more it becomes certain that 
there is some underlying element that provides order in the chaotic jumble of input 
and output factors. As one example of the complexities of this process, it can easily be 
demonstrated that a rat will react to a certain threatening stimulus in a specific 
situation on the basis of the features of the stimulus (discriminability, movement, 
                                               
5 While the Blanchards characterize their claim in terms of analogy and speak primarily of the adaptive 
function of these systems, they also advocate the use of these systems as animal models of aggression. But 
for animal models to be useful, the standard assumptions is that there needs to be a conserved mechanism 
shared by model and target organisms alike. In any case, the argument of this paper is that a homology 
claim is plausible for this aggression system. 
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etc.). If a neutral stimulus is experimentally paired with this noxious stimulus, the 
animal usually begins very quickly to treat the neutral stimulus as a threat. However, 
rather than reacting to the now conditioned threat source as it did to the threat with 
which it was formerly paired, the animal will give [avoidance] responses that are 
appropriate to the relevant characteristics of the conditioned stimulus…Thus, what is 
learned is not a [avoidant] response per se, but the emotional reaction to the 
stimulus. This emotional reaction, in conjunction with stimulus and situational 
characteristics, then determines the precise response to be made. (D. C. Blanchard 
and Blanchard 1984, 18) 
Not only do avoidance behaviors reveal an underlying element that determines the 
appropriate response depending on each situation, a specific set of aims unifies these 
behaviors. While each behavior in the avoidance repertoire (e.g. freezing, flight, attack, 
etc.) are distinct in nature, they are unified in that they each contribute to, and all are 
coordinated in pursuit of, the central aims of threat avoidance (from both conspecifics 
and predators) and risk assessment (see Blanchard and Blanchard 1988, 46-47). This 
kind of coordination around a set of aims would not be expected of a reflex system (see 
e.g. Konrad Lorenz 1957). While Blanchard and Blanchard make this case in less detail 
for the confrontation system, it is clear that the aim of confronting an intruder and biting 
its back coordinates the deployment of different strategies from the confrontational 
repertoire. In sum, the unity of confrontation and avoidance behaviors with respect to 
their respective aims is evidence for the existence of separate systems underlying these 
respective behaviors.  
2.2. The Neurophysiological Hypothesis 
Now consider the neurophysiological hypothesis. This is the claim that human 
anger is connected with a RAGE system that has been characterized primarily in cats. 
This hypothesis has been primarily championed by Jaak Panksepp (1998; Panksepp and 
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Zellner 2004; Panksepp and Biven 2012) and R. J. R. Blair (2012) and draws on a 
tradition of neurophysiological research that includes the work of Walter Hess, John 
Flynn and Alan Siegel.  
The explanandum phenomenon for this tradition is called defensive rage and is 
displayed in the wild by cats that have been threatened. In these situations, aggression is 
accompanied by sympathetic arousal, piloerection, pupillary dilation, arched back, and 
hissing (Leyhausen 1979). Walter Hess (1954) was the first to elicit this behavior by 
stimulation of the hypothalamus, while Panksepp (Panksepp 1971), Siegel (2004) and 
others carried on extending this line of investigation.  
Since this tradition draws from neurophysiology and neuroscience, this 
phenomenon is distinguished from another form of aggression by the fact that they have 
distinct subcortical neural substrates. Specifically, defensive rage produces a kind of 
attack that is distinct from predatory attack and can be elicited by stimulation from 
electrodes placed at a location in the ventral hypothalamus of cats and rats, a region also 
known as the Hypothalamic Aggression Area (HAA) (Siegel et al. 2010; Siegel et al. 1999; 
Siegel 2004; Kruk et al. 1983). This form of aggression is distinct from predatory attack 
(also called quiet-biting attack), which consists in stalking prey and pouncing. While 
these experiments are usually conducted in cats, some strains of laboratory rats display a 
similar form of predatory aggression against mice, and mice will exhibit this kind of 
predatory aggression toward crickets.6 Not only is predatory attack unaccompanied by 
sympathetic arousal, pupillary dilation, or piloerection, the electrode placements that 
elicit predatory attack are also concentrated in different areas of the hypothalamus 
(specifically, the dorsolateral hypothalamus) from those that elicit defensive rage 
(Wasman and Flynn 1962). Sites that elicit defensive rage do not elicit predatory attack 
                                               
6 See e.g. Panksepp (1971). To my knowledge, no one has investigated whether predatory attack appears in 
any form in herbivores, so it is unclear whether this kind of attack applies to them. 
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and vice versa. The brain system that produces defensive rage behaviors is referred to by 
Panksepp (1998) as the RAGE system. According to Panksepp, the system includes all 
and only brain regions linked with defensive rage behavior, including specific locations 
in the amygdala, hypothalamus, and periaqueductal grey area.  
To see what other aggression phenomena might be included in the category of 
defensive rage, we can compare it with another prominent classification system. Both 
Siegel and colleagues (2004; Weinshenker and Siegel 2002; Siegel and Victoroff 2009) 
and Panksepp (1998) mention Kenneth Moyer’s (1976) classification of aggression in 
clarifying their conception of defensive rage. Whereas Moyer’s classification posited six 
subtypes of aggression (predatory, inter-male, fear-induced, maternal, irritable, and sex-
related aggression), Panksepp (1998) and colleagues (Panksepp and Biven, 2012) 
contrast their view with Moyer’s, suggesting that there are only two forms of aggression 
(predatory and defensive aggression) that can be reliably differentiated on the basis of 
neurological data. Panksepp (1998, 2012) conceives of defensive rage as distinct from 
both predatory and inter-male aggression (which he claims does not have a primary 
neural substrate, see Panksepp and Biven 2012, chap. 4) while encompassing fear-
induced aggression, maternal aggression, and irritable aggression.7 Siegel and others 
also argue that it is useful to categorize aggression in this way (Siegel and Victoroff 
2009).  
It is important to note that defensive rage is not coextensive with the 
confrontational form of aggression isolated by the ethological tradition. The kind of 
aggression evoked by stimulating the HAA does not always have the same characteristics 
as a resident rats attack, nor does it have the same characteristics as the intruder’s 
behaviors. Stimulation of the HAA in rats yields a mix of behaviors including not only 
                                               
7 I am not aware of behavioral evidence that connects defensive rage with these other categories of 
aggression. The connection is usually presented as conjecture. 
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those that are associated with confrontation, but also behaviors associated with 
avoidance, such as jumping attacks and threats (distress calls and teeth chattering, Kruk 
et al. 1984; Siegel et al. 1999). Some of the postures distinctive of the confrontational 
repertoire are notably absent from behaviors triggered by stimulation of the HAA. 
Moreover, stimulation of the same electrode placement can lead to confrontational or 
avoidant forms of attack depending on the level of stimulation (Kruk and van der Poel 
1980)8. Siegel and others conclude that hypothalamic attack is a “...behavioural category 
in its own right” (Siegel et al. 1999, 364, see also Kruk & van der Poel, 1980). Finally, it is 
not clear whether and how the RAGE system can account for the motivational states that 
correspond with the confrontation and avoidance systems identified by the ethological 
tradition (see below for further discussion).  
As a result of the forgoing evidence, there is some agreement that the behavioral 
repertoires identified by the resident-intruder model do not have independent neural 
substrates at the level of the hypothalamus (see e.g. Siegel 2004, ch. 1). We can conclude 
that these modes of individuating aggressive behavior are incommensurate. To 
summarize, this is because the RAGE system is responsible for a mixture of 
confrontation and avoidance behaviors but it does not appear to be responsible for some 
of the most distinctive behaviors of the confrontation system (e.g. lateral threat, 
approach motivation and lateral attack) and avoidance system (e.g. avoidance 
motivation) as understood by the ethological tradition. Thus, the systems responsible for 
these putative phenomena cannot be the same. While this incommensurability may 
indicate that one or both of these traditions have isolated spurious phenomena, I do not 
wish to defend any claim along these lines.9 
                                               
8 Consequently, it isn’t out of the question that other brain regions could control confrontational and 
avoidant behaviors by modulating the rate of stimulation to the HAA.  
9 One can find hedged claims to this effect within both research traditions. See e.g. Adams (2006) for the 
claim that defensive rage is an artifact of stimulation techniques and Siegel (2004) for the claim that 
confrontational attack is not well-defined. 
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Importantly, some the evidence presented in support of these hypotheses has 
little to do with homology. For instance, the eliciting conditions for both aggression 
systems are thought of in largely adaptive terms. What is a threat but something that can 
reduce an organism’s fitness directly or indirectly? What is a conspecific challenge but 
something that can compromise an organism’s control over fitness relevant resources? 
Even the ethological hypothesis is sometimes presented explicitly in terms of analogy: 
“The view that natural defensive and aggressive behaviors of lower animals may provide 
an analogue to human emotions began with the pioneering work of Darwin (1872).” (D. 
C. Blanchard and Blanchard 1988, 44) Moreover, adaptational categories are sometimes 
used to identify classes of biological traits over and above homology thinking:  
Certainly these behaviors, and the circumstances in which they occur, appear to be 
highly adaptive and functional under normal conditions of life for individuals of 
virtually all mammalian species. Specifically, [confrontation] increases access to 
breeding females, with dominant males reproducing at a higher rate than 
subordinates... There is no evidence of any discontinuity in the adaptive values of 
either [confrontation or avoidance] for people as opposed to lower mammals. (D. C. 
Blanchard and Blanchard 1988, 48–49)  
In these strands of aggression research, there is very little reflection concerning 
the kind of evidence that supports claims of behavioral and psychological homology as 
distinct from adaptation. Nonetheless, as our discussion of homology will show, adaptive 
function is a thin reed on which to base the identification of two traits. The very existence 
of homologies shows that the same trait can take on different functions within a lineage 
(e.g. tetrapod forelimbs are the same trait but with many functions), and that similar 
functions can be served by very different traits in separate lineages (e.g. bat wings and 
bird wings have similar functions but are not the same biological trait). In the following 
section, I will argue that, properly understood, the operational criteria of homology help 
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to clarify the evidence on which homology claims should be tested. The question that the 
operational criteria of homology help to answer is the following: are there similarities 
that provide evidence of common history between the two traits? If there are such 
similarities, this provides evidence of common ancestry that stands independently of 
evidence for shared adaptive function. 
3. Homology and Its Competitors 
Though the concept of homology is crucial to evolutionary thinking, it was 
conceived in the service of biological taxonomy prior to Darwin's time. Owen (1846) 
thought of homology as the sameness of an organ or structure in different organisms 
under every form and function. A common example of homology is the skeletal anatomy 
of the vertebrate forelimbs. The radius and ulna are bone structures that are common to 
bats, chimps, giraffes and manatees even though their forms and functions are 
dramatically different among these animals (see Figure 1). They can be more or less 
dense, thicker or thinner, longer or shorter, (though their spatial relationship to other 
bones of the forearms are preserved) and they can contribute to the different functions of 
swimming, flying, running and grasping in different organisms. So the radius and ulna 
are the same traits that occur in different animals, even though they have widely varying 
forms and functions within these various animals.  
Now that evolutionary thinking has been integrated into biological systematics, 
one prominent idea about homology is that homology is a causal-historical concept(for a 
clarification and defense of this claim, see Ereshefsky 2012). Specifically, a homology 
refers to traits of various animals that derive from a trait of a common ancestor. In this 
way, shared ancestry is the common cause of each homologue, and this common cause 
explains similarities between the homologous traits. In the words of one biologist (with 
some help from Darwin), homology is “…grounded in ‘descent, with modification,’ a 
process that belongs to the past.” (Rieppel 2005, 24)  
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Figure 1. The bones of some mammalian forelimbs. The radius (green) and 
ulna (red) are the same kind of bone, which takes on different forms and 
functions in different animals. Thanks to Valerie Wiegman for this 
illustration. 
 
As a causal-historical concept, we can identify and refer to a homology without 
having or requiring detailed knowledge of the developmental and hereditary 
mechanisms that give rise to it, just as we can refer to a disease entity, such as measles or 
chicken pox, without knowing about its underlying causes (Putnam 1969). Nonetheless, 
we learn more about each homology as we learn more about its underlying causes, just as 
we learn more about chicken pox as we learn more about the virus that causes it. 
Given the causal-historical nature of homology, there is a vast range of evidence 
that could bear on whether or not one trait is homologous to another. Some of the best 
evidence pertaining to homology comes from cladistics. If one has an independently 
established phylogenetic tree, one can look at the distribution of a candidate homology, 
or character, on that tree. If, for instance, the existence of a homology is more 
parsimonious than convergent evolution on one or more occasion, then there is a strong 
reason to think that a trait is homologous.  
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Nevertheless, before we can even look at the distribution of a character on a 
phylogenetic tree, we need to know how to identify the character in each taxon, which 
becomes a tricky matter when dealing with behavioral and psychological characters. For 
instance, knowing that humans have anger, that rats have a confrontation system, and 
that cats have a RAGE system does not determine which of these capacities are the same 
trait or character.  
One way of addressing this problem is to use the operational criteria of 
homology. These criteria need not function as a definition of homology but instead we 
can use them to establish a consistent set of methods for ascertaining homologies and by 
extension, identical traits. The criteria of homology attempt to identify particular kinds 
of similarity, the kinds that are best explained by common history over and above a 
range of competing hypotheses. For any given similarity across clades, there are several 
hypotheses in competition with homology. One is that the similarity is only by chance. 
Another more probable possibility is that convergent evolution explains the 
correspondence. When a similarity is explained purely by convergent evolution, we have 
a clear case of analogy. Still another possibility in the behavioral domain is that 
similarity is explained by plastic developmental processes, particularly learning. In the 
clearest cases of plasticity, similarity can be explained entirely by convergent learning or 
development, perhaps shaped largely by task demands or shared developmental 
mechanisms.10 The main competition is thus between hypotheses of homology, analogy, 
and developmental plasticity. Insofar as they function as evidence, the criteria of 
homology should help pick out similarites between traits that are explained by common 
ancestry and not convergent evolution or plastic developmental processes. 
                                               
10 See Brown (2013) for a detailed discussion of the difficulties (e.g. due to the plasticity and 
transformability of behavior) in applying the criteria of homology to behavior. 
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The most prominent criteria for homology were developed by Adolf Remane 
(1971) and can be deployed for this purpose. Consider first the criterion of position. The 
criterion applies to the radius and ulna because even with different forms and functions 
across different organisms, they retain their relative position to other bones of vertebrate 
forelimbs (humerus and the bones of the wrist). It would be highly unlikely for these 
characters to have evolved de novo in each of the different animals that possess it and yet 
to have the same relative position to other structures. Moreover, there is no shared 
function across the different animals which possess this character that would explain the 
correspondence. While corresponding position sounds like a spatial property, it is 
actually topological, and can include corresponding positions in temporal sequence or 
corresponding positions across cognitive architectures (e.g. “boxologies”). 
The criterion of special quality concerns “…shared features [that] cannot be 
explained by the role of a part in the life of the organism. The fact that in the vertebrate 
eye the blood supply to the retina lies between the retina and the source of light is a 
famous example of a ‘special quality’.” (P. E. Griffiths 2007, 648) The more complex a 
shared quality is, the less likely that they would have evolved independently. The location 
of blood supply to the vertebrate retina is both complex and non-essential (and even 
slightly counterproductive) given the functional role of the retina (what it is used for in 
the organism), so it identifies a correspondence that provides strong evidence that the 
various instances of this character derive from common descent. 
Finally, the criterion of intermediate forms allows identification of homologous 
forms, A and C, because of the existence of one or more transitional states, B1...Bn, 
between the two forms. In many cases, the homology between transitional forms, say 
between A and B1 or between B1 and B2, is determined by applying the other two criteria. 
For instance, there are transition states between the bones of the mammalian inner ear 
and the bones of the reptilian jaw. We know this because the bones of the reptilian jaw 
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share the same position (relative to other bones of the jaw) as the bones of several 
intermediate forms, some of which share the same position as the bones of the 
mammalian inner ear. 
While the examples so far deal straightforwardly with morphology or body 
structure, all three of Remane’s criteria have also been applied to behavioral and 
psychological traits by ethologists (for overviews, see Ereshefsky 2007; Wenzel 1992). 
The following are some clear examples of how Remane’s criteria have been applied to 
behavior. The position criterion, for instance, can be applied to temporal position in the 
same way that it is applied to spatial position. Accordingly, this criterion is satisfied 
when the behaviors of different organisms occupy the same position in a broader 
sequence of behavior. Wenzel (1992) uses the example of different tail movements in 
different species of Tilapia fish, which occupy the same position in the sequence of 
behaviors that comprise the courtship ritual.11 
In the case of special quality, Alexander (1962) discusses several cases in which 
different species of crickets have identical songs and in which these songs are considered 
homologous. These songs have complex acoustical properties that constitute a special 
quality. This is because the acoustical properties are arbitrary relative to their function. 
That is, their function is to assist in locating and courting a mate, and this function could 
be filled by a number of different song patterns that would differentiate between local 
species and allow for collocation of mating pairs. Indeed, similarities and differences in 
song have been a primary tool for determining taxonomical relations between different 
kinds of cricket, grasshopper, katydid, locust and cicada. Importantly, when a similarity 
is arbitrary with respect to function, this provides evidence in favor of homology over 
hypotheses of both analogy and ontogenetic adaptation. This is because it is improbable 
                                               
11 One difficulty with deploying this criterion concerns the transformability of behavior from one species to 
another (e.g. Beer 1984). Whether behavior sequences in separate species are similar depends on how 
behaviors are segmented. This and other worries make behavioral homologies more tenuous as taxonomic 
distance increases. 
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that processes like learning or convergent evolution would lead to the same arbitrary 
quality when any number of other arbitrary qualities (e.g. acoustical patterns) could have 
satisfied the same function. Alexander (1962) and Ereshefsky (2007) both point out that 
different joint movements sometimes produce homologous cricket or grasshopper songs, 
demonstrating that different body structures can execute homologous behaviors. The 
patterning of songs can correspond in ways that indicate shared ancestry without the 
song being produced in the same way. 
For my purposes, an important constraint on homology claims derives from the 
fact that some homologies are nested within other homologies. For instance, the class of 
tetrapod forelimbs is nested within the class of paired appendages. Thus, the forelimbs of 
reptiles, amphibians, mammals and avians are members of the homology class of 
tetrapod forelimbs, but they are also members of the more inclusive homology class of 
paired appendages, which also includes the pectoral fins of sharks and teleosts. While 
pectoral fins are homologous with instances of tetrapod forelimbs as paired appendages, 
the similarities between pectoral fins and tetrapod forelimbs do not provide evidence for 
homology at the less inclusive level of tetrapod forelimbs. Inclusion in this more specific 
class is indicated by bone structures that are absent in pectoral fins. These structures are 
due to modifications that occured subsequent to the divergence of tetrapods from 
teleosts, and that is why teleost pectoral fins are not included in this homology class.  
As a result, some similarities only indicate inclusion in a broader homology class 
(e.g. paired appendages), whereas other similarities indicate inclusion in narrower 
homology classes (e.g. tetrapod forelimbs). In other words, some similarities (e.g. those 
between pectoral fins and forelimbs) only provide evidence for inclusion in broader 
homology classes (e.g. paired appendages rather than tetrapod forelimbs). It follows 
that, when evaluating similarities between traits, it is sometimes necessary to consider 
which homology class a similarity indicates.  
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From these considerations, we can derive an evidential constraint on homology 
claims. To see this, consider the correspondences between a human forelimb and a feline 
hind limb. The criterion of position is satisfied, because there are similarities between 
the parts (e.g. between humerus and femur). There are relations of homology between 
these traits. They are homologous as mammalian extremities and tetrapod extremities. 
Nevertheless, if we were to specify the homology class as one that includes human 
forelimbs but excludes human hind limbs, the similarity in question does not provide 
evidence for homology at this level.  This is because there are no similarities between the 
human forelimb and cat hind limb that are not also shared between the human forelimb 
and hind limb. Thus, to provide evidence for relations of homology at the level of some 
homology class G (in this case, the homology class that includes forelimbs but excludes 
hindlimbs) as opposed to the more inclusive class, H (in this case, homology classes that 
includes forelimbs and hindlimbs), requires that some similarities between relata are not 
shared by traits in the more inclusive class, H. I call this an “evidential constraint” on 
homology claims. 
While the examples so far deal straightforwardly with morphology or body 
structure, all three of Remane’s criteria have also been applied to behavioral and 
psychological traits by ethologists (for overviews, see Ereshefsky 2007; Wenzel 1992). I 
suspect that what seems obvious concerning morphology might be easily confused 
concerning behavior or psychology. As a result, one could find evidence that 
psychological traits are homologous, but misidentify the homology class that this 
evidence supports. One way of doing so is to violate the evidential constraint above. I will 
argue that the neurophysiological hypothesis is an instance of this mistake. As yet, there 
is no evidence that the RAGE system identified by neurophysiological research is a 
member of the homology class that includes anger but excludes other human emotions. 
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This is because the hypothesis does not identify any similarities that are not shared with 
other human emotions. I spell out the details of this argument in the following section. 
In summary, homology is a causal-historical concept, and homology thinking is a 
way of providing historical explanations for observed similarities between biological 
traits (or characters). The evidential criteria for homology can isolate evidence 
pertaining to this kind of historical explanation. In the following section, I show how the 
evidential criteria can discriminate between the two hypotheses laid out in section 2. 
4. Which Kinds of Aggression are Manifestations of Anger? 
Now we are in a position to evaluate the ethological and neurophysiological 
hypotheses. Recall that the two hypotheses focus on different sets of phenomena. The 
ethological hypothesis focuses on patterns of confrontational behavior of territory-
holding, “resident” rats, whereas the neurophysiological hypothesis focuses on patterns 
of defensive behavior elicited by electrical brain stimulation. The ethological hypothesis 
lumps its phenomena together according to contrasting motives of behavior 
(confrontation versus defense), whereas the neurophysiological hypothesis lumps its 
phenomena together according to dissociable neural substrates of behavior (regions of 
the hypothalamus that elicit defense behavior versus distinct regions that elicit predation 
behavior). In this section, I show how homological thinking helps to adjudicate between 
them. Arguably, the available evidence supports the ethological hypothesis over the 
neurophysiological hypothesis. When applied to the ethological hypothesis, the criteria 
of homology identify similarities between human anger and the confrontation system 
that indicate a common ancestral origin (see Table 2 for a summary). The proponents of 
the neurophysiological hypothesis, on the other hand, have not yet identified similarities 
of this kind. Rather, the similarities observed between human anger and the RAGE 
system also hold in relation to a broader set of human emotions.  
 119 
Table 2. Summary of criteria of homology applied to competing hypotheses. 
 
First, consider the ethological hypothesis. There are other aspects of the 
confrontation system that may share corresponding positions in sequences of behavior 
across the taxa that share a common ancestor with rats and humans. For instance, 
increases in blood pressure are correlated with confrontational aggression in rats and 
with anger and aggression in humans (Fokkema, Koolhaas, and van der Gugten 1995; 
Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen 1983; Levenson, Ekman, and Friesen 1990; Levenson 
1992; J. E. Hokanson, Burgess, and Cohen 1963; J. Hokanson and Burgess 1962; J. E. 
Hokanson and Shetler 1961; Geen, Stonner, and Shope 1975; Tyson 1998; Gambaro and 
Rabin 1969). Moreover, piloerection, another indicator of autonomic arousal can 
accompany confrontational attack in rats as well as an approach-oriented aggressive 
behavior pattern in chimpanzees (R. J. Blanchard et al. 1977; Goodall 1986; L. a. Parr, 
Cohen, and Waal 2005). Finally, there is some indication that increases in plasma 
 Ethological Hypothesis Neurophysiological 
Hypothesis 
Position  Sequence of behavior 
(autonomic arousal & signal 
-> attack)  
  
Sequence of behavior 
(autonomic arousal & signal 
-> attack) – no evidence to 
favor a correspondence 
with anger as opposed to 
fear signals; not a unique 
correspondence with anger 
Special quality Back-biting attack shared 
between rats and macaques  
Morphological homology 
between facial expressions 
accompanying aggression 
in humans and primates  
Facial expressions during 
HAA stimulation in 
humans?   
Continuity of intermediates Aggression paired with 
homologous signals across 
descendants (i.e. rats, 
macaques, chimpanzees 
and humans) of 
intermediates  
HAA stimulation elicits 
urge to attack across 
descendants (i.e. cats, rats, 
and macaques) of 
intermediates – unique 
correspondence with 
human anger not 
substantiated 
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noradrenalin accompanying provocation correlates with aggressiveness in both male rats 
and human males (Fokkema, Koolhaas, and van der Gugten 1995; Gerra, Zaimovic, and 
Avanzini 1997) In other words, there may be correspondence between several indicators 
of autonomic arousal that precede attack in non-human animals and that accompany 
anger in humans. 
Perhaps the strongest pieces of evidence for homology, however, is a special 
quality that is shared by rats and stumptail macaques. Adams and Shoel (1981a) note 
that dominant macaques and resident rats both implement strategies aimed at accessing 
the back and biting it. In macaques, this behavior seems arbitrary with respect to the 
(probable) function of inflicting non-lethal damage on the subordinate. Macaques have a 
much larger repertoire of bodily movements than rats, many of which could serve the 
function of inflicting non-lethal harm (pushing, kicking, scratching, slapping, holding 
etc.). Thus, back-biting is a special quality, and the best explanation of this behavior may 
appeal to products of common ancestry. In other words, the reason that the attacks of 
both rats and macaques are aimed at biting the neck and back may be that they share a 
common ancestor with a corresponding aggressive strategy and perhaps similar 
motivational mechanisms for negotiating intraspecific conflict.12 There is some evidence 
that human anger includes an impulse to approach and attack, but no one has 
demonstrated that the impulse is pan-cultural or species-typical.13 
While Adams and Schoel did observe several facial expressions of subordinate 
macaques, they did not note any facial expressions that uniquely accompanied the 
attacks of a dominant macaque. However, in more ecologically valid studies of macaque 
behavior, macaques with higher dominance status do display facial expressions toward 
lower ranking macaques in aggressive encounters, expressions that resemble anger 
                                               
12 Adams and Schoel argue for homology by considering similarity in the dynamic of attack and submission 
across both species. 
13 See e.g. Carver and Harmon-Jones (2009); Baron (1971); Berkowitz et al (1981); and Pedersen et al 
(2011).  
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expressions in humans (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1974).14 Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1973) argues 
that two of these expressions are similar (utilizing homologous action units) across 
macaques, chimps, and humans. Some confirmation of these comparisons has been 
attained by comparison using a facial action coding system to quantify chimpanzee facial 
expressions (L. Parr et al. 2007b). Thus, there is continuity across the intermediates for 
some components of putative aggression systems across the common ancestors of these 
species.  
Now consider the neurophysiological hypothesis. The problem is that the case for 
homology is incomplete. First, there is some evidence for correspondence that has 
continuity across intermediates: stimulation of the hypothalamus of cats, possums, rats 
and marmoset monkeys leads to similar forms of attack (Roberts, Steinberg, and Means 
1967; Bergquist 1970; Panksepp 1971; Woodworth 1971; cited in Lipp and Hunsperger 
1978). 15  However, ethical and practical considerations make it nearly impossible to 
obtain evidence concerning the effects of hypothalamus stimulation in humans. It 
remains uncertain whether it would lead to attack or to any of the other concomitants of 
human anger (e.g. experiences of anger, facial expressions of anger, or physiological 
changes associated with anger, as distinct from fear). Nor have any of these studies 
observed distinctive facial expressions that indicate continuity with human anger.16  
                                               
14 Chevalier-Skolnikoff calls these expressions “stare”, “round-mouthed stare” and “open-mouthed stare”. 
15 Delgado (1968) produced aggressive behaviors with electrical stimulation of the thalamus and 
cerebellum of chimpanzees and macaques. However, these brain structures are notably absent from the 
neurophysiological hypothesis and its descriptions of brain structures involved in aggression. Moreover, 
Delgado and colleagues did evaluate facial expressions. However, these facial expressions were not 
analyzed.  
16 It is compelling that in macaques, stimulation only results in attack under certain conditions (M. 
Alexander and Perachio 1973), some of which depend on whether the electrical stimulation occurs in the 
presence of a higher or lower ranking conspecific (attack being more likely in the latter case). Nevertheless, 
one cannot conclude from this that this form of aggression is of a piece with the aggressive syndrome 
which includes angry facial expression. It is quite possible that there are several forms of impulsive 
aggression that an animal might inflict only upon lower ranking conspecifics, including pain induced 
aggression, fear induced aggression or perhaps even disgust induced aggression. Neither is it obvious that 
any of these forms of aggression are of the same kind as angry aggression. By contrast, the work of Adams 
and Schoel (1982), and Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1973) describes a certain kind of confrontational or 
dominance-influenced aggression with which angry facial expressions are associated. The same is not true 
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There is some evidence that amygdala stimulation can produce feelings of anger 
(e.g. Hitchcock and Cairns 1973). This evidence is even bolstered by the fact that 
stimulation of the medial amygdala in cats can potentiate defensive behaviors elicited by 
electrical stimulation of the hypothalamus (e.g. Shaikh, Steinberg, and Siegel 1993). 
However, several other emotional experiences beside anger have also been reported as a 
result of amygdala stimulation in humans, including anxiety, guilt, embarrassment, 
jealousy, and a “desire for flight or escape” (which is more strongly associated with 
human fear, see Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989). It seems that current evidence 
does not support a distinct localization of anger-like and fear-like feelings or behaviors 
within the HAA or in the other brain structures that make up the RAGE system (in cats 
or otherwise). Thus, the evidence from brain stimulation does not reveal a unique 
correspondence with human anger; one that is not also shared with other human 
emotions.  
Second, consider the criterion of position. As with the confrontational attack 
observed in ethological work, physiological arousal and threat signals do occur prior to 
defensive attacks elicited by electrical brain stimulation. However, no evidence has been 
presented that either the signals or physiological arousal involved in these attacks are 
homologous with these components of human anger as opposed to human fear. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that any such evidence will materialize.  
This becomes apparent when we look closely at the work of Siegel and others on 
the HAA, which is cited as support for the neurophysiological hypothesis (Panksepp 
1998, 2012). In fact, Siegel does not advocate the neurophysiological hypothesis, and in 
many cases makes claims that constitute evidence against it. In several places (including 
                                                                                                                                            
of aggression elicited by electrical brain stimulation. The connection with angry facial expressions has not 
been made, nor has the behavioral syndrome been carefully circumscribed in ecologically valid conditions 
in most of the organisms in which it has been observed. Leyhausen (1979) has done this work concerning 
defensive aggression in cats, but he distinguishes this form of aggression from a confrontational form of 
aggression that includes a back-biting attack. I suspect that this latter form of aggression is more 
comparable to the confrontation system in rats (cf. Blanchard and Blanchard 1984). 
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Siegel 2004) Siegel compares defensive behaviors with a disorder known as Episodic 
Discontrol, which is marked by “...decreased impulse control – a characteristic common 
to defensive behavior – and altered perceptual states following stimuli evoking anger, 
fear or rage.” (Siegel and Victoroff 2009, 213 emphasis mine) Indeed, many of the 
similarities that are noted between defensive behaviors and these forms of human 
aggression are characteristics of affectively driven behavior in general. Impulsivity is a 
characteristic of many kinds of emotion expression (see e.g. Frijda 1986), including fear, 
anger, sadness, and joy. Thus, the position criterion is not satisfied in a way that provides 
evidence for a homology between the RAGE system and anger that is not also shared 
between human anger and human fear.  
By contrast, manifestations of the confrontation and avoidance systems in rats 
can be distinguished by quantifiable differences in the facial expressions of residents and 
intruders (Defensor et al. 2012), just as manifestations of anger and fear in humans can 
be distinguished by their distinctive facial expressions (e.g. Ekman and Friesen 1971). 
Moreover, resident and intruder rats have distinct forms of attack with distinct target 
sites. Thus, it is possible to distinguish within rats at least two different patterns of 
impulsive behaviors accompanied by distinct facial expressions. Moreover, some of the 
similarities between confrontation behaviors and angry behaviors in humans are not 
shared with fearful behaviors in humans or avoidance behaviors in rats. In other words, 
human anger and the confrontation system in rats do not violate the evidential 
constraint on homology claims (relativized to a homology class that only includes the 
emotion of anger) because they satisfy the evidential criteria of homology in ways that 
are not also satisfied by other emotions like fear. A related virtue of the ethological 
hypothesis is that it can distinguish angry aggression from the widely acknowledged 
category of fear-induced aggression (see esp. Moyer 1976). The same cannot be said for 
the neurophysiological hypothesis. I suspect that at least some of the phenomena 
 124 
identified by the neurophysiological hypothesis reflect behavioral outcomes of fear, 
rather than (or perhaps in addition to) anger.  
In sum, the case for homology between the RAGE system and anger (with respect 
to a category that includes anger but not other human emotions) may be similar to the 
case for homology between the cat hind limb and the human forelimb (with respect to a 
category that includes human forelimbs but not human hind limbs). The similarities so 
far observed do not evince a homology relation that excludes other emotions (especially 
fear), whereas the case for homology between the confrontation system and anger does 
evince such a relation. 
5. Criticisms 
I have argued so far that the confrontation system is homologous with human 
anger and that there is better evidence for this hypothesis than the threat-defense 
hypothesis. The argument depends on two claims that have been challenged in the 
literature on aggression in non-human animals. First, the confrontational tactics of 
rodents must actually be underpinned by a confrontation system. Second, the 
confrontation system of rodents must have phylogenetic continuity with anger in 
humans. The first claim has been challenged by Panksepp (1998) and others, (Panksepp 
and Zellner 2004; Panksepp and Biven 2012) who think that this form of attack is 
produced by the interaction of different emotion systems in the brain. They argue that 
intermale/competitive aggression is poorly understood and may arise from the 
interaction of SEEKING (a dopaminergic appetitive system) and RAGE systems rather 
than having an independent neural basis. Specifically, they suspect that confrontational 
behaviors are motivated by an urge or appetite to dominate and that this reflects the 
influence of the SEEKING system. Their assumption, which I will not question here, is 
that if there is not an independent neural substrate for confrontational attack, then the 
form of aggression is not a natural kind of aggression. Their conclusion seems to be that 
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the putative confrontation system does not exist, or that confrontational attack is not 
produced by a primary emotion system, or that confrontational attack is not a legitimate 
category, or natural kind, of aggression. Any of these claims would be problematic for the 
thesis defended here.  
The argument depends on a questionable assumption and a dubious claim. First, 
it assumes that confrontational attack in rats is a phenomenon secluded to the category 
of intermale aggression. Certainly the paradigm instance of this form of aggression is 
territorial and intermale aggression. However, it tells against this interpretation that 
similar patterns of behavior can be observed in lactating mothers defending their young 
(D. Albert et al. 1987) and in other forms of aggression in female rodents (e.g. Syrian 
hamsters in Michael Potegal and TenBrink 1984).  
Second, the argument depends on the claim that confrontational attack behaviors 
are motivated by an appetite for dominance. While it is likely that the maintenance of 
dominance relationships requires an (acquired?) appetite for aggression or dominance, it 
is not true that all dominance-related aggression involves such an appetite. For rats with 
successful histories of fighting, the opportunity to fight another male can be reinforcing 
(for a review, see M. Potegal 1979), and this may be a key factor in maintaining 
dominance. However, it is doubtful that the initial formation of dominance relationships 
requires any kind of desire for dominance. 
 Consider some of the details of intermale aggression in rats. It is only under 
certain conditions that male rats will fight each other for dominance. In the case of 
sibling pairs of wild rats (JR R Alberts, Jr, and Galef 1973) and also pairs of unrelated lab 
rats (C. Grant and Chance 1957), there is little evidence of formation of a dominance 
relationship between pairs. The development of such a relationship tends to require 
some kind of provoking conditions. For instance, the presence of females (Barnett and 
Stoddart 1969), increased numbers of rats (E. Grant and Chance 1958) or the social 
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isolation of one of the cohabitants (K. Flannelly and Lore 1975) is often required for 
fights to break out and for dominance relationships to be established between pairs. This 
evidence goes against the claim that dominance relationships arise as a consequence of 
an anticipatory or proactive “urge for dominance or competitiveness”, which would 
predict the spontaneous formation of dominance relationships without provocation. 
Rather, it is more plausible that territoriality or competition first break out when there is 
some kind of perceived provocation (as is likely with socially isolated rats in which 
anxiety or social ineptitude might easily be interpreted as a provocation) or challenge (as 
when perceived “ownership” of a female is threatened by another male). Thus, initial 
establishment of dominance relationships may be caused by provocation, whereas in 
subsequent attacks from dominant organisms, Panksepp’s SEEKING system may 
become more important.  
What I am proposing is that these two systems may influence dominance 
relationships in different ways at different points across the development of these 
relationships. While I agree with Zellner and Panksepp that intermale aggression may 
involve a nuanced interplay between different systems that influence aggression, I think 
there is an important corollary to this insight: we need not suppose that all aggression 
related to “intermale aggression” has the same motivation. We need not suppose that all 
dominance-related fights between males involve a reaction to provocation nor that all 
such fights involve an appetite for dominance. If I am right, then this undermines 
Panksepp’s reason for claiming that intermale aggression arises from the interaction of 
separate systems. 
 Remember that the case for homology between the confrontation system and 
anger also depends on phylogenetic continuity between these two systems. However, 
Albert and colleagues (1994) make an influential criticism of any attempt to identify 
confrontational attack with human aggression. They claim that confrontational 
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aggression is a form of hormone-dependent aggression and refer to a wealth of evidence 
that there is no direct dependency of human aggression on serum levels of hormones like 
testosterone (as there is in rodents). For instance, artificially increasing serum 
testosterone to supranormal levels does not increase various measures of aggression (see 
the metaanalysis in D. J. Albert, Walsh, and Jonik 1994, 409). Thus, they claim that the 
confrontation system is not an important cause of human aggression.  
The primary response to this criticism is that a phylogenetic perspective does not 
predict a direct dependency of aggression on plasma testosterone levels. Rather, in some 
species the effects of testosterone on the central nervous system (CNS, e.g. on sexual and 
aggressive behaviors) and the effects of testosterone on the reproduction and 
maturation (e.g. in spermatogenesis and the development of secondary sex characters) 
are adaptive in different contexts. For instance, testosterone’s plausible CNS function of 
increasing aggressive behavior is not always adaptive in ecological contexts in which its 
reproductive functions are (J. C. Wingfield, Lynn, and Soma 2001). In humans, sexual 
maturation (of secondary sex characters and testes) subsequent to rising testosterone 
levels occurs over a long period of time, and this rise in testosterone occurs well before 
mate competition would be appropriate (even relative to the era of evolutionary 
adaptedness). The opposite pattern can also be found in some species, in which 
aggressive behaviors are appropriate when physiological preparedness for reproduction 
is not. Wingfield et al (2001) point out (among a host of other examples) that in some 
species of birds (e.g. the sedentary song sparrow), territorial behaviors occur at life 
history stages that do not overlap with the breeding season.  
There are many adaptive costs of testosterone that are consistent across several 
taxa. These include increased energy consumption, lowered fat stores, interference with 
pair-bonding, and decreased paternal care. Given these effects, it would be advantageous 
for the effects of testosterone on aggressive behaviors, reproduction and maturation to 
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be independently controlled in some species. Thus, Wingfield et al (2001) point out 
several putative mechanisms by which the influence of plasma testosterone on the 
nervous system could be mediated or by which testosterone levels in the CNS could be 
independently modulated (pp. 245-248). Independent control of these functions is 
predicted in some species because of the adaptive costs of maintaining high levels of 
circulating testosterone and the independent and context-dependent benefits of its 
various effects. Given the significance of these ecological considerations for the evolution 
of testosterone’s effects, there is no reason to think that direct hormone-dependency 
(direct dependency on plasma testosterone as opposed to mediated dependency or 
independent modulation) is criterial for identifying confrontational aggression across 
lineages (among which different ecological conditions have prevailed in recent 
evolutionary history).  
A more nuanced view about the dependency of human aggression on testosterone 
makes more plausible predictions. For instance, the Challenge hypothesis (J. Wingfield 
et al. 1990) predicts increases in testosterone specifically in the context of status 
challenges that impact reproductive potential , that pubertal increases in plasma 
testosterone (which function to bring reproductive organs to maturity) will not 
necessarily or immediately affect aggressive behaviors (because during maturation they 
are not yet adaptive for reproductive competition), and that paternal care will correlate 
with lower testosterone levels and decreased aggression. These predictions are largely 
confirmed in humans (see John Archer 2006 for a detailed review).  
In sum, the most influential criticisms of the ethological hypothesis do not 
provide evidence against the identification of anger with the confrontation system in 
rodents. These criticisms involve mistaken or unsupported assumptions, on the one 
hand, assumptions about the motivation behind the formation of dominance 
relationships, and on the other hand, assumptions about the relationship between 
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plasma testosterone levels and confrontational aggression predicted by the ethological 
hypothesis. 
6. Conclusion 
The hypothesis of a behavioral homology between a trait of humans and rodents 
leads us to expect that corresponding clusters of behavior will be present in most of the 
taxa that share a common ancestor with humans and rodents (if not in most mammalian 
taxa). This includes not only members of rodentia and primates, but also those of 
lagomorpha (e.g. rabbits), scandentia (tree shrews), and dermoptera (flying lemurs). 
Across these taxa, there should be patterns of aggressive behavior that share a similar 
temporal sequence and special qualities. These clusters of behavior should include threat 
displays and piloerection prior to approach and attack. Especially in non-primates, when 
confrontational attacks are directed at conspecifics, they should be aimed at biting dorsal 
surfaces. There is already some evidence supporting some of these predictions in 
scandentia (Olsen 1969; Walletschek and Raab 1982) and, as already mentioned, in 
stumptail macaques and chimpanzees. 
For some of the relevant taxa, there is increased visual acuity (in primates and 
scandentia) and a diminution of olfaction and olfactory receptors (in primates Preuss 
2007). Thus, visual communication becomes more valuable, and facial expressions 
homologous to involuntary expressions of anger in humans should naturally occur in the 
context of confrontational attacks. This leads to the prediction that well-established 
phenomena of reactive aggression in primates, such as redirected aggression toward 
subordinates (Cheney and Seyfarth 1989; Aureli et al. 1992), should be accompanied by 
these facial expressions and also by piloerection and ANS activation.  
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Table 3. Summary of predictions and questions based on a phylogenetic approach to 
anger. 
Predictions Parsimonious distribution among taxa (i.e. 
primates, dermoptera, scandentia, 
rodentia, lagomorpha) 
Homologous facial expressions among 
primates associated with aggression 
(perhaps in redirected aggression) 
Questions What is the relationship between ANS 
activation and facial expressions across 
primate taxa? 
Do humans display piloerection when 
angry and aggressive? 
Is post-aggression relaxation response 
pan-cultural? Distributed across primate 
taxa? 
Is there a connection between anger and 
noradrenaline across taxa? 
Are there patterns of immunoreactivity 
across taxa? 
 
While many of these predictions can only be evaluated by developing detailed 
ethograms of agonistic behavior patterns between both conspecifics and predators or 
prey 17 , there is much experimental work that can be done as well on human and 
nonhuman animals. For instance, what is the relationship between ANS activation and 
angry facial expression in nonhuman primates? Do they bear a similar relationship to 
that found in humans (e.g. Levenson, Ekman, and Friesen 1990)? Do humans display 
evidence of vestigial piloerection response in a state of anger leading up to aggression (as 
reported anecdotally in Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1979)? What about related measures of skin 
conductance in humans (as observed in pilot data reported by Hubbard et al. 2010)? 
                                               
17 The evaluation of agonistic encounters with predator or prey is especially important when prey is of 
similar or greater size or when predators are of similar size or less. For instance, in the case of chimpanzees 
or gorillas (prey) and leopards (predator), confronting the predator is sometimes more beneficial than 
fleeing (see citations in Boesch 1991, 221). In any case, these are the conditions (greater benefit for 
confrontation than flight, due to relative size and speed) in which large ungulates are likely to display 
confrontational aggression against their predators (1974). In the case of chimpanzees who sometime hunt 
infant or juvenile baboons, adult male baboons will sometimes display ostensibly confrontational 
aggression against chimps who threaten their young (Goodall 1986, 286). In such a case, it may sometimes 
be adaptive for chimps (predator) to get angry at baboons (prey) and vice versa.  
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What terminates the physiological arousal initiated by anger or confrontational 
aggression? In humans, there is some evidence that consummation of angry and 
aggressive action sequences can reduce physiological arousal caused by anger (see Tyson 
1998 for a review), is this relaxation response pan-cultural? Does a corresponding 
relaxation response occur subsequent to confrontational attacks in other species? 
Moreover, are there correlations between the production of hormones such as 
noradrenalin and confrontational aggression across the relevant taxa? Are there patterns 
of immunoreactivity subsequent to anger arousal across the relevant taxa? This is just to 
gesture briefly at the many predictions and questions generated by a hypothesis of 
homology, and to point out the many ways in which the hypothesis can be confirmed or 
put to the test.  
While these predictions are important for the study of anger and aggression, the 
case study has broader implications for psychological categories. The lesson is this: 
homology thinking can provide independent criteria for evaluating substantive 
disagreements on – and for eliminating confusion about – the nature of psychological 
kinds. In absence of homology thinking, it is difficult to see how further knowledge about 
the RAGE system or the confrontation system would serve to determine which 
aggression systems in non-human animals are most like human anger. Indeed, this is 
probably one of the reasons why there has been little productive discussion between the 
advocates of the two hypotheses. Homology thinking in this case provides a set of 
independent theoretical constraints for identifying corresponding traits across taxa. In 
the service of this demonstration, I further developed some of the methods for thinking 
about homology (cf. Ereshefsky 2007; Ereshefsky 2012) as it applies to psychological 
kinds. This account helps to specify what kind of evidence supports homology claims, 
namely, identification of unique similarities at the appropriate level between traits; 
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similarities that provide evidence for common ancestry as opposed to common selective 
pressures. 
Though counterintuitive from some perspectives, the concept of homology helps 
to clarify what counts as evidence for claims of character identity. Note that identical 
characters can have different character-states. For example, a human arm and whale fin 
are identical characters, because they are both instances of the tetrapod forelimb. 
Nevertheless, they are different character-states, because they represent different forms 
that this character can take. Homology thinking allows the identification of characters 
that take shape in dramatically different character states; it enables us to identify evolved 
characters that walk in the guise of dramatically different forms and functions. Anger is 
one such character.   
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Chapter 4  
Emotional Action in Animals: Beyond Fixed Behaviors 
 Vengeance is a powerful and destructive motive. It is powerful because the 
behavior of otherwise reasonable people can be bent to this purpose; destructive because 
vengeance harms its target, sometimes without any benefit to the vengeful. Importantly, 
vengeful actions have a common purpose – one that we pick out with words and phrases 
like “retaliation”, “retribution”, “getting even”, “balancing the scales”, “settling scores” 
and “expressing hostility”. Nevertheless, there are a variety of means by which this 
purpose can be achieved. There are no topological qualities shared by all vengeful actions 
(e.g. a specific mode of attack). Rather, their common purpose draws them together into 
a single category of action. Behaviors as widely varied as punching, stabbing, glaring, 
ignoring, stomping out of a room, and hiring a hit man can all count as vengeful because 
of their shared purpose of getting even and their directedness at the vulnerabilities of the 
agents they target.  
Many explanations of vengeful behavior appeal to our animal nature rather than 
to our distinctively human qualities. The story usually goes something like this. 
Vengeance is an innate product of our evolutionary past (e.g. McCullough, Kurzban, and 
Tabak 2012) that defies straightforward rational explanation (e.g. John Elster 1990) and 
that instead finds its proximal cause in the emotional responses that we share with other 
animals (e.g. Barash and Lipton 2011). As I have argued, basic human anger is just such 
an emotion. Nevertheless, its plausibility as a proximate or developmental cause of 
vengeful behavior hinges on an important question: is it possible for shared emotions 
(shared with other animals) to cause the highly variable behaviors that constitute acts of 
vengeance and retribution? In animals, these emotions appear to produce only 
stereotyped, instinctive behaviors. If the same emotions also influence human behavior, 
why then do humans exhibit so many varying and incompatible responses when they 
 134 
manifest shared emotions? The tension is between the variability of emotional behavior 
in humans and the specificity of emotional behavior in animals. In this chapter, I focus 
on a special case of the tension. I take a step toward resolving the apparent tension 
between the claim that anger is a shared emotion and the claim that it can motivate 
behaviors aimed at retribution or retaliation. To do this, I argue against a widely and 
casually held view concerning shared emotions, that in animals, they do not influence 
purposive behavior, or action.1  
In the first section, I lay out a set of individually plausible but jointly implausible 
claims about basic emotions together with some of their presuppositions. Some shared 
emotions, like anger, are continuous with the emotions of nonhuman animals in humans, 
they motivate purposive behavior; yet in nonhuman animals, these emotional states 
seem only to cause stereotyped behavior. Much of the work of this section (and of this 
chapter as well) is to clarify when behaviors are purposive and when emotions motivate 
behavior. In the second section, I look at some empirical evidence, which demonstrates 
that angry behaviors in rats clearly are purposive, despite their apparent stereotypy. In 
the third section, I draw out the implications of this claim for a widely but casually held 
view in emotion theory. I conclude by considering some of the reasons that we might 
expect the behavioral effects of anger to be even more flexible in primates and humans, 
                                               
1 I use “purposive behavior” and “action” interchangeably. Some philosophers reserve the word action for 
planned behavior or behavior mediated by conscious knowledge of what one is doing. I do not use it in this 
way. There are clearly interesting behavioral phenomena that fall between this highly intellectualized 
notion of action and mere passive movements.  
While “purposive behavior” is more cumbersome, it is sometimes helpful to contrast it with non-
purposive behavior, emphasizing that they are both behaviors, distinct from passive movements (as when 
someone moves because they are pushed) and perhaps also monosynaptic reflex movements (though see 
Burge 2010; Dretske 1991, chap. 1; Millikan 1993 for a range of different notions of behavior). It is also 
helpful to have a way of talking about behavior in isolation from its purposiveness, as when one asks 
whether a specific behavior is purposive or not. I also use “purposive behavior” in preference to the more 
familiar “goal-directed behavior”. The notion of a goal can be misleading, because some would understand 
a goal as an explicit representation of a behavior’s end state as a desired outcome. I do not want to seem to 
beg any questions against those who think there can be implicit representations of the aim of a behavior 
(e.g. Frijda 2010). 
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and I consider recent evidence suggesting that anger in humans includes a biological 
disposition toward reactive aggression or retaliation. 
1. Shared Emotions and Purposive Behaviors: A Soft Paradox 
I begin by articulating what I call a “soft paradox” or a set of individually 
plausible but jointly implausible claims:  
1) Some shared emotions are continuous between human and nonhuman 
animals with regard to their motivational structure. 
2) In humans, these shared emotions motivate purposive behavior. 
3) In animals, these shared emotions only cause stereotyped behaviors, which 
are not purposive. 
This soft paradox has an important set of presuppositions. It only makes sense to 
talk about the continuity or discontinuity of emotions across human and non-human 
animals if these presuppositions are true: there are basic emotions; some basic emotions 
are innate adaptations (as I argued in the introductory chapter); and some basic 
emotions are shared with non-human animals (as I argued concerning anger in the 
previous chapter). It is from these presuppositions that the paradox arises.  
To get in the grip of the paradox, suppose that for some shared emotions, such as 
anger and fear, there is no discontinuity in their motivational structure across human 
and nonhuman animals; that differences between the human and nonhuman forms of 
these emotions are in degree and not in kind. In animals, emotions like these are thought 
to cause only stereotyped behaviors, such as threat displays or tonic immobility (a view I 
discuss further in section 3). But if this is true, then it is difficult to see how shared 
emotions could directly cause flexible, purposive behaviors in humans (e.g. skilled 
evasion, revenge, and retaliation). Since stereotyped behaviors in animals do not seem to 
be flexible or purposive, it is difficult to see how the mechanisms responsible for these 
inflexible behaviors could be gradually modified (without the addition of novel 
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components) over the course of evolution to motivate the kind of flexible, purposive 
behaviors that constitutes human actions of revenge and retaliation.  
In this paper, I argue against the claim that shared emotions in animals only 
cause non-purposive behaviors. Several distinctions are key to understanding this 
paradox: the distinction between evolutionary continuity and discontinuity, the 
distinction between purposive and non-purposive behaviors, and the distinction between 
actions motivated by emotion and those merely influenced by emotion (perhaps 
indirectly). In the remainder of this section, I clarify these distinctions. 
1.1 Continuity and Discontinuity 
First, consider continuity. A claim of continuity concerning anger would go 
beyond the mere claim that human and nonhuman anger are homologous, or derived 
from the same ancestral trait (a claim I supported in chapter 3). For instance, we might 
suppose that both human and nonhuman anger derive from a common ancestral trait, 
but that the human form of this trait underwent a fundamental change, perhaps 
involving the addition of a novel component. To claim that human anger is continuous 
with its nonhuman forms is to deny such a possibility. It is to claim that anger across 
human and non-human lineages derives from an ancestral trait without the addition of 
novel components. 
Discussions of continuity versus discontinuity between different lineages arise 
most prominently in discussions of evolutionary novelty. In these discussions, novelty is 
sometimes thought to require non-homology (e.g. Brown 2013). This is only partly true. 
As I pointed out in the previous chapter, homology classes form nested hierarchies. 
Morphological units as wide ranging as human forearms and shark pectoral fins are 
homologous qua paired appendages, but within the category of paired appendages, there 
are mutually exclusive homology classes which constitute different states that the 
character paired appendage can take. For instance, paired appendages can be 
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cartilaginous or bony, and the class of bony paired appendages includes coelacanths 
pectoral fins and human forearms, but not shark pectoral fins. The evolution of bony 
paired appendages was an evolutionary novelty with respect to the broader class of 
paired appendages. From the moment it appeared, a new, nested homology class arose 
within the broader class of paired appendages. It is not as if, at that moment, it ceased to 
be homologous with other paired appendages. Rather, the newer state of this character is 
only non-homologous with the shark pectoral fin qua bony paired appendage. In other 
words, the evolutionary novelty of bony paired appendages established a new homology 
class within the broader one, a class that excludes some members of the broader class.  
In light of this and the previous chapter, the suggestion that hominid anger is 
discontinuous with anger in rats amounts to the claim that anger in one of these lineages 
took on novel components, thus establishing a newer homology class that excludes the 
other. This would be consistent with the claim that the characters are homologous qua 
anger but non-homologous qua hominin anger or qua rodent anger. 
For my purposes, the plausibility of discontinuity concerning the behavioral 
influence of emotion will depend on whether emotions have qualitatively different 
influences on action in human and nonhuman animals. There is little reason to posit 
discontinuity of influence over action if it turns out that human and nonhuman anger 
alike do not directly cause purposive behavior, or if human and nonhuman anger alike 
cause purposive behavior.  
1.2 Purposive behavior 
Now consider the distinction between purposive and nonpurposive behavior. In this 
subsection, I say more about what it means for a behavior to be purposive, and I briefly 
argue for two conditions under which we are justified in inferring that a behavior is 
purposive. Later, this will provide a principled basis on which to claim that emotional 
behavior in rodents is purposive.  
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 As a first pass, purposive behavior is behavior caused (in the right way) by the 
informational and motivational states of an agent.2 3 When we say that a behavior is 
undertaken for a purpose, we are attributing a purpose to the agent or organism as well 
as some information about how to fulfill it, both of which play a causal role in the 
production of the behavior. Why “informational” and “motivational” states as opposed to 
traditional notions of belief, desire, and intention? I think these notions are not 
particularly clear or helpful for my purposes, and I want to avoid getting lost in disputes 
about how to understand these terms.4 Moreover, I think there may be motivational 
states other than desires (e.g. urges, fears, embarrassments, appetites) and informational 
states other than beliefs (e.g. perceptual and motor representations, representations of 
affordances, etc.) that can cause purposive behavior. The view I take in what follows is 
that the purposiveness of behavior does not depend on what type of informational and 
motivational states cause behavior but on whether behavior is caused by these 
representational states at all. The question I will focus on below concerns when we have 
                                               
2 However, see Sehon (Sehon 2007; Sehon 1994)for an argument against understanding action in terms of 
causation. Sehon and others (Frankfurt and Frankfurt 2014) argue for a class of teleological explanations, 
claiming in addition that these explanations cannot be given a causal analysis. The plausibility of such 
claims seems to depend on a particular conception of causation that no longer holds sway. By contrast, if 
one holds a manipulationist account of causation, teleological explanations have a straightforward causal 
construal. Whether or not an organisms engages in a certain class of actions causally depends on whether or 
not it has a specific kind of goal. On a manipulationist account of causation, this just means that if we were 
to intervene to change the organism’s goal, then its behavior would change in certain ways. Of course the 
teleological action theorist could argue that the concept of a goal cannot be analyzed in terms of causation. 
Nevertheless, the causal theorist could similarly deny that beliefs and desires can be given a causal 
analysis. In fact, a claim like this may fall out of Davidson’s holism. If so, then whether or not a theory is a 
causal theory of action does not obviously depend on whether the variables in its causal explanations can 
themselves be given a causal analysis.  
3 The parenthetical “in the right way” is often inserted as a nod to the intractable problem of deviant 
causation (Davidson 1963). A version of this problem also plagues teleological theories of action (Mele 
2000). I do not have space here to deal with this problem, nor is it necessary to do so for my purposes. 
4 Specifically, there is debate about what beliefs, desires and intentions are, sometimes accompanied by 
arguments that nonlinguistic animals cannot have beliefs and desires (Davidson 1986; Gauker 2003; 
Schroeder 2004; Railton 2012; Pacherie 2006). Interestingly, some researchers in animal learning do use 
the concepts of belief and desire to distinguish animal behaviors that are goal directed from those that are 
not (Balleine and Dickinson 1998; though for criticisms, see Carruthers 2004; Sterelny 2001). It is an 
interesting question how one would reconcile this usage to standard philosophical views about beliefs and 
desires. Nevertheless, it is a question that I cannot resolve here, nor is it necessary to resolve it for my 
purposes.  
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good evidence that behavior is caused by informational and motivational states, or 
equivalently, when we have good evidence that a behavior has a psychological 
explanation.5  
 Of course, we can interpolate the notions of information, motivation and purpose 
into almost any system. Famously, we can interpret the behavior of a rock as being 
guided by the purpose of being at the bottom of a hill (or for Aristotle, at the center of the 
universe); we can interpret thermostats as possessing information about the current 
temperature and a motivation to keep the temperature at 75 degrees (or whatever 
temperature it is set to); and we can predict the autumnal defoliation of deciduous trees 
by attributing beliefs about the impending winter. If representational states can be 
applied to almost anything, this explanatory practice will not be particularly helpful in 
distinguishing between purposive and non-purposive animal behaviors. So we need 
some way to regiment the practice of psychological explanation if it is going to be of any 
use.6 
1.2.1 Regimenting the practice of psychological explanation 
 I think the mishap in the “explanations” above is that they conflate three very 
distinct explanatory projects, each with its own explanandum – or phenomenon to be 
                                               
5 Notice that I did not say “when behavior seems to be caused by informational and motivational states, or 
when we seem to have good evidence that a behavior has a psychological explanation”. To me, the absence 
of “seems” marks the difference between folk psychology and psychology proper. This relates to another 
reason that I want to avoid disputes about the nature of belief and desire. These philosophical disputes often 
turn on folk psychological considerations, for instance how we talk and think about beliefs and desires. I 
am more interested in empirical considerations. For instance, what are the empirically observable 
phenomena that beliefs and desires are necessary to explain, and what do these states have to be like in 
order to produce these phenomena? 
6 The following discussion will be reminiscent of Dennett’s work on the “intentional stance”. This is no 
accident, because the issues I am concerned with are closely related to those of concern to Dennett. The 
main difference between my approach and Dennetts is that for Dennett, the unique predictive power and 
predictive success of the intentional stance is what justifies positing beliefs and desires (cf. Viger 2000). On 
my view, the reason to posit informational and motivational states is that there is a further phenomenon to 
be explained beyond what Dennett would call the physical stance and the design stance. I am interested in a 
more straightforward realistic construal of psychological explanation, and one that does not directly hinge 
on an inference from predictive power and success to the existence of theoretical entities. See Van Fraasen 
(1980) for an influential critique of this inference. It is difficult to tell whether Dennett makes this 
inference, but this is the most natural way of interpreting him if he is a realist of any kind. 
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explained. The explanatory project that I call psychological explanation only makes sense 
when directed at one of these explananda. To identify the right one, it helps to appreciate 
two different errors – the animistic error and the Quixotic error – that one makes when 
psychological explanations are applied too liberally. An appreciation of these errors 
marks the difference between the three different explananda.  
One error is the animistic error of attributing purpose to the movement of a rock 
down a hill. Certainly, we can make fairly accurate (though not particularly precise) 
predictions about the movement of a rock by attributing a “desire” to move as close to 
the center of the earth as possible and a “belief” that a certain path down a hill is the path 
of least resistance. The mistake here is to think that once we have a physical prediction 
or explanation of the rock’s movement (in terms of its mass, position, velocity, and the 
forces acting on it) there is some further phenomenon to explain. Only if there were 
some further phenomenon would there be any point in positing other theoretical terms 
to explain its trajectory, regardless of their functional role.  
In the usual case, there is no such further phenomenon, but it would be a mistake 
to say that there never is anything further to explain, even where rocks are concerned. 
Consider the case of Indiana Jones. His foot hits a tripwire, and suddenly there is a 
massive boulder hurtling toward him. Even if one has a complete physical explanation of 
the rock’s movement (e.g. explaining how the force exerted on the tripwire transferred to 
whatever mechanism was holding the rock in place…), there is still something else to 
explain. Why was the rock set up to move exactly when Jones walked into its path? To 
ask such a question is to inquire about the structuring cause of an event or process 
(Dretske 1991, 42). This further question inquires into the events or process that caused 
the tripwire to cause the rock to hurtle toward Jones.  
Of course, there are different kinds of structuring causes. Sometimes a process is 
structured by design. Thermostats are set up to ignite the furnace when the temperature 
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dips below a set point, which has the effect of raising the room temperature. The reason 
why they do so is explained by the intentions of their designers. Other times, processes 
are structured by natural selection (or some other selection process). When an egg (or 
even a white cube of the right size) falls out of the nest of a graylag goose, the goose will 
engage in a species-typical, stereotyped movement that usually has the effect of bringing 
the egg back into the nest. Nonetheless, a graylag goose will slavishly carry on this 
movement even when the egg is snatched away (by an experimenter) well before the 
behavioral sequence is completed. Natural selection is almost certainly responsible for 
this movement. Graylag geese perform this movement today because their ancestors who 
performed the movement were more successful at raising their young to reproductive 
maturity than geese that did otherwise.  
In all these cases, one should avoid the Quixotic error of crediting either the rock, 
the thermostat or the goose with structuring the relevant process. By contrast, behavioral 
processes are sometime structured by an organism itself rather than by some external 
process of design or selection. When I walk over to the refrigerator to get a beer, it is I 
(and not, say, the evolutionary forces that shaped me) who structures the behavioral 
process. In this case, psychological explanation becomes appropriate because the process 
is structured by motivations and means that belong to me in some sense.  
While beer retrieval and egg retrieval are clear cases of agential structuring of 
behavior on the one hand and selectional structuring on the other, a critical difficulty 
remains. How can one tell the difference in more borderline cases? When are we justified 
in crediting the agent with structuring its behavior to achieve its own purposes and with 
means of its own devising? Here, I can do little more than describe some of the 
conditions that evince purposive behavior and gesture at why these conditions support 
the claim that an agent itself structures its behavior.  
1.2.2 Behavioral plasticity and the explanatory role of motivational states 
 142 
 I believe that two conditions are jointly sufficient to infer that behavior is 
purposive, or that it has a psychological explanation. One mark of purposive behavior is 
its flexibility. Such behavior can be adjusted in various ways to bring about a certain 
outcome or end state, which is the hypothesized purpose of the behavior. Philosophers 
and behaviorists both have tried to capture this with the notion of plasticity. 
Behavior is plastic when the organism can reach an outcome or end state in a 
number of different ways, some of which may be novel (to the organism) ways of causing 
that outcome.7 If we imagine a rat swimming across a stream to get a piece of cheese, the 
behavior is plastic if we have evidence for a set of subjunctive conditionals concerning 
the rat’s behavior: “‘If the food were further to the left, the rat would be swimming 
further to the left’, ‘If the food were not on the far side of the river, the rat would not be 
swimming across it’, and a host of others, more or less specific, affirmative or negative” 
(Woodfield 1976). These plasticity-conditionals are a way of describing the sort of 
flexible behavior adjustment in relation to an end state that is characteristic of purposive 
behaviors. 8  The counterfactual nature of these conditionals highlights the fact that 
psychological explanation does not only aim to explain what the animal actually does 
but also explains what we have good reason to believe that the animal would have done.9  
                                               
7 One obvious difficulty is individuating different ways of bringing about an end state in a principled way. 
This is a methodological difficulty that is best left to the ethologist and animal behaviorist. While there may 
be borderline cases when it is difficult to tell whether a means to an end is the same as one the organism 
has pursued before, there are also clear cases, like the one I discuss in the following section. Moreover, 
novel means for a given end are particularly clear cases. 
8 Plasticity can also be manifested in the persistence of behaviors. A behavior is persistent when various 
behaviors (appropriate to a given end state) continue until the end state has been reached. While it is 
sometimes treated separately, I think persistence is either special case of plasticity or it is an attempt to 
capture exchangeability (discussed in the following heading). If behavior does not persist in a range of 
conditions, then this will either limit the plasticity conditionals for which we have evidence or it will show 
that a given kind of behavior (that could be used to achieve a given end state) is not exchangeable across a 
range different end states. 
9 Importantly, a physical explanation of what an animal actually does could leave us wondering what an 
animal would have done on some of these counterfactuals. This is part of what it means to say that there 
would be a further phenomenon to be explained even if we had a complete physical explanation of actual 
behavior. 
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If an organism is only able to bring about an end state through one element of its 
behavioral repertoire, then we have little basis on which to credit the organism with 
guidance toward the end state (especially if all other members of the species are also 
capable of using that element to bring about that end state). If the graylag goose can only 
retrieve its eggs using a single type of movement, then we have less reason to think that 
the goose itself is trying to bring about the relevant end state and still less reason if the 
movement continues when it is no longer contributing to that end state. In that case, it 
seems unlikely that the goose itself has selected that behavior as a means to its own end.  
By contrast, being able to bring about an end state in more than one way 
(especially if novel) provides some evidence for purposiveness. Why does plasticity give 
us reason to credit the organism with structuring its own behavior? Plasticity uniquely 
supports hypotheses that postulate an internal motivational state guiding behavior, as 
opposed to a range of (reasonable) alternative hypotheses. A paradigmatic behaviorist 
hypothesis, for instance, would try to explain behavior in terms of reinforcement 
relations between sensory and physiological stimuli and behavioral responses. Another 
alternative hypothesis would be that behavior is triggered, perhaps innately, by a highly 
constrained set of stimulus conditions. Call this an “ethological hypothesis”. If behavior 
is sufficiently plastic, then hypotheses of these sorts will have difficulty predicting all the 
plasticity conditionals without adding in ad hoc assumptions.10 
The reason is that both kinds of hypotheses explain behavior in terms of lawlike 
connections between inputs and outputs. Imagine the massive disjunction of lawlike 
generalizations that would be necessary to predict the input-output relations that 
                                               
10 Of course, the goose’s behavior might seem to be plastic with respect to egg-retrieval under the following 
conditions. We might imagine being able to train a goose to use its feet to push an egg into a nest. 
However, it is very unlikely that this kind of behavior would be plastic with respect egg retrieval. Instead, it 
would likely be a plastic response for increasing the frequency of positive reinforcers (or diminishing the 
frequency of negative reinforcers). The point is that plasticity is relative to a specific end state, and that the 
end state toward which trained behaviors tend to be plastic are the presence of rewards or the absence of 
punishers. 
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constitute the many paths I might take to get a beer were that my primary goal. Many of 
the courses of action I would be able to take have never been rewarded or reinforced or 
selected for in my evolutionary history. My ancestors may have all been faithful Amish 
folk; I may never have purchased beer before; or I may never have done so at the gas 
station around the corner. Nevertheless, I can still successfully get beer by these and 
other means if I have seen signs in the gas station window advertising beer or if I have 
seen other people purchase beer at other gas stations or if I have heard people talking 
about the wide selection of beer on offer at the liquor store on Jefferson and 14th…etc. It 
is difficult to see how any simple lawlike connection between my experiences with beer 
(the input) and my behavior (the output) could predict the indeterminate number of 
paths through the world that I might take to achieve what (to me) is the same kind of 
outcome.11  By contrast, when we posit an internal motivational state of desire, we 
attribute a state that tracks the desired outcome and inclines the agent toward it, across 
the manifold paths that might have lead to it (or to the multiple ways of realizing the end 
state). Such an explanation posits fewer entities and without ad hoc assumptions (e.g. a 
multitude of fixed action patterns, or reinforcement relations that depend on extreme 
response generalization). When behavior is sufficiently plastic (especially if the range of 
plasticity includes novel or unreinforced behaviors), the evidence favors the existence of 
motivational states that guide behavior in this highly variable way. 
1.2.3 Exchangeability of behavior and the explanatory role of informational states 
Whereas plasticity focuses on the various means by which an organism can 
achieve a given end, another condition, exchangeability, focuses on the various ends that 
                                               
11 The goose’s behavior has some degree of variability, but this variability can be predicted by a lawlike 
input/output relationship. In a multidimensional perceptual space characterizing the stimulus (the “egg”), 
there is likely to be a single region in that space that triggers the same kind of egg retrieval response (cf. 
Sterelny 1999). The same cannot be said for the many behaviors that are instrumental for beer retrieval. 
There is no multidimensional perceptual space on which these behaviors are triggered only by stimuli in a 
single region and there is no principled taxonomy of behaviors that can characterize my beer retrieval 
behaviors as of the same kind.  
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an organism can pursue by similar means. Two different kinds of end state are 
exchangeable with respect to an element of an organism’s behavioral repertoire if that 
element can be used to bring about either end state. If an organism is only able to use a 
given behavioral sequence in service of one kind of end state, then we have little or no 
reason to credit the organism with selecting that element of its repertoire in service of a 
given purpose. If the graylag goose can only use its beak to maneuver its eggs to its nest 
and cannot use a similar movement to accomplish some novel end (say getting food or 
performing a trick for a reward), then we have little reason to credit the goose with 
selecting this behavior to accomplish either end.  
Why does exchangeability give us reason to credit an organism with structuring 
its behavior? Exchangeability supports hypotheses that postulate informational states 
representing the behavioral means available to (or the affordances of) an organism. 
Imagine the difficulty with which an ethological or behaviorist hypothesis might explain 
all the ends that I can pursue by getting in my car and driving to the gas station. I may 
never have won the lottery or bought beer or tried to buy something off of craigslist. 
Nevertheless, I am still able to drive to the gas station in order to meet up with a seller on 
Craigslist or to buy a lottery ticket or a beer. When we posit informational states of belief 
concerning an agent’s abilities or available means, we attribute to its possessor the ability 
to deploy those means across the many ends to which those means are appropriate. 
When behavior is exchangeable (especially if it can be applied to novel ends), we have 
evidence for informational states that allow the deployment of abilities or means toward 
several different ends. 
When both exchangeability and plasticity are present in a given means-end 
pairing, they demonstrate a kind of agential integration across means and ends. Susan 
Lackey calls this holism: 
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The holistic flexibility of intentional agency contributes a degree of generality to the 
agent’s skills: a given means can be transferred to a novel end, or a novel means 
adopted toward a given end. The end or goal functions as an intervening variable that 
organizes varying inputs and outputs and allows a degree of transfer across contexts. 
As a result, understanding another organism as an intentional agent permits 
transfer or generalization from a specific circumstance/behavior contingency to 
others: if she has ends that call for deception, she may be expected not only to give 
leopard alarm calls when there are no leopards, but also to give eagle alarm calls 
when there are no eagles. (Hurley et al. 2003, 237–238 emphasis mine) 
This kind of holism provides strong justification for attributing the structuring of 
behavior to the organism (rather than to external sources). The ability to integrate 
information and motivation across the situations that one encounters is part of what it 
means to be an agent possessing motivational and informational states.  
 To sum up, purposive behavior is behavior that has a psychological explanation, 
which appeals to the motivational and informational states of an agent. When behavior is 
plastic and exchangeable, we have evidence that behavior is structured by motivational 
and informational states that interact holistically and thus are attributable to the 
organism performing the behavior. 
1.3 When do emotions motivate purposive behavior 
Now I shall address a final clarification. There are many ways that emotions 
influence behavior, but under what conditions do emotions motivate purposive 
behavior? To recapitulate some of the conclusions of the previous section, the point of 
attributing a motivational state to an organism is to explain the ability to reach the same 
end state across a range of different means. Moreover, to play that explanatory role, the 
motivational state has to incline the organism toward the same end state across several 
different ways of achieving it. Given this way of understanding of motivational states and 
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their role in producing purposive behavior, emotions function in this way only if they 
incline an organism toward some specific end state across different ways of achieving it. 
In this section, I look at several of the ways that anger influences behavior. I show that in 
many of these cases, anger does not actually motivate behavior because the inclination 
toward the end state of behavior is a motivational state that is independent of anger. The 
point is to clarify the distinction by drawing attention to some of the ways that anger can 
seem to motivate action without actually doing so. 
 First, suppose that I am angry. As a result, my body may be in an unpleasant state 
of increased physiological arousal (heart rate, blood pressure, etc). Psychologists have 
long known that aggression, whether verbal or physical, can cause a reduction in 
physiological arousal and that this contingency can increase the likelihood of aggression 
(probably by reinforcement).12 Thus, we might suppose that being angry causes me to say 
something rude to a bank teller because of the change in arousal that it affords me. In an 
indirect sense, I was rude to him because I was angry. Nevertheless, my anger is not the 
motivational state responsible for this action. Rather, if my purpose is to diminish the 
unpleasant state of arousal that my anger produced, then the relevant state is something 
like a desire to diminish that arousal. To satisfy this desire, I might just as easily have 
told him a joke (Newman and Stone 1996) or breathing slowly, actions that we would be 
disinclined to attribute to my anger. Alternatively, I might have been just as rude had I 
just returned from a run. In such cases, I would have acted for the very same reason, to 
influence my unpleasant bodily arousal (Zillmann 1979). In this case, the end state 
toward which I am motivated is a state of diminished arousal, and that motive is 
independent of anger. I can be motivated in this way without being angry (e.g. due to 
                                               
12 See Tyson (1998)for a review. Some of the same things can be said about negative affect. See Berkowitz, 
Cochran, and Embree (1981) for examples. 
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physical activity) and the motivation can lead to actions that do not accord with anger 
(e.g. telling jokes or breathing deeply and slowly).  
Emotions can also influence action through affective forecasting. The idea is that 
in considering a possible course of action, my (offline) emotional response to the 
anticipated outcome will help me to decide whether or not to act in that way (e.g. 
Baumeister et al. 2007).13 Deliberation that is influenced by affective forecasting thus 
depends more specifically on the anticipated emotional states, rather than just on their 
effects (e.g. bodily arousal or affect). Nevertheless, this is still not an example in which 
anger is the motivational state responsible for action. To see this, imagine that someone 
has decided to turn on the radio and that she is considering whether to tune in to Rush 
Limbaugh (which usually makes her angry) or to tune in to the classical music station 
(which makes her less angry). Suppose that she is driving to work and running late 
because someone slashed one of her tires. Consequently, she is very angry. Will her 
anger make her more likely to choose one option over the other? We cannot say. 
Whether it does or not depends on her particular constellation of attitudes toward anger. 
Perhaps she enjoys being angry. Perhaps anger helps her to perform better in her 
competitive workplace (e.g. Tamir, Mitchell, and Gross 2008). If so, better to listen to 
Rush Limbaugh. Alternatively, it may be that anger has never been for her a source of 
empowerment or positive motivation. Perhaps she has learned to cope with these 
situations by turning her anger inward and this contributes to an inhibited or depressed 
mood (Smits and Kuppens 2005; Felsten 1996; Bridewell and Chang 1997). The fact that 
one option will make her more angry and the other less does not directly influence her 
decision. Rather the effect of anger will be mediated by the attitudes, habits and coping 
mechanisms that have grown up around her anger and the situations that elicit it. It 
                                               
13 One might think that Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis is relevant here. However, he 
emphasizes a very different role for emotion in deliberation. What distinguishes his view from affective 
forecasting is an emphasis on the informational role of emotions rather than their motivational role. Thus, 
his account does not illuminate a separate motivational role for emotions.   
 149 
should be clear that anger is not the motivator in this case. Whatever radio station she 
might choose, the end state toward which she is motivated depends not on her state of 
anger, but on the cluster of desires and other attitudes she has concerning anger. If she 
chooses Rush Limbaugh, it is because of her motivation to increase or maintain her 
anger, and this motivation does not depend on her anger but instead on her attitudes 
toward it.  
One conclusion that might be drawn from these examples is that emotion cannot 
motivate behavior through deliberation. However, this is not so. If motivational states 
like desires can influence behavior via deliberation as in these examples, then there is no 
obvious reason why emotional states could not do so as well, provided that they motivate 
agents toward an end state of some kind. Suppose for instance that anger motivates me 
to retaliate. That is, independent of my attitudes about anger, when angry, my behavior 
is guided toward end states that constitute retaliation rather than a range of other 
outcomes, such as reconciliation or avoidance. One could imagine this very motivation 
influencing a deliberate plan to avenge a past insult. If this is possible, then in such a 
case, the influence of anger is unmediated. It might not hold complete sway over my 
decision, but it would motivate me toward a specific kind of outcome (retaliation), 
irrespective of my attitudes or dispositions toward anger.14 This is the sense of emotional 
motivating that I am interested in here. Thus, the central question of whether anger 
motivates behavior is the question of whether states of anger incline me toward a single 
kind of action irrespective of my attitudes or dispositions regarding anger. It seems to 
me that anger could exert this kind of influence whether or not my ultimate course of 
action is arrived at via deliberation. 
                                               
14 It is worth noticing that a number of seemingly distinct behaviors count as retaliation. For instance, one 
might retaliate toward verbal offenses with verbal attacks, whereas toward relational offenses, one might 
merely stomp out of a room. While the latter isn’t a paradigmatic case of retaliation, it can play that role if 
one knows that the other person in the room can be emotionally distressed by outbursts of that kind. 
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Importantly, some philosophers emphasize the flexibility of emotional behavior 
in humans and insist that their behavioral effects depend entirely on planning and 
deliberation. For instance, Prinz distinguishes between motives, or reasons for action, 
and motivations, or impulses to act. On his view, emotions can be reasons for action, but 
they give rise to motivations only if the agent chooses: 
Being angry provides a reason, ceteris paribus, to attack…But emotions are not 
always motivations. They do not always succeed in impelling us. One can be angry, it 
seems, without being disposed to revenge. In contrast, one cannot be hungry without 
being disposed to eat. The link between emotions and action tendencies is weaker 
than the link between motivation and action…In the case of anger, our bodies are 
prepared for aggression, and the valence marker tells us that we should maintain that 
state (positive valence) or change that state (negative valence). At this point in 
processing, no action has been selected, no strategy has been determined, no plan 
has been conceived. The somatic state and valence marker must be fed into a mental 
system that selects responses. Among the available responses is violent revenge 
against the source of our anger. The state of anger increases the probability of this 
response, but it is not constituted by this response. The decision to seek revenge is a 
choice that follows anger. Once that choice has been made, we can say there is action 
tendency at work. The action tendency is not itself a motive for action. It is a 
motivation. An active plan to seek revenge is an urge or a want; it is like hunger.” (J. 
J. Prinz 2004, 193–194) 
The upshot is that on Prinz’s view, the influence of emotion on behavior is primarily 
determined by deliberation or planning. Whether or not the emotion gives way to 
motivation depends on whether a certain motivation is chosen through deliberation.  
Tappolett captures the general outlines of this view when she describes what she calls the 
desire model of emotional motivation as applied to fear:  
 151 
(a) given its physiological underpinnings, fear facilitates but does not necessitate 
certain types of [fixed] actions; 
(b) fear involves a desire that sets a goal, such as the avoidance of a specific harm or 
loss, and if it results in action, it does so only on the basis of the agent's deliberation. 
(Tappolet 2013) 
Tappolet follows Prinz in claiming that emotions lead to desires, which have their 
behavioral effects through deliberation or planning rather than directly motivating 
behavior.  
 This view has three major drawbacks. First, this view neglects the possibility that 
emotions can influence deliberation.15 For instance, it could be that if I deliberate while 
angry, my valuations of outcomes are systematically skewed, making vengeful outcomes 
seem far more favorable. In that case, it would take great effort to choose a course of 
action that was not vengeful, and it would be misleading or false to say (as Prinz does) 
that I was not disposed to revenge in a robust sense. If this scenario is an empirical 
possible, then anger can create a disposition toward revenge without me deliberately 
choosing revenge. This is a possibility that Prinz does not explicitly consider.  
Second, this view leads to inaccurate predictions. If anger leads to revenge “only 
on the basis of deliberation”, then inhibiting deliberation should reduce vengeful 
behavior when angry. Under the plausible assumption that depleted resources for self-
control interfere with deliberation, a natural prediction (based on Tappolett and Prinz’s 
view) is that resource depletion will decrease the likelihood of vengeful behavior when 
angry. The opposite is actually true. For instance, in several different studies DeWall and 
colleagues (2007) exposed participants to different resource depletion manipulations 
(abstaining from eating a donut, not looking at words that appear during a video viewing, 
reading color words printed in incongruent ink colors, and breaking a habitual behavior) 
                                               
15 See Lerner et al (2006) for a recent review of the systematic effects of anger on deliberation. 
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prior to a provocation. While resource depletion did not change reported levels of 
frustration or anger, they did increase several measures of aggression against the 
provocateur (making them eat a cracker with more hot sauce, subjecting them to higher 
intensity noise blasts, and giving them negative performance evaluations for a job 
opportunity) as compared with control participants (who were not subjected to resource 
depletion).  
Finally, Prinz and Tappolet have to deny the possibility that emotions cause 
impulsive or unplanned action like kicking a door in anger (which I take to be distinct 
from mere behaviors like involuntary facial expressions). While there is little 
psychological data that would explicitly contradict this view, there is a wealth of evidence 
showing (as do the experiments just described) that aggressive actions require active 
exertion of self-control for inhibition (see Denson 2009 for a review). There is also a 
wealth of common sense data. Since I do not want to rule out any of these empirical 
possibilities (or plausible hypotheses), I will not follow Prinz and Tappolet in their claim 
that emotions can only motivate action through deliberation. 
Thus, the question of whether anger motivates behavior depends on whether 
anger inclines the agent to select behaviors because they lead to a certain kind of end 
state irrespective of an agent’s attitudes or dispositions toward anger and independently 
of whether she deliberates and decides to give rein to her angry impulses. Does anger 
ever motivate purposive behavior of this kind? I doubt that anyone capable of anger 
needs to consult psychological studies to answer this question. I suspect that only the 
most even-tempered or peacefully-ensconced have not experienced an immediate urge to 
inflict verbal or physical harm when angry. Who has not (during childhood if not as an 
adult) spontaneously struck a door, or a table or a hammer after inadvertently stubbing 
her toe or biting her lip or bashing her hand? In such cases, I think there is little reason 
to doubt that something answering to the term “anger” motivates behavior. Yet there 
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may be some reason to doubt whether such an emotion is the shared emotion of anger, 
or the emotion that is homologous with anger in rats. In section 3, I consider some of the 
reasons that one might doubt this. 
2. Resolving the Paradox 
 Now that some key distinctions have been made, I restate the paradox:  
1) Some shared emotions are continuous between human and nonhuman 
animals. 
2) In humans, these shared emotions motivate purposive behavior. 
3) In animals, these shared emotions only cause stereotyped behaviors, which 
are not purposive. 
In this section, I demonstrate that 3) is false concerning anger in rats. In the following 
section, I develop some of the implications of this claim for emotion theory. 
2.1 Initial thoughts  
Given discussion in section 1.2 and in chapter 2, there are initially several reasons to 
think that angry behaviors in rats would be non-purposive. If the selection model of 
chapter 2 is correct, a great deal of the structure of the behavior is shaped by natural 
selection. First, the nonlethal nature of a resident rat’s attacks (constituted by the fact 
that they are directed at a protected target site) is probably structured by kin selection. 
Second, consider the resident rat’s tendency to attack an unfamiliar male intruder 
independently of whether these attacks have ever met with success. If the arguments of 
chapter 2 are correct, then this behavioral tendency was structured by the demands of 
frequency dependent selection.  
Were we to inquire as to the structuring causes of the resident rat’s behavior, we 
would ask a question like the following: why does an unfamiliar rat intruding on a 
resident’s territory cause the resident rat to bite the intruder’s back until it runs away? 
The answer is that rats with heritable dispositions to behave in these ways were more 
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likely to promote copies of the same heritable dispositions in subsequent generations. So 
the structure of these behavioral dispositions was determined by selection and not by a 
structuring cause internal to individual rats, such as their informational and 
motivational states. It would be absurd to think that the rat has any kind of insight into 
the outcomes that tend to result from these behaviors. More specifically, we have no 
reason to attribute to the rat the purpose of running off a competitor or preventing the 
propagation of mutant strategies nor do we have any reason to credit it with choosing the 
manner in which these goals are pursued (by biting the back and thus avoiding lethal 
harm to intruders). 
Another reason to doubt that these behaviors are purposive is their apparent lack 
of exchangeability and plasticity. The biologists who study these attack behaviors are 
quick to say that they are highly stereotyped, meaning that the same patterns of behavior 
can be observed in any appropriately stimulated resident rat. In other words, resident 
rats seem to have only a few behavioral means by which to pursue the end of biting the 
intruder’s back. Neither do these behavioral means seem to be available to the rat for 
deployment toward other ends. Thus, it is initially doubtful that a resident rat chooses 
the means by which this end is achieved; doubtful that the rat has any informational 
state representing those means across the ends to which it might direct them; and 
doubtful that the rat has a motivational state that explains its ability to bite the backs of 
intruders across a range of means to that end. 
2.2 Evidence for plasticity and exchangeability 
Nevertheless, some of these appearances are misleading, and this becomes 
apparent when we consider experimental investigations of these behaviors. In certain 
conditions, the presence of the unfamiliar male can produce highly flexible and novel 
behaviors that are clearly aimed at biting the intruder’s back. If an intruder rat is tied 
down on a Plexiglas plate with only its ventral surfaces (belly-side) exposed and placed in 
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the cage of a resident rat, the resident will sometimes bite at the bands that tie down the 
intruder or dig under the intruder so that the resident can bite the intruder’s back (R. J. 
Blanchard et al. 1977). In contrast, none of these behaviors are adopted when the 
intruder is tied down with his dorsal surface exposed.  
These behaviors are clearly not stereotyped forms of attack, rather they are forms 
of flexible behavior adjustment to achieve the aim of biting the intruder’s back: they 
exhibit both plasticity and exchangeability. The behavior is plastic because the same end 
state can be achieved by several, novel means. Attempts to bite the intruder’s bonds or to 
dig underneath the intruder are novel means toward the end of biting the back of the 
intruder. This suggests that the rat has a motivational state by which it can arrive at the 
normal end state of behavior (biting the intruder’s back) by various means. Since the rat 
can reach the end state through novel routes, there are no reasonable hypotheses 
concerning the rat’s behavior that could predict these routes without appealing to a 
motivational state of this kind.  
Moreover, some of a resident’s behaviors are exchangeable because the same 
means can be deployed toward different ends. Digging is an element of the rat’s 
behavioral repertoire that is used for an entirely different purpose: constructing burrow 
systems for shelter and nesting (Boice 1977). The rat can thus exchange digging as a 
means for different ends. This suggests that the resident has informational states 
(representing its available means) by which it can deploy digging behaviors toward 
different ends. Since both of these conditions, plasticity and exchangeability, are satisfied 
concerning the same end and for some of the means by which it is pursued (respectively), 
there is some reason to believe that the motivational and informational states of the rat 
can be integrated across different contexts. There is a many-to-one and one-to-many 
mapping from a resident rat’s informational states (representing its available means) to 
the motivational states with which they can interact. Thus, we have considerable reason 
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to think that biting the intruder’s back is the resident’s own purpose in acting and reason 
to credit the resident with an ability to select the means by which this end is pursued.  
Importantly, the emotional state of anger in the rat seems to motivate this 
behavior. The innate (or at least highly invariant) disposition to bite the backs of 
intruders is coordinated with the cluster of behaviors and physiological changes that 
enable it to defend its territory. This is why it is included in the set of phenomena 
explained with reference to the underlying psychological entity, anger. Moreover, the 
innate disposition to bite intruders’ backs seems to be responsible for the novel 
behaviors manifested in the bound-intruder task. The novel behaviors are structured to 
bring about the same end state as the stereotyped behaviors that usually bring it about, 
and the most compelling explanation is that the same underlying motivational state is 
responsible for inclining the rat toward both stereotyped and novel behaviors. In sum, 
anger in rats motivates purposive behavior.16 
What is unique and important about this singular example is that it is a rare case 
in which instrumental behaviors are clearly connected with a well-characterized emotion 
system. There is a wealth of anecdotes concerning animal behavior that suggest the 
phenomenon captured in this experiment is not atypical. Some of these anecdotes 
concern primates. For instance, ethologist Marc Bekoff (Bekoff 2009, 81) tells a story 
about a driver in Saudi Arabia who hit and killed a baboon.  
Afterward, the baboon’s troop lay in waiting for three days by the side of the road 
until the same driver appeared again. As the driver passed the troop, one baboon 
screamed and then all the baboons threw stones at the car and tore out its windshield. 
Obviously, the behavior described was highly flexible, and the details of the case suggest 
that something akin to payback was the motivation behind the behavior.  
                                               
16 On my view of psychological explanation, this is consistent with the claims above that resident rats do 
not have motivational states representing other outcomes of the behavior (e.g. running off an intruder or 
preventing the propagation of mutant strategies). The experiment does not provide any evidence that the 
rat’s behavior is plastic or exchangeable with respect to these goals. 
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A similar anecdote involves a Siberian tiger (Vaillant 2010). After Vladamir 
Markov wounded the tiger and took a portion of the tiger’s kill, the tiger found Markov’s 
hunting cabin, destroyed many of Markov’s possessions and lied in wait for him for 12-
48 hours. When Markov returned, the tiger killed and ate him. Hunger may have 
partially motivated the tiger’s actions. Nevertheless, at least part of the motivation here 
seems to have been payback for the wounding or theft. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain 
why the tiger would have also destroyed Markov’s possessions.  
In a more scientific report on aggression induced by electrical brain stimulation, 
Jose Delgado described aggression in six macaques: 
The aggressive behavior…was well organized, skillfully performed and specifically 
oriented toward the investigator or toward determined animals… The aggressive 
intent was reliable, but the motor pattern varied according to the proximity and 
reactions of the other animals. For example, monkey Charley…turned to the right or 
left depending on the location of monkeys #3 and #4, adjusting his speed to that of 
the chased animals, and moving his body and hands in order to hit or grab the flying 
[sic] monkey… These facts demonstrated that brain stimulation had not activated a 
stereotyped response or a kinetic formula, but had produced a basic change in the 
emotional tuning for the processing of sensory inputs. (Delgado 1967, 179) 
In this example, the aggression was apparently affective in nature (though there is little 
indication of what kind of affect), and the behavior seems highly plastic.  
These studies and anecdotes demonstrate different forms of flexible behavior that 
seem to be motivated by emotions like anger. They give us some reason to doubt that the 
emotional behaviors of rats are atypical. However, by comparison with the rat 
experiment, these other examples lack as clear a connection with a specific emotion 
system, and it is less clear what the aim of the attacks are. The experimental design and 
the connection with back biting are what make the rat example a particularly clear case 
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for my purposes. Nevertheless, the other examples suggest that the singularity of the 
example is no indication that it is atypical or anomalous with respect to aggression and 
other emotional behaviors in the animal kingdom.   
3. Implications 
 Of course, one response to this argument will be that it is trivial or obvious that 
emotions motivate purposive behavior in nonhuman animals. However, the argument 
has  nontrivial implications for a view held by at least two influential emotion theorists, 
one that has modest theoretical support: even in humans, shared emotions like anger do 
not motivate purposive behavior.  
One primary reason to take this position concerns the role of basic emotions in 
explaining various phenomena. Basic emotions in humans are primarily postulated to 
explain highly stereotyped behaviors such as involuntary facial expressions of emotion. 
Thus, there is some hesitation to lump purposive behaviors together with the other 
behavioral phenomena that basic emotions explain. Consider Paul Ekman’s (1977) view: 
Somewhat longer and more elaborated [than facial and physiological responses 
produced by basic emotions] are the coping behaviors directed at whatever has set off 
the emotion. Included would be fighting, fleeing, denying, apologizing, etc… 
Through experience, with sufficient time and learning, habits become established 
for how to cope with each emotion. I do not believe that such coping behaviors are 
part of the given [basic emotion]…Memories, images, expectations associated with 
one or another emotion are, like coping, not given but acquired… (Ekman 1977, 56–
57 emphasis mine) 
For Ekman, what is important is that the given or innate (and not acquired) basic 
emotion is supposed to explain pan-cultural response tendencies toward emotion 
elicitors. This seems to be one of his reasons for thinking that basic emotions do not 
include coping behaviors, since these behaviors seem to be acquired. 
 159 
Neither does Ekman think that basic emotions are capable of strongly influencing 
the acquisition of coping behaviors: 
Biology may provide some predispositions affecting the likelihood of one versus 
another type of coping behaviour being developed for an emotion. For example, the 
skeletal muscle response for anger suggests that attack may become more frequent 
for coping with anger than flight. Yet, this predisposition is relatively fragile. 
Experience can overcome such predispositions and institute diametrically opposite 
coping. Coping involves a wide range of elaborated activities, and biology at best 
gives only a tap in a direction. Culturally and individually variable learning is the 
overwhelming contributor to coping. (Ekman 1977, 64)  
So far as I know, Ekman retains this view up to the present. Ekman (2003) writes the 
following in an endnote: “Frijda’s description of the actions that characterize each 
emotion includes what I have said and quite a bit more. I believe it is only these 
rudimentary initial postural moves [e.g. looking down on an object of contempt, fixed 
attention on the object of surprise, movement toward the source of sensory pleasure, and 
slumping posture and loss of muscle tone in sadness] that are inbuilt, automatic, and 
universal.” (p. 268)17 I suspect that one of the motivations for this view is a hesitation to 
                                               
17 Contrary to the way Ekman and others (e.g. Clore 1994) frame the matter, the question is not whether 
anger includes inbuilt, automatic action patterns, as if a jab to the nose or some other action were written 
into human DNA. The question concerns whether anger can motivate a person toward a specific, 
biologically predisposed end state (say retaliation) by inclining an agent toward a range of (and possibly 
acquired) means, including a jab to the nose, a withering glare, or a variety of other possibilities. Ekman 
gives entirely separate reasons to doubt this possibility: 
 Compare with coping the initial skeletal muscle response directed by the [basic emotion] when an 
anger elicitor has been identified…The immediate skeletal muscle response might be a slight 
movement forward. Coping could vary – attack, flight, denial, appeasement, etc. We discover how to 
cope with our emotions, what is likely to be successful, proper or improper. When angry, our 
likelihood of fighting or scratching our face, depends upon what we have learned about how to deal 
with the particular kind of anger elicitor. 
Once coping techniques have been acquired, they can become so well learned that they operate 
automatically and are called forth when the [basic emotion] is set off… (Ekman 1977, p. 72) 
The contrast here is between the incongruity of coping behaviors (perhaps mediated by learning) and the 
specificity of purposive behaviors. Ekman’s idea is that if anger was accompanied by a motivation toward a 
specific end state, then it would not “call forth” so many different and seemingly incompatible coping 
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extend the explanatory role of basic emotions to the control of flexible or acquired 
behaviors. 
 The problem here is that this theoretical consideration is frail in the face of 
empirical evidence to the contrary. If basic emotions could only predispose or motivate 
behaviors that are inbuilt, automatic and universal, then we should be utterly surprised 
to find that anger in rats can motivate novel back-biting behaviors. Perhaps digging and 
biting are innate, universal and at times automatic, but they are certainly not innate, 
universal, or automatic responses to an intruding conspecific. Moreover, the fact that 
anger can motivate such behavior in rats should make one extremely dubious of any 
purely theoretical rationale for claiming that human anger cannot also motivate action 
(as opposed to mere stereotyped behaviors). 
I suspect that Ekman has another reason to think that basic emotions do not 
influence purposive behaviors. This arises from a focus on their signaling function. For 
instance, he thinks that “…the primary function of emotion is to mobilize the organism to 
deal quickly with important interpersonal encounters, prepared to do so by what types of 
activity have been adaptive in the past.” (Ekman 1999) The anchoring of basic emotions 
to facial expressions is one of the reasons to think they have a central signaling function. 
Basic emotions aid in the avoidance of poisons, parasites and predators and help to deal 
with gains, losses and resource competition, and for groups of organisms (whether 
closely related or highly interdependent) to effectively deal with each of these tasks, 
                                                                                                                                            
behaviors. Anger would almost never be accompanied by behaviors like flight, denial, and appeasement if 
it included a biological predisposition toward aggression or retaliation.  
I suspect that Ekman is assuming here that it is anger, rather than some other psychological entity, that 
automatically calls forth many of the seemingly incompatible coping behaviors. This assumption is entirely 
unwarranted, and there is some support for the opposite assumption. For instance, there is some evidence 
that anger regulation can occur automatically (Mauss, Cook, and Gross 2007; see also Smits and Kuppens 
2005). If this is right, then the fact that behaviors like flight, denial and appeasement can occur subsequent 
to anger is consistent with the claim that anger includes an opposing action-tendency toward, say, 
confrontation. Given the existence of automatic emotion regulation, one cannot infer the non-existence of 
action-tendencies from the fact that they are not consistently manifested in behavior after an emotion has 
been elicited. 
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signals are critical. A look of disgust can warn others that food is contaminated; an alarm 
call can alert others to a predator nearby; and a threat display can signal a willingness to 
escalate a competitive encounter (J Archer and Huntingford 1994). In effect, humans 
and other animals avoid poisons, parasites and predators together, and they negotiate 
resource competition primarily with other members of their species (Dawkins 2006, 
chap. 5).  
If this is right, it makes sense that basic emotions are innate or at least develop 
with a high degree of regularity across a wide range of environmental conditions. 
Consider Ernst Mayr's view: “Since much of the behavior directed toward other 
conspecific individuals consists of formal signals and of appropriate responses to signals, 
and since there is a high selective premium for these signals to be unmistakable, the 
essential components of the phenotype of such signals must show low variability and 
must be largely controlled genetically.” (Mayr 1974, 657) Signaling phenomena of this 
kind will thus tend to be structured by selection processes and strongly influenced by 
inheritance rather than by internal motivational and informational states of animals. 
Thus, if basic emotions are postulated as proximate explanations for signals of this kind, 
this may be another source of hesitation to extend their explanatory role beyond innate 
behavioral dispositions. 
Nevertheless, the flexibility of a resident rat’s behavior overturns this theoretical 
rational as well. Just as with signaling phenomena, we have good reason to believe that 
parts of this behavior program are innate or highly constrained by genetics (cf. section 
2.2). Nevertheless, this clearly does not warrant the conclusion that the program will 
only produce genetically constrained behaviors. It is highly unlikely that the resident 
rat’s digging underneath the intruder and biting at the intruder’s bonds are genetically 
constrained in any interesting sense. Rather, this example suggests that evolutionary 
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forces can structure one or more aspects of the action (e.g. the goal of back biting plus 
some of the means for achieving it) while leaving room for improvisation. 
Another emotion theorist, Paul Griffiths gives similar theoretical reasons to think 
that the behavioral influence of basic emotions is limited to stereotyped behaviors. 
Griffiths argues that basic emotions cannot, without significant revision, replace folk 
concepts of emotion. This argument depends critically on the theoretical role of basic 
emotions: “The identification of emotion in general with [basic emotions] would exclude 
a lot of what is currently regarded as emotion from the revised category… it would be 
argued that [many of the psychological states referred to by folk emotion concepts] are 
too flexible, too well integrated with long-term, planned action, and so forth. The 
extension of the emotion concept would be restricted to short-term, stereotyped 
responses…” (P. E. Griffiths 1997, 1997:241 emphasis mine)18 On this view, anything 
answering to the term “anger” that is integrated with long term planned action is 
unlikely to be the same kind of psychological state as basic human anger. Griffiths 
compares this reasoning to Ekman’s (1985) argument that the startle response is not an 
basic emotion. While it does have a characteristic facial expression, Ekman thinks the 
startle response is too reflexive and too difficult to suppress to count as a basic emotion. 
Likewise, Griffiths thinks that some folk emotion concepts should be excluded from the 
category because they refer to psychological states that are too flexible. Thus, Griffiths 
seems to think that the explanatory role of basic emotions should be secluded to highly 
stereotyped behaviors. 
 But how flexible is too flexible on Griffith's account? Griffiths argues that basic 
emotions are inflexible in the sense that they lack integration with certain cognitive 
processes. These are “…the processes in which people use the information of the sort 
                                               
18 I think it remains plausible even in light of the conclusions of this essay that affect program states would 
exclude a lot of vernacular emotions. There are plenty of emotional states that are not shared across 
cultures and are not plausible influenced by the phylogenetic information encoded in affect programs. 
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they verbally assent to (traditional beliefs) and the goals they can be brought to recognize 
(traditional desires) to guide relatively long-term action and to solve theoretical 
problems.” (P. E. Griffiths 1997) Griffiths thinks that the involvement of basic emotions 
with these processes is limited in several different ways (P. E. Griffiths 1997, 1997:100). 
Basic emotions unfold automatically and involuntarily without requiring elicitation or 
guidance from higher cognitive processes. They are opaque to cognitive processes: 
“People are aware of [basic emotion] outputs, which are the emotional responses 
themselves, but not aware of the processes that lead to them…” Finally, they are 
informationally encapsulated:  
[They] cannot access all the information stored in other cognitive systems, and [they] 
can store information that contradicts that other information. Conscious beliefs 
concerning, for example, the harmlessness of earthworms do not get taken into 
account when the system is deciding upon a response. (P. E. Griffiths 1997, 1997:93)  
In other words, basic emotions are not holistically integrated with the conscious beliefs 
and intentions that guide much of human action. In the end, Griffiths comes short of 
denying that emotional behaviors lack holistic integration with any of the 
representational states of an organism. Nevertheless, he only considers two possible 
influences that emotions might have on behavior. One is that they trigger stereotyped 
behaviors, and the other is that they are integrated with beliefs and desires and so also 
with long term planning. This omits the possibility that emotions are highly integrated 
with representational states of organism aside from conscious beliefs and desires and 
the possibility that they might do this while also causing stereotyped behaviors.19  
Moreover, emotions may cause action in both human and nonhuman animals in 
just this way. The plasticity and exchangeability of the resident rat’s back biting attack 
                                               
19 Though his recent work (P. E. Griffiths and Scarantino 2004; P. E. Griffiths 2010) comes closer to 
admitting this kind of possibility. 
 164 
could be produced by something far less cognitively complex than the desires and beliefs 
that seem to guide long term planning in humans (perhaps an urge to bite the back 
coupled with a representation of a “digging-for-biting” affordance). Similarly, when I 
kick my car door in anger, the action seems to be produced by informational and 
motivational states less complex than conscious desires and beliefs (cf. Ginet 1990). In 
my experience, such actions occur without any forethought or planning, and it is difficult 
to think of any conscious belief or desire that I had prior to acting or that I would report 
to explain my action. What desire or intention would plausibly cause me to kick the 
door? It is not likely that I want the door be kicked or harmed, and it is difficult to think 
of a desire that fits the bill. Perhaps I just wanted to express my anger, but I cannot recall 
ever experiencing a conscious desire of this kind. 
On the other hand, if the anger of a resident rat motivates purposive behavior 
because it is sufficiently integrated with its beliefs and desires, then the role of beliefs 
would not be restricted to long term planning and the requirements for integration 
would seem to be minimal. We could easily assume that human anger is just as 
integrated with beliefs and desires.20 Either way, the lack of integration with beliefs, 
desires and long term planning processes does not give us any strong reason to doubt 
that basic emotions motivate action. Either anger in rats motivates action without being 
so integrated, or, if anger in rats motivates action because it is integrated with beliefs 
and desires, then there is little reason to doubt that humans share the requisite 
integration for anger to motivate action. In sum, these theoretical considerations seem 
frail when juxtaposed with the demonstrable flexibility of animal emotions. 
4. Conclusion 
                                               
20 Notice that this would require modification of Griffith's view that beliefs and desires are reportable or 
consciously accessible. 
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 Moreover, some of the evidence surrounding human aggression seems to provide 
some evidence favoring a shared anger motivation in humans. Not only is there strong 
evidence that both anger and physical aggression appear very early in human 
development (Côté et al. 2006), there is some evidence that flexible aggression in young 
children is coordinated with the other components of the anger response. Hubbard et al 
(2010) report that in a pilot study angry facial expressions became synchronized with 
skin conductance responses prior to acts of reactive aggression (disfiguring a virtual 
interactor’s artwork after receiving criticism) in young children but not prior to acts of 
proactive aggression (disfiguring artwork when a reward could be obtained). 21 The kind 
of aggression that follows these expressions is not inflexible or stereotyped, rather it 
requires integration with knowledge of how another child would respond to having their 
artwork disfigured.   
 Of course, a key contrast between human aggression and rodent aggression is 
that anger in rats has the fixed aim of biting the back (though see Carrier and Morgan 
2014 for some evidence that the face has been a primary target of hominin aggression). 
While disfiguring another child's artwork might qualify as back-biting in a metaphorical 
sense, it is not easy to imagine that it is motivated by the same kind of state that 
motivates rats to engage in literal back-biting. Moreover, it is possible that over the long 
course of evolution from our common ancestors with rats until today, the influence of 
shared anger on instrumental behavior was simply bred out of our ancestors, and that 
the impulse toward reactive aggression is acquired developmentally.  
 Nevertheless, a theoretical case can be made that rather than disappearing, 
shared anger became more flexible in the evolution of the primate and then hominin 
                                               
21 In general, anger is closely associated with the reactive subtype of aggression but not the proactive, 
predatory, and instrumental subtypes of aggression (with which reactive aggression is usually contrasted, 
see Vitiello and Stoff 1997 for a review). For instance, proactive and predatory forms of aggression (even 
in other species) need not involve anger and are often unaccompanied by the distinctive physiology of 
anger. 
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lineages. In ethological comparisons of rats and macaques, there is already a notable 
change in the dynamics of aggressive interactions between dominant and subordinate 
macaques (D. B. Adams 1981b; D. B. Adams and Schoel 1982). While back-biting is 
preserved, there are no fixed strategies for offense or defense in the macaque. This may 
reflect increasing degrees of freedom for aggressive interaction, degrees of freedom that 
only increase as social cognition becomes more complex.  
 Here is the trend as I understand it. In tandem with increasing social complexity, 
resource competition becomes increasingly abstract. Position in a social dominance 
hierarchy becomes the main determinant of reproductive success, so defending a 
position in a hierarchy takes the place of defending a physical territory. Even in rats, 
when population density increases, the mating system shifts from polygynous (where the 
alpha rat monopolizes estrus females) to polygynandrous (where males copulate 
sequentially with estrus females). Since dominant rats in the latter mating system have 
reproductive priority and probably greater success, defending a position of dominance 
from cohabiting (and potentially rivalrous) males becomes as important for reproductive 
success as defending the colony from unfamiliar males.22 Accordingly, the dominant rat 
in a colony (with a mix of male and female rats) reinforces dominance by the same 
patterns of confrontational aggression exhibited by resident rats in experimental settings.  
 Nevertheless, as social cognition increases in complexity by comparison, a broad 
range of possibilities arise for defending position in a dominance hierarchy with minimal 
energy expenditure and minimal risk of injury. Instead of repeatedly biting the back of a 
subordinate conspecific, organisms can respond to challenges and reinforce dominance 
with a threatening facial expression or by physically displacing a subordinate with 
impunity. In humans, the abilities to wield symbols and language make it possible to 
                                               
22Though there is rarely anything resembling an orded hierarchy except that one male, the alpha, initiates 
and wins most fights. 
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“put someone in their place” with symbolic or verbal barbs and blows. Certainly, there is 
the possibility of physical escalation, but it is advantageous even for an unassailable 
individual to waste as little energy as possible “putting someone in their place”. The 
increase in available options for defending social dominance and its extensions (perhaps 
deference or respect) suggests that the motivational aim of anger would gradually 
become more diffuse, while still having a kind of central direction. This is roughly the 
path by which a motivation with a fixed aim could gradually come to resemble a 
vengeance motive. 
 In this chapter, I began by articulating a paradox. It is implausible to claim that a 
shared emotion like anger is continuous between humans and other animals and that it 
it motivates purposive behavior in humans but only nonpurposive behavior in animals. 
After clarifying some central terms in the paradox, I argued that we should reject the 
claim that shared emotions only cause nonpurposive behavior in animals. Finally, I drew 
out some substantive implications of this argument for emotion theory. I have concluded 
by gesturing at why we could expect the motivational aim of a shared emotion to become 
more diffuse over the course of human evolution rather than simply disappearing. 
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Conclusion 
 
I believe very strongly…that no one could ever deserve to suffer. Of the people in 
whose moral judgment I have the most confidence, some disagree. When some 
wrong-doers suffer, these people believe, this suffering is in itself good, or at least not 
in itself bad. Though this belief seems to me mistaken, I would be greatly relieved if I 
could explain why these people are making this mistake. This may be one of the cases 
in which an evolutionary explanation helps to undermine what it explains. This 
retributive belief may seem to justify certain natural reactive attitudes, such as an 
angry desire to hurt or the withdrawal of good will. These attitudes are like some 
simpler emotions that are had by the animals that are most like us. If evolution can 
explain why many people have these reactive attitudes, that might give some 
support to the view that these attitudes, and the widely held belief that such 
attitudes are justified, are not responses to reasons. 
 -Derek Parfit (2011), p.429, emphasis mine 
 
 About halfway through this dissertation, I came across this piece of text. It has 
slowly dawned on me that this dissertation is, in some sense, a footnote to what Parfit 
says there. My main aim was to demonstrate that human anger is importantly connected 
to a psychological category in non-human animals, and that it is connected in such a way 
as to draw retributive motives under the same explanatory umbrella as some motives of 
non-human animals. Once we understand the structure of their shared explanation – 
that these motives were shaped by natural selection (and here we can add, maintained) 
for their biological consequences – we see that they cannot be good indicators of non-
derivative reasons for punishment, such as the belief that the suffering of wrong-doers is 
deserved. Here, I will briefly sketch this argument once again in a revised form and point 
out along the way some of the work that remains to be done.  
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Consider again principle R: The value (or justification) of an act of punishment is 
not (or not only) derived from the consequences of punishment.1  While I never gave an 
explicit argument, it should be clear why retributive motives incline us to believe R. 
Retributive motives cause people to find punishment fitting (in some sense) as a 
response to past wrongdoing. This explains why retributive motives make people willing 
to act and judge in favor of punishment (or to punish in a certain way or with a certain 
severity) when it will obtain no future benefit (or less future benefit than an alternative 
punishment). Moreover, if one endorses this kind of judgment across many individual 
cases, then this kind of tendency will seem to provide support to the more general 
principle, R. 
So what does the evolutionary explanation look like for these inclinations? In 
chapter 2, I argued that some retributive motives are best explained by the evolutionary 
forces captured in the war of attrition model. For my purposes here, this means that 
these motives were selected for their role in preventing mutant strategies from invading 
the population. More specifically, I tried to show that an aggression system in rats was 
shaped by these evolutionary forces. In chapter 3, I then argued that human anger 
derives from a common ancestral trait with this aggression system. Given their 
connection with anger (since anger derives from a common ancestral trait), it looks 
plausible that retributive motives in humans and rats may have a common evolutionary 
explanation.  
However, the question remains whether the retributive motive was maintained in 
the human lineage. Chapter 4 was meant to address some of the reasons that one might 
deny that the retributive motives of rats and those of human beings have evolutionary 
continuity. If the argument there is correct, then retributive motives in rats cause 
                                               
1 This principle is closely related to what Parfit says above, because the truth of a principle like R is often 
supposed to be made true by the fact that suffering can be deserved by trangressors and that the aim of 
punishment is to give transgressors their deserved suffering. 
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purposive behavior just as they do in human beings. Together with the fact that anger 
exists in both humans and rats and is connected with retributive motives in both, this 
gives us some reason to believe that these retributive motives have a common 
evolutionary explanation (for their existence in our common ancestor if not for their 
maintenance to the present). 
 If the arguments of chapter 1 are right, these motives cannot be good indicators 
of non-derivative value, because they were shaped by natural selection to bring about 
certain biological consequences. So retributive motives do not really provide evidential 
support for R. Nevertheless, there are two small wrinkles here that need to be smoothed 
out. First, principle R concerns both personal and impartial punishment, whereas the 
explanation of retributive motives that I give in chapter 2 (which is supposed to replace 
the preliminary explanation given in chapter 1), concerns only personal punishment. 
While there is some reason to believe that both personal and impartial punishment are 
influenced by some of the same underlying causes (as I argue in the introduction), it 
remains to be seen exactly what these underlying causes are. My hypothesis was that the 
repeated manifestation of retributive motives in cases of personal punishment lead to the 
development of a response-dependent category, the outrageous, that sustains impartial 
punishment judgments and behaviors. If this is correct, then we can explain impartial 
punishment inclinations (as well as their support for principle R) by appeal to the 
evolution of retributive motives in personal punishment. Thus, we have an evolutionary 
explanation of the broader set of inclinations (including inclinations to punish in the 
personal and impartial case).  
Second, as it stands, I cannot entirely exclude the possibility that though 
retributive motives were selected for their consequences they were somehow exapted by 
cognitive processes of reasoning and reflection and given an epistemically virtuous 
connection to non-derivative sources of value they seem to indicate. Though such an 
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argument remains possible, I am completely unsure of how such an argument would go. 
It seems to me that the burden of proof is on the supporters of principles like R. 
Nevertheless, one way to mitigate this concern would be to give a more detailed 
evolutionary explanation of retributive motives in humans that fleshes out their more 
recent history. Some of these details involve the evolution of these motives in our 
common ancestors with primates, and that story was sketched briefly (though not 
supported by evidence) in chapter 4. Other details involve their evolution in the hominin 
lineage. If, as some have argued (e.g. S. Bowles and Gintis 2011), retributive motives 
were selected for their role in sustaining cooperation in large, human cultural groups, 
then we have some reason to believe that they were preserved to the present primarily 
because of that adaptive function. This is an area on which further work needs to be done. 
If I draw on a promissory note on this last point, the overarching evolutionary 
story looks like the following. Retributive motives took shape through natural selection 
for their role in preventing the invasion of mutant strategies for resource competition. 
They were shaped for a subsequent role in preserving position in a dominance hierarchy 
(as suggested at the end of chapter 3). Finally, they were exapted for their role in 
stabilizing cooperation in large cultural groups. If this is their evolutionary history and if 
they are responsible for judgments and inclinations that support R, then we have good 
reason to doubt the evidential role of those inclinations. They are not good indicators 
that punishment has non-derivative value. 
If this is right, then it may have large scale implications for western legal theory. 
If for instance, retributive punishment as instituted in the United States does not have 
good consequences overall, then we have added reason to rethink institutions of 
punishment.  
It may also provide fuel for the fire of peace and reconciliation movements. At 
first glance (and perhaps due to our retributive inclinations), it is shocking that there 
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were no charges of crimes against humanity in the transition from Apartheid in South 
Africa. Nevertheless, part of the success of the peace and reconciliation movement there 
was due to the fact that parties to reconciliation did not seek retribution for past crimes. 
The debunking argument I pursue here can add some moral legitimacy for abstaining 
from retribution, because it can help us to see that retributive motives do not always 
have moral worth. While retributive motives function to deter, they can also cause 
reverberating waves of violence or resentment as the force of these motives are felt in 
response to each prior act of retribution or retaliation. In such cases, they may retain a 
deterrent function (say as an evolutionarily stable strategy that prevents the invasion of 
other strategies), but I doubt that they have any morally valuable consequences. If we 
can begin to see the difference, there may be greater hope for peace and reconciliation.
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